

EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

WHY NOT TRY?

MOSCOW WOOING WITH TITOIST SLOGANS

DOSTOYEVSKI PARDONED

DEMOCRACY IN THE BALKANS

BAIT FOR RUMANIAN EXILES

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Why not try?

(V. S.) The "Declaration of Washington" signed by President Eisenhower and British Premier Sir Anthony Eden on February 1, has had a varied reception. Soviet quarters reacted to it—as would be expected—with jeers and sneers. Even in the free world there were those, individuals and organs of the Press alike, who discreetly deprecated the Declaration by whispering that it was but a collection of pious platitudes. Yet the fact remains that, despite its emphasis on the quest for world peace and peaceful methods, the Declaration stands out miles above all other manifestations issued from the free world by the clarity with which it sets out *the philosophical foundations of Western policies and the acceptance by the West of the deadly challenge of Communism*. Only the Fulton speech could be compared with it in those respects; but, then, in 1946, Winston Churchill spoke as a private individual, at the best in his capacity of Leader of His Britannic Majesty's opposition, not as the responsible head of a major allied Government.

Much as it is to be deplored that those actuated by an excess of 'little faith' should try to detract from the significance of the Declaration of Washington, their gibes cannot dim the light that shines forth from these simple yet forceful words, intelligible to all men of good will and unbiased mind:

"We are conscious that in this year of 1956, there still rages that age-old struggle between those who believe that man has his origin and his destiny in God and those who treat man as if he were designed merely to serve a state machine."

The authors of the Declaration of Washington leave no doubt as to the utter rejection on their part, as well as on that of all free nations, of the philosophy of the debasement of man as mere fuel for the high-powered engine of the all-devouring State; nor do they make any bones about regarding world communism as the sole exponent of that despicable philosophy today. That is why they did not hesitate to denounce the Soviet Union for having "forcibly incorporated millions of people of different blood, religions and traditions". With equal clarity, the signatories to the Declaration of Washington register their disapproving awareness that "many millions more have in fact, although not always in form, been absorbed into the Soviet Communist block." Specific mention is made in Europe alone of *some 100 million people, in what were once 10 independent nations, who "are compelled, against their will, to work for the glorification and aggrandisement of the Soviet Communist State."*

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No less explicit is the Declaration of Washington as regards the danger inherent in the resolve of the Communist leaders "to extend the practice of Communism by every possible means, until it encompasses the world." And, in respect of the western world still free, it significantly adds the warning: "It would be illusory to hope that in their foreign policies, political and economic, the Soviet rulers would reflect a concern for the rights of other peoples which they do not show toward the men and women they already rule." It was in the unequivocally avowed knowledge of this perilous position that the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland solemnly declared on February 1, 1956:

"We shall help ourselves and others to peace, freedom and social progress, maintaining human rights where they are already secure, defending them when they are in peril and peacefully restoring them where they have temporarily been lost."

As to a political Review, trying in a modest measure to represent the interests, anxieties and hopes of those "some 100 million" East Europeans "in what were once 10 independent nations", to us the last eight words of the paragraph quoted above are, of course, of the greatest significance. They specifically connect the so-called captive nations of Europe with the Anglo-American pledge to restore lost liberties and leave no room for doubt as to the earnestness with which the present heads of the U. S. and British Governments mean to redeem that pledge.

Indeed, the Declaration of Washington represents a great advance on earlier Western declarations relating to the communist enslavement of the Central and East European nations. Rightly wrote the NEW YORK TIMES editorially on January 11, 1956, that "*heretofore emphasis has been (only) on nonrecognition of Soviet conquests and rejection of any deal with the Soviets...*" Such was indeed the purport of the penultimate joint declaration issued by the Anglo-American Governments in relation to the captive nations, known also as the Potomac Charter, in which the United Kingdom and the United States merely promised that "as regards formerly sovereign States now in bondage, we will not be party to any arrangement or treaty which would confirm or prolong their unwilling subordination."

That emphasis began to shift from the negative to the positive aspect of the East European nations' right to independence and self-determination, continues the NEW YORK TIMES editorial quoted above, when in reply to Soviet comment on President Eisenhower's Christmas Message to the captive nations a White House statement approved by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles categorically declared that the peaceful liberation of the captive peoples

"has been, is and, until success is achieved, will continue to be a major goal of American foreign policy."

It is by no means one of the minor features of the Declaration of Washington that in it the United States' senior ally, the United Kingdom, has now joined that pledge.

If it were true, as has been reported from some quarters, that a British Foreign Office official should have commented on the Washington Declaration by describing it as "a simple reminder for simple-minded people", that may

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be an utterance much to be deplored. It cannot alter the fact that once Great Britain, most perilously exposed in case of war as the greatest single "aircraft carrier" of the Western Alliance and laboriously struggling to preserve the tenuous links of her Commonwealth and Empire, has decided to associate herself with the United States in the solemn obligation of restoring freedom where it has temporarily been lost, she meant much more than throw a sop to simpletons.

Moreover, we are in a position to confirm the information published by TIME magazine in its issue of February 13, 1956, according to which the idea of the Washington Declaration had been Sir Anthony Eden's; he had brought the basic draft with him, and the final document had to be credited much more to him than to any U. S. source. In this sense TIME was laudably correct in declaring editorially "the U. S. is honored to be the signatory of a document, *drafted by an ally*, that expresses the U. S. attitude toward the moral issue raised by Communism perhaps more clearly and forcefully than any American ever expressed it."

*

When confronted with so much commendable resolve on the part of the two most powerful nations in the Atlantic Alliance to restore the liberties of those who have been temporarily deprived of them, there remains only one, albeit important, question to be asked. *How do they propose to go about it?*

In all humility, let us offer a few suggestions.

First and foremost, do not let the Western allies believe it for a moment that they can afford much longer to prevaricate on this problem. Saying, as President Eisenhower said in his last State of the Union message to Congress that "we shall keep the injustice done to the captive nations in the forefront of human consciousness and seek to maintain the pressure of world opinion to right the wrong" just will not do.

Obviously the Western allies are most anxious to prevent millions of Africans and Asians from falling a prey to the embrace of Communism through self-deception, lassitude or fear. Witness the Bandoeng Conference of last April; some, if not all, of those nations are keenly watching the fate of the captive nations of Eastern Europe. How long do the Western great powers expect to keep their 'face' and credit with those Asians and Africans if the latter are allowed to see that the West is leaving in the lurch indefinitely 10 once independent nations of Europe? Can any one in Washington or London sincerely and, what's more, realistically, believe that there may be found the required amount of self-sacrificing resolve and steadfastness in resisting communist pressures, say, within the framework of SEATO, if the peoples of South-East Asia are offered no more encouraging a sight to behold than the sorry spectacle of the Soviet block continuing to chew up and devour unhindered those captive European nations whose loss of liberty is mainly to be attributed to the Western powers' credulity and weakness at the close of World War II?

This is but one of the very real and practical disadvantages of paying lip-service only to the moral principle of liberation. Many more could be listed. What about the moral fibre, the will to resist communist encroachment of the Western peoples themselves? Can any one in his right mind believe that these may be maintained purely by raising the standards of living? In a state of

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permanent deadly peril, high standards of living act as a soporific; they blunt the peoples' awareness of danger. And the Western democratic governments who, happily, depend for their policies on the support of their voters, are running a grave risk of losing that support if they propose to closet the moral issues of anti-communism in a remote shrine. Reducing the Western masses' sense of urgency about the liberation of their brethren in Eastern Europe—the Soviet Zone of Germany included—inevitably spells the diminution of their sense of alertness in the face of an ever-threatening communist onslaught. Such military imponderables as might herald the danger of an impending Soviet attack are known to and can be judged only by a small esoteric circle of expert soldiers, scientists and government servants. The masses need be told plainly that so long as their kith and kin are left in bondage there can be no minimum of safety for them. And, conversely, once Eastern Europe is back again in the comity of free, civilised nations the security of the free world as a whole will have been considerably strengthened.

Obviously we are not competent to offer advice to the chancelleries of the Western big powers as to how the cause of liberation is to be pressed; nor would it be practical to make suggestions publicly on matters of detail. Perhaps it may be sufficient for us to propose that rather than give vent to the rightful aspirations of the captive nations at public conferences, and be brazenly charged by the Soviet leaders with "intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign countries", the Western powers should seek to make the real and effective withdrawal of communism from the East European countries a *quid pro quo* in return for such concessions as the West can afford to offer to the Soviet block. Why not try, for once, real negotiations through diplomatic channels.

In that connection it would be a great pity, indeed, to draw the wrong conclusions from the truly startling phenomena that emerged at the recent 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The act of dethroning Stalin *ex post morte* by his former most faithful collaborators must not be taken as the soothing symptom of a Soviet change of heart. It should be recognized for what it is—a *sign of internal weakness and, at the same time, a desperate attempt at persevering in the pursuit of communist world domination by radically amended methods.*

If it be true, as has now been asserted in varying keys by comrades Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov, that the cult of personality and Stalin's single-handed dictatorship had been the source of some of the greatest errors in the conduct of Soviet internal and external policies for the past three decades; if it be true that scores of the most deserving revolutionaries and Soviet patriots had wrongly been branded traitors and shamelessly destroyed by Stalin's tyranny—what conclusions are to be drawn as regards the East European peoples who were enslaved ten years ago at the command and in concession to the self-same Stalin? If Stalin is no longer the "leader of all progressive forces in the world", "the teacher of all nations", "the fountain-head of wisdom", but rather the reverse, then he is obviously not the "liberator of the East European peoples" either.

If Stalin is now branded so a pernicious tyrant in Russia that his evil works must be undone, let them be undone in Eastern Europe, too!

Moscow Fair

The 20 th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party provided Mr. Khrushchev with a welcome opportunity to step into the limelight once more and offer the world the spectacle of a number of conjurer's tricks and gimcrack. Never before have his goods and services been so largely been destined for export; they were meant in the first place to ensnare the politicians and the broad masses of the free world.

And indeed the First Secretary had a lot to offer, for last year he had purchased considerable stocks both in Geneva and on his extensive tour through Asia. Khrushchev displayed his wares enticingly labelled and apparently above all competition—among other items such as “respect for coexistence”, “improved relations with the western powers”, “prevention of war”, the latter at the cost of hypocritically denying an important tenet of Marxist-Leninist doctrine bearing on the inevitability of an armed show-down to break “capitalist encirclement”.

At the same time, Mr. Khrushchev also held up to public view “the invincibility of the Socialist camp”, “the superiority of the Socialist economic system”, “the further tightening of relations with the people's democracies and the countries of South-East Asia”, “the unavoidable disintegration of the capitalist world” and “revolution by Parliamentary methods” in all countries enjoying representative government. Finally, he promoted for sale slogans about “the unfaltering increase in military potential” and “the maintenance of permanent military superiority in relation to the free world” in the service of “preserving peace to the bitter end”.

There should by now be enough people in the West so hurtlingly bitten once that they will be twice shy to allow themselves being allured by the tunes of the pied piper of Moscow. Soviet practices as performed before a world audience since the end of the late war are instructive enough to decipher the big Soviet chief's new signal code. As regards countries such as France and Italy, singled out by Mr. Khrushchev as ideally suited for “revolution by Parliamentary methods”, they should have already satisfied their requirements in goods imported from Moscow until further notice. And since experience has taught us that the communist fifth columns just cannot keep quiet for the duration and are rather prone to practise “Parliamentary methods” according to their own peculiar rules of conduct—witness the recent political history of Czecho-Slovakia and other “people's democracies”—we may be pretty certain that even those western nations that have been weeded over with communist growths will through a natural process eliminate from their systems the Muscovite poison at the very first attempt by the communists to apply such “Parliamentary” methods for the advancement of their creed.

What is the real meaning of Mr. Khrushchev's latest display of showmanship? Obviously, the “respect of coexistence” is merely another phrase for the recognition of Soviet conquests and the final abandonment of all the

enslaved peoples while Moscow is given a free hand bring to heel gradually the entire free world either by peripheral wars, such as were those in Korea and Viet Nam, or through "Parliamentary revolutions", as witnessed in Prague. "The prevention of war" at all costs has as its objective the securing of the integrity of the communist empire as it now stands based on brutal force as well as safeguarding its undisturbed further expansion. The much-vaunted "invincibility" of the communist bloc of powers and its economic superiority, coupled with the threat of a war potential impossible to catch up with, shall paralyze into resignation the free world like a frightened rabbit under the spell of the snake's hypnotic stare. Finally the "further tightening" of relations with the satellite people's democracies and the countries of South-East Asia is evidently intended to incorporate the former in the Soviet Union while reducing the latter to the status of satellites for a beginning.

On the whole Moscow seems to base its calculations on the naivety of the free western world and its apparent inability to learn from the past. What is needed to counter these communist maneuvers can be told in very few words. If Mr. Khrushchev now claims that the United States has already passed the zenith of its post-war prosperity, the West should retort that, for its part, it has also long passed the zenith of its credulity and trusting faith in Soviet methods of stultification and enticement. Such should, at any rate, be the appropriate reply to Mr. Khrushchev's latest conjurer's tricks performed at the Moscow Fair—a reply to be given in deeds as well as in words.

Moscow Wooing with Titoist Slogans

Soviet Communist party chief Nikita Khrushchev told the 20th Party Congress in Moscow that "cooperation with sections of the Socialist movement adhering to other views than ours on the question of the transition to Socialism is possible and necessary". He also said that by aligning left-wing movements the "working class" had the possibility of inflicting a defeat on the reactionary anti-popular forces and of gaining a firm majority in Parliament, and of converting it from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an instrument of "genuinely popular will".

Of course, Khrushchev did not mention the basic and well-known aim of this maneuver. The Second Congress of the Communist International put it this way: "The Communist party enters such institutions not in order to do constructive work but in order to direct the masses to *destroy from within* the whole bourgeois state machine and Parliament itself." And Lenin said: "No Parliament can in any circumstances be for Communists an arena of struggle for reforms. The only question can be that of utilizing bourgeois institutions for their destruction." The Communist mechanism of penetration into a country's legitimate governmental structure and the fragmentation and absorption of non-Communist parties is evident in the recent histories of Eastern European nations.

This must be kept in view when discussing Khrushchev's bid for "cooperation with sections of the Socialist movement adhering to other views than ours". The 20th Congress' proclamations confirmed, in reality, the objectives

of the new Moscow tactics, the setting up of "popular fronts" throughout Europe. Whether we wish to call them "popular fronts", "fronts of united action", "rank-and-file fronts" or, as *Izvestia* of January 8 suggests in commenting on the French elections, the "national front", it all boils down to one thing—the recurring *spirit of Prague*, the totalitarian conquest of power through the tactics of collaboration and the policy of the offering hand. Did not the Bolshevik bigwigs in Moscow quote the Prague coup d'état of February, 1948, as an example of using "Parliamentary methods" in achieving Communist aims in a bloodless way?

It must not be forgotten that the Moscow tactics of wooing western socialist parties was specially accentuated after the famous Khrushchev-Tito meeting in Belgrade, in May, 1955. One month after this sensational meeting had taken place, an important article appeared in the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee's organ *Komunist* under the title "Forms of Cooperation Between Socialist Forces". The article was written by one of the Yugoslav Communist Party's theoreticians, Veljko Vlahović, President of the Commission for International Relations of the SAWPY (Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia).

In his article (to which at that time no special importance was attributed) Vlahović called western socialists to unite with the Communists in "fighting bourgeois influences" in the world. He lashed out at "contemporary forms" of organization within the social-democratic camp as well those in the Soviet-dominated bloc of countries and said verbatim:

"Attempts at reviving the Second International, and attempts at reviving the Comintern through the Cominform, have shown all the illogicality and impossibility of resuscitating old forms in present conditions. Once again we have confirmation of the truth that the contemporary situation cannot be viewed through old spectacles... The present situation requests forms of cooperation suited to it... *The ground must, first of all, be cleared for the strengthening of all positive elements in the cooperation of socialists now appearing on the horizon. And this means renouncing every attempt at prolonging the life of these organizations by injections...* The clearing of the ground, however, must clash inevitably with dogmatism, petrified forms, prejudices and faulty theoretical attitudes, and results of hitherto perverted practice... But the needs of the contemporary situation impose this cooperation (i. e. between the communists and social-democrats) and future development will compel even those who artificially try to avoid this cooperation, gradually to alter their present attitude... (This cooperation) can be introduced only on the basis of Marxism-Leninism; namely through the application of Marxist methods in the analysis of the contemporary processes of socialist development... Future cooperation of socialist forces will move towards the most comprehensive and broadest association of *all* organizations, parties and movements fighting for socialism. Thus, we shall gradually reach the situation conceived by Engels at the time the First International was created 'When the international association will include socialists of *all* shades of socialist conviction'..."

On January 30, 1956, preliminary talks were held by the Bureau of the Socialist International in London and a full-length discussion will take place at the meeting of the Council of the International in Zurich in March. "The

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reason for this renewed interest in the subject is the approaches which have come from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia", said the London *Times* of January 30. The Russians, after Khrushchev's meeting with Tito in Belgrade, were at pains to prove that they were also accepting "Parliamentary methods" in struggling for socialist aims. They *completely adopted* the attitude of Tito's deputy, the Yugoslav Vice-President, Kardelj, who, in a lecture to the Norwegian Labour Party in Oslo, in 1954, said that there was no doubt that "for a whole series of countries the *evolutionary* process towards Socialism *through the classical European bourgeois democracy was not only practicable but was already happening.*" Kardelj further said that the categorical imperative for international socialism today was to find the way to its internal unity; not uniformity of the Cominform type but in the sense of constructive democratic cooperation capable of coordinating the international socialist trends on a general line of progress towards Socialism.

According to the London *Times* some West European socialists would like to see a state of peaceful co-existence between parties of East and West, but *conditions would have to be made.* First of all, those socialist leaders still in prison in Communist countries would have to be set free. Above all, the Russians would have to make it clear that they repented of their errors and were prepared to act on Stalin's dictum that there were two roads to socialism. The *Times* concludes: "European socialist parties are influenced in their attitude by the fact that they may become the governments in their countries, and in that capacity cannot refuse to have dealings with Communist governments."

The 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow has met some of these socialist conditions. Titoist tactics appeared to them to be much more effective than those of Stalin. This is the reason why they buried Stalin once again, hoping to win new legions of fellow-travellers within the social-democratic parties; in any case, at least to split them on the question whether or not one should cooperate with the Soviet Union under the "changed circumstances".

R. P.

For the Record

For some time past the fact has been known that there is a movement afoot in Great Britain aiming at holding a public meeting of protest against the official reception in that country of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev. Its origins were revealed in a letter written to the editor of the London *TIMES* by that famous figure in contemporary British journalism, Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge, Editor of *PUNCH*. As Mr. Muggeridge makes it clear, the project originated in an informal talk between himself and a number of friends, fellow-countrymen and East European exiles alike, and among the British there were again Roman Catholics as well as Protestants, Conservatives as well as Labourites, not excluding men of no party. "It would, we thought, be a great pity", Mr. Muggeridge wrote, "if the world was given to understand that in this country opinion was unanimously behind the present Government's

decision to invite and entertain Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Krushchev, when, in fact, quite a strong contrary feeling existed." Mr. Muggerridge wished it to be emphasized especially that the initiative had come from the British, not the exile side, and in so doing displayed both acumen and a strong sense of fairness. For, wrote he, "naturally, exiles, who are personal sufferers from Soviet oppression, and Christians who know what their co-religionists have had to endure under Marxist rule, feel particularly strongly, but so, I am convinced, do quite a number of ordinary workaday citizens, who just wonder what is to be gained by seeming to welcome two individuals, intolerant of freedom at home, convinced that it is their destiny to destroy our way of life, and lately returned from a tour of India and Burma characterized by abuse of and untruths about our country."

Nor have the exiles domiciled in Britain, "personal sufferers from Soviet oppression", taken lying down the prospect of a festive reception being prepared for the Muscovite butchers in their adoptive country. The London Committee of Free Representatives of Central and Eastern European Countries have, even while Mr. Malenkov is already touring the country in the guise of Minister of Electric Power Stations, registered their protest. "The rulers of Soviet Russia", they state in their Declaration, "are drenched with human sacrifices. Millions of their victims in our captive countries... are astonished by such an extension of British hospitality. They were already greatly disheartened by the back-slapping of Geneva, where their cause was neverpressed. Since then the Communist despots have indulged in an orgy of anti-western words and deeds. And still they come! The West therefore must not be surprised to learn", the Free Representatives from the captive nations go on declaring, "that the visit will still further depress—indeed anger—the 100 millions of our captive countrymen whose tragic lot no confabulation has ever mitigated by one jot. This inevitable effect will be a deterrent to the unflinching opposition to Communist régimes behind the Iron Curtain which is one of the West's principal safeguards. In the name of all our peoples we have a duty to ask whether a sham cordiality is really worth such consequences."

The Government of the day having decided, for reasons of their own, that the visit must take place, there is probably nothing to be done about it. As Sovereign of a limited monarchy, the Queen in respect for the Constitution, will have to accept her Prime Minister's advice and—though being the last Christian Monarch by definition left in this world—will have to sit down at the same table with the butchers of Moscow, similarly as she was compelled to sup with Tito, the mass-killer of Britain's gallant world-war-two allies, Drazha Mikhailovich and his Chetniks.

These sad facts being unalterable, we hope all the more fervently that the protest planned by the British people, irrespective of creed or party politics, will be a resounding success. This we wish not only for the sake of saving the honour of Britain, "the hospitable, the generous, the free", but also because it would be of great practical significance if the attitude of the man in London's streets were to bring home to the bosses of the Kremlin's badly shaken "collective leadership" that holding down 100 million Europeans is bad business, too costly for them to afford in the long run.

Dostoyevski Pardoned

An Inquiry into His Sudden Revival in the USSR

BY FEDOR STEPUN

For many years past, the works of one of Russia's greatest novelists have been practically banned in the Soviet Union. Although mention was made of him in learned treatises on the history of Russian literature his books were not allowed to be reprinted and read by the broad masses of the people. This trend has now suddenly been reversed. As the civilised world commemorated the 75th anniversary of the great writer's death, official Russia unexpectedly joined in the celebrations. According to news reports received from the Soviet Union, Dostoyevski's standard novels are to be reprinted shortly in large editions; some of them will moreover be dramatized for the theatre and the screen. Why?

There are those who believe that this change of policy is due to the decline of contemporary Soviet literature. The Kremlin is said to have become aware of the critical scarcity of good reading material for the people and to be desirous to fill the gap. Eastern Europe's Monitor consulted Professor Stepun who is at the present time holding the Chair of the History of Russian Civilisation in the University of Munich. Here is what he has to say on the subject.

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Seventy-five years ago, on February 9th, Dostoyevski died in Moscow with the Bible in his hands. It would seem unnecessary to prove that, far from having forgotten the profound thinker and great writer, Russia and, indeed, Europe are faithfully continuing to keep his memory alive. The ever widening dissemination of his works, the undiminished flow of new essays on Dostoyevski appearing practically in all the European languages, and the lively discussions about his views on the philosophy of history and sociology, are sufficient evidence of the fact that he is still a live force in our midst cooperating with us in the solution of the most difficult problems of our time.

The answer to the question why Dostoyevski is still so full of meaning to us may be found in the almost unfathomable depths of his personality, the paradoxical nature of his dialectically polished way of thinking, the inexhaustible resources of his artistic creativeness, and, by no means in the last place, in the tragic course of his life.

A partisan of the revolution in his youth, Dostoyevski later emerged as a conservative Christian thinker. In Dostoyevski's own mind there was never any doubt but what the steep curve of his life, leading him from the sentence of death through unexpected reprieve at the place of execution to long-term imprisonment and exile, had been one indivisible and consistent manifestation of fate destined to form his personality into what we see and venerate in him to this day.

The 23-year-old novice's first novel, "Poor People", made an overwhelming impression on the most important writers of the period, Nekresov and Gregorovitch, as well as on the contemporary *pontifex maximus* of the Russian opposition's art criticism, Belinski. Nekrasov and Gregorovitch, having de-

voured the 180 pages of the novel at one go, rang Dostoyevski's doorbell at four in the morning to tell him with tears in their eyes how tremendously impressed they were. Next day, Dostoyevski was received by Belinski with the words "are you aware at all of what you've written here?" "I left the great critic", reports Dostoyevski on the event in his diary, "as if I were drunk."

Apart from Dostoyevski's talent, all that enthusiasm must be attributed also to the fact that "Poor People" impressed both writers and critics of the period as a distinctly "social" novel. They hoped to have found in the young writer a great fighter against reaction. In his diary of the year 1873, Dostoyevski relates in this connection that Belinski had tried to win him over to atheism and revolutionary socialism; the latter even had the audacity, says Dostoyevski in one of his letters from that period, to revile Jesus Christ.

However, the hopes entertained by the opposition's great critic were not to be fulfilled. For the time being, Dostoyevski had chosen an altogether different path. Under the influence of Gogol, the romantic and visionary, he wrote, immediately following upon the "Poor People" a number of short stories which were at once rejected sharply and ruthlessly by Nekrasov and Belinski.

The publication of the "Demons" further widened the rift between Dostoyevski and the liberal opposition circles of Russia. While the conservatives had but little use for a novel that mercilessly unmasked Tsarist officialdom as being utterly alien to the people, the liberals, being largely identical with the revolutionaries of the period, felt enraged to the utmost at Dostoyevski's having dared to represent them as dyed-in-the-wool nihilists, utopistic dreamers, cantankerous ideologists, even criminals. The hurt went so deep as to have survived Dostoyevski's death by decades. When the Moscow Art Theatre undertook the experiment to produce the "Demons" for the stage, it was Maxim Gorki who protested against it in the name of Russia's entire progressive intelligentsia as its spokesman and leader. On the eve of the long-delayed revolution, Gorki deemed it ill-timed to lend the rostrum of the theatre to the detractor of the revolution.

Gorki's protest immediately evoked passionate retort from Dostoyevski's defenders. The counter-attack was led by disillusioned Marxists who had been so negatively impressed by the distorted and destructive image of the revolution, as it had first cast its horrible light over Russia in 1906, that, without wanting in the least to support the cause of reaction, they felt in duty bound to take up the cudgels for Dostoyevski, "the Christian revolutionary", who had had the courage to identify Eastern Christendom with Russian Socialism.

Nor had the linking of socialism with Christianity been incidental in Dostoyevski's mind. After all, he nearly suffered capital punishment for his close connection with radical, revolutionary circles. And whatever had once been part of his life, Dostoyevski may have sublimated but never forgotten, let alone betrayed. Incidentally, the articles written at that time against Gorki, had Nikolai Berdyayev and an economist, subsequently turned priest and theologian, Sergei Bulgakov, for their authors.

★

Dostoyevski's religious attitude, explains why, despite his occasional sharp attacks against Western Christian denominations, the Russian author has found so much understanding, even admiration, on the part of Christian theologians

and distinctly Christian authors in the West. Paul Claudel, François Mauriac, André Suarès, Romano Guardini, Steinbüchel, Turneisen, among others, should be mentioned in the first place in this respect. But great humanists also, and even expressly agnostic authors, have displayed understanding and admiration for Dostoyevski's works; every one of them had something significant to say about them from his own particular perspective. To confine myself to a few examples, let me mention only the names of Victor Hugo, Romain Rolland, André Gide and Thomas Mann. The latter both admired Dostoyevski and warned against him; finally the highly gifted Albert Camus who owes Dostoyevski the deepening of his tragic outlook.

Dostoyevski's particular place in cultural history might perhaps be best defined by describing him; together with his friend in philosophy, Solovyev, as a posthumous Slavophile. Christian romantics, the Slavophiles—not to be confused with the Panslavists—were passionately hostile to rationalist enlightenment. They were at variance, however, with romanticism in that they regarded the whole of Europe as having fallen prey to the evil of enlightenment—the atomism of life and the rationalism of thinking, as they used to express themselves. Russia, on the other hand, seemed to them a world enclosed within itself, still living and creating from the central depths of existence, that is, still steeped in the religious tradition of the middle ages. The Slavophiles were no chauvinists. Significantly, their periodical was entitled "The European", not "The Muscovite". Khomyakov, their leading theologian, called the West "the land of sacred miracles". Yet they were all convinced that their country had its own path to tread and set Russia the task to lead the West back to God, i. e. to its own self, to the sources of the "sacred miracles".

These theses Dostoyevski held in common with the Slavophiles, yet he was an altogether different kind of man. The old brand of Slavophiles possessed and cherished their faith as a substance inherited: Dostoyevski had gradually to fight his way through to his ultimate firm faith by a process of negation. That is why there is always the faint aftersound of a "no" ringing in the wake of his strang affirmations of faith. He would never have accepted the Christianity of some one saying "I believe" without adding immediately "O Lord, help my unbelief!" All easy and free relationship to God which was not constantly pitched against freedom opposed to God would have appeared suspect to him. Although he knew that freedom stemmed from truth, in the sense of St. John's gospel, he also knew full well that only truth conceived in freedom could make man truly free. It would be difficult not to attribute Dostoyevski's abiding great influence in a major part to his being a positive Christian and hence a revolutionary. Indeed, Dostoyevski was fully aware that in comparison to the permanent revolution in which evil stands pitched against this world, purely political revolutions represented but miserable jacqueries.

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Up to very recently, Bolshevism has regarded Dostoyevski, the Christian and nationalist, as a hostile power. Although historians of literature were not prevented from dealing with him in their writings the general public was not supposed to read his books. Now, all of a sudden, he has been publicly re-privileged. His works are to be reprinted, even dramatised. It has been promised that some of his works should be produced on the stage. It is as yet far from

clear on what conditions the pardon has been granted and what purpose it is to serve. Perhaps his dictum "the Eastern Church is our Socialism" shall be reversed in order to produce the similar-sounding, yet, in meaning, altogether different slogan "our Socialism is the true Church". Maybe also that Dostoyevski's view "our future lies in Asia" will be misused to justify bolshevik policies in Asia and that the Kremlin will attempt to exploit propagandistically his tragic prophecy "the 19th century will end in old Europe with something terrible... perhaps the changing of the face of the world". Possibly the Soviet rulers will strike even deeper. Who knows? All is still wrapped in mystery.

Democracy in the Balkans

BY DR. DIMITER VALTCHEV

Critical reflexions on Professor Dr. Georg Stadtmüller's study "Formal Democracy and Authoritarian Emergency Exit", published in our issue of November-December, 1955.

In his above-mentioned study, the author, after casting a glance back on the historic premisses of the democratic State, embodying the concepts of representative government and equality under the law, arrives at the conclusion that in the countries of South-Eastern Europe democracy was naturally bound to fail and degenerate into authoritarian forms of government because Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgars and Greeks had been lacking in the requisite antecedents and political consciousness. In our opinion these are generalisations which are arbitrary in nature and cannot be substantiated by history as a science; partly because they are based on false premisses, and partly because the author's conclusions as to the general failure of democracy in the Balkans do not correspond either with the more recent political history of the countries concerned or with established facts.

Undoubtedly the author takes as his point of departure a fact, in itself correct; namely, that the situation in the "European Occident" had been substantially different from that in the Balkans at the zenith of the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance. More specifically, the author also asserts that while in Western Europe the Church, the nobility and the municipalities had, at an early date, countered the claims to supreme power by State or Crown with their claims to "preserves of immunity", the Church in South-Eastern Europe, following the example of Byzantium, had wrapped itself in the mantle of state power, and that the entire problem of a delimitation of spheres between civic rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the absolute State, on the other, had been completely eliminated in this area for centuries owing to Ottoman Turkish occupation.

From this, in turn, the author draws the conclusion that while the peoples of Western Europe had already at that time formed the nucleus of a democratic consciousness, developing the appropriate forms and institutions of society, the nations of South-Eastern Europe had been suffering from a gap in their

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historical training almost as if it were an organic deficiency. This is why they were incapable, even in recent times, to build for themselves and maintain democratic parliamentary forms of government. Among the causes which are supposed to account for the Balkanic peoples' being so ill-fitted for democracy there have been listed as special, so to say "institutional", causes the absence of a strong middle class, a civil service with a tradition and a thoroughly trained judiciary of high moral integrity.

One would have to counter these contentions, first of all, on the plane of principle by pointing out that neither have church and nobility in the West always proved to be the forerunners of democratic thinking and forms of government. Both have, from time to time within their "preserves of immunity" grown to be instruments of power politics, instruments that were averse to democracy and which, in their autocratic ways and absolutistic moods, overshadowed even the power of the State. *Among the orthodox Balkanic peoples under Moslem domination, however, it had been precisely the Church, or rather the Christian religion as a spiritual and political factor, which was not subordinated to the State in any way: on the contrary, it proved its worth, partly as a stimulus of national consciousness opposed to alien rule, partly—by virtue of the Christian outlook and morality—as the powerful component part of a markedly libertarian and social-minded political concept and political will.*

Thus, among the Bulgars for example, who were the last to free themselves of the Turks' alien rule, national rebirth had begun crystallizing particularly around the orthodox Christian faith and, since 1870, after they had wrestled it from the Sublime Porte on the strength of a plebiscite, around their autocephalous Church; nor was that national renaissance of an exclusively national-revolutionary character, for it also displayed distinctly progressive and democratic traits. Thus, decades prior to the liberation from the Ottoman-Turkish yoke, democratic ideas and tendencies asserted themselves, though certainly not without the influence of liberalism and the French revolution. Even the liberation movements were not wholly devoid of democratic characteristics, and many a rising for freedom—as authentically recorded in history—had been proclaimed at true-to-type, if illegal, "people's meetings", attended by elected delegates from all parts of the country concerned.

It would carry us too far if we were to try, here and now, to follow in every detail the relevant historical processes and developments. It may suffice to establish the basic fact that in the very *ethical content of the liberation idea* evolved by those Balkanic nations the modern ideals of liberalism and democracy became clearly reflected. Indeed it had been due to the inspiration gained from those ideals that those nations were enabled to "reconquer their national liberty and, by the force of arms, win states of their own", as the author himself felt induced to concede. *Nor was it, therefore, due entirely to coincidence when following their liberation, the Balkan peoples began to shape their state structures on Western liberal-democratic models.* The new constitutional system they adopted did not thus mean to them an "imported commodity", essentially alien to their own mentality; it corresponded, in fact, to an inner attitude matured under alien rule, admittedly above all by the intellectual stratum. The processes which unfolded themselves subsequently in the lives of these peoples and young states were not merely the "spiritual and intel-

lectual facets" of a kind or artificial "Europeanisation" either, leading to a "break with their own specific national past" and even "anarchical unrest". Rather they were the consequence of those peoples' *having caught up, intellectually and spiritually, with the general evolution of the European continent*, evolution which by no means failed to fertilize the South-East European nations as the author seems to believe. At any rate, the contention that during the further course of events there had been only a "formal democracy", erected above a "vacuum" of political consciousness, that was bound to collapse under the first gust of storm and "unavoidably" lead to the setting-up of authoritarian régimes, is utterly erroneous.

The Balkanic peoples are in no need of having their democratic reputation restored at all cost. However, if some one goes to the length of proffering, on the grounds of an arbitrary historical theory, the allegation that those nations with their "newly-baked states had not much use for the democratic form of government" and even charges that they "proved prone to ephemeral political quackeries", the interests of historic truth call for a rebuttal. An expert scrutiny of the more recent political history of Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece cannot fail to reveal the fact that constitutional life under those limited Parliamentary monarchies had on the whole for many a decade been evolving in an orderly fashion and—save a few exceptions—proved comparatively stable. *Already at a time when the German Empire in the heart of Europe was still representing no more than a league of princes and the so-called Reichstag a mere ornament of formal democracy, the representative forms of government adopted by most of the Balkan countries were asserting themselves as very palpable political realities.* Take, for example, the newly created Principality of Bulgaria, whose people proved themselves able convincingly to operate democracy properly and to the benefit of the overall situation, as it then existed in the Balkans, when, shortly following their liberation, they frustrated, by means of Parliamentary elections, the "prerogatives" accorded to their ruler at Tsarist Russia's behest, thereby drastically thwarting the plans for a Bulgarian "Danube Government" hatched in St. Petersburg.

Nobody wants to call it in doubt that during that period there had occurred in the various Balkan kingdoms crises and upheavals which distorted the democratic forms of government and occasionally side-tracked them for some time. But there is no need—as the author does—to attribute those political earthquakes to genetic defects in the historic make-up of the South-East European nations. The truth is that those upheavals were brought about by *quite specific, topical* causes, e.g. internecine dynastic struggles in the Old Kingdom of Serbia, brutal interference by "Western Powers" which treated those nations as pawns in their game of power politics, arbitrarily drawing and re-drawing their frontiers, and, not in the last place, by the massive attempts on Moscow's part to push forward to the Straits of the Dardanelles that reached their climax, after World War I, in massed political murder and artificially fostered civil war in Bulgaria. The fact that the democratic political structure of the Balkan countries was able to withstand all those impacts, and that the nations in the "filthy corner" of Europe succeeded, time and again, in dealing with overwhelmingly powerful ruffians from outside out of their own strength, does not demonstrate with particular cogency a lack of political

stedfastness or democratic efficiency, let alone susceptibility to fallacies, on their part.

As regards, in particular, the substitution, during the 'thirties, of authoritarian régimes of various hues for Parliamentary democracy in the Balkan countries, that phenomenon was certainly not due to specific, let alone genetic, defects in the make-up of those nations: rather was it the reflection of the universal crisis of democracy which, at that time, manifested itself even more powerfully in the West. It was the case of copying authoritarian blueprints, first elaborated in the Western regions of Europe, not in the Balkans. King Alexander's authoritarian régime in Yugoslavia, in particular, was by no means derived from some obscure "atavistic" leaning: it was the consequence of acute national and political conflicts inherent in the newly created Yugoslav State.

On the other hand, the South East European countries are in a position to point with pride to a galaxy of democratic statesmen and Parliamentary politicians whose names they can, with assurance, entrust to the annals of world history. Let us think only of Venizelos and Gunaris in Greece, Pashitch and Davidovitch in Serbia, Bratianu and Maniu in Rumania or Karavelov, Stambolov or Liaptchev in Bulgaria, not to mention an impressive multitude of other similar names, who certainly cannot be said to have been artificially reared exotic specimens, for they had naturally grown out of a congenial environment and represented a palpable political reality.

In the light of these facts, the "statement" the author has ventured upon, namely, that in all the Balkan countries democracy had, "after a short experimental period" been replaced unavoidably by "authoritarian forms of government" must appear as completely gratuitous. On the contrary, it is an established historic truth that *the limited Parliamentary monarchies* had been prospering comparatively well in the Balkans for decades in contrast to the authoritarian régimes that are the ones to be regarded as both experimental and incidental in nature.

To lose from sight these tangible facts and to search, instead, for far-fetched instances of historic biology, in order to dispute the Balkan nations' state-building consciousness, is tantamount to descending to the regions of purely hypothetical speculation. *Especially today, when most of these peoples are languishing under bolshevik dictatorships; when they are wholeheartedly longing for the restoration of their democratic rule of law, and making the heaviest sacrifices, in terms of life and limb, day by day, to attain that end, it would appear least appropriate to indulge in the negation of their democratic, state-building capabilities. There may even be read tendencies into insinuations of this sort which have certainly been utterly remote from the author's mind.*

Finally, as regards the alleged "susceptibility" of the South-East European peoples to the blandishments of "world-saving" political doctrines, such as communism, fascism and the like, it may be stated with assurance that, in this respect, they have been and are still far behind the political realities presented by contemporary France or Italy, although these countries, as the heartland of the "Latin Occident", are supposed to be less susceptible to political diseases and especially well equipped for the democratic forms of government. Nor could the Balkanic peoples ever claim to compete with that proneness to totalitarian extremism which, for example, Germany displayed in the inter-

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war years although, according to the criteria established by the author, one should have been justified in expecting more democratic predestination and steadfastness from that Central European country.

Let us, therefore, take to heart Goethe's dictum "all theories are drab, dear fellow" and keep our eyes wide open to realities. Our sorry tried nations and countries had not been lacking either in "middle classes" or in an experienced civil service and conscientious judiciary. Nor do they dream today of rummaging in their dim atavistic past for some "nationally genuine" but by now surely archaic forms of social organisation and legal order. What they need, above all, in order to be able to renew their political lives and make them better tomorrow than they were yesterday, in the true spirit of the libertarian principles of our age, is that freedom they have lost out of no fault of their own, and immunity from the evil practices of power politics of the world outside.

A few weeks ago, Dr. Béla Fabian, a veteran liberal Parliamentary politician from Hungary, in a letter to the NEW YORK TIMES, reminded the British people of a historically significant incident that happened in London over a hundred years ago. Baron Haynau, the butcher of both the the Italian and Hungarian liberal revolutions, the ill-famed "hyena of Brescia" was visiting the British capital in the guise of an innocuous, elderly Austrian General on the retired list. However, when he signed his name in the guests' book at Barclay & Perkins' renowned brewery, the workers, having recognized the seemingly indifferent "distinguished stranger", almost beat him to death and Haynau could be rescued only thanks to the frantic efforts of the London police. For centuries the nations of Eastern Europe had looked upon the British as the champions of liberty and human rights; should they now be deceived, Dr. Fabian asks, by Bulganin and Khrushchev being acclaimed in London with garlands and cheers?

Tito and the Middle East

BY DR. DJOKO SLIJEPCÉVIC

President Tito's visits to Egypt and Abyssinia were undertaken at a time when a variety of politically important circumstances happened to coincide most critically in the Middle East. Since then events have shown even more clearly that the atmosphere is fraught with explosive tensions. The impoverished masses of that region are being deemed extremely accessible to subversive ideas by the strategists of world communism, particularly as Moscow has to a very great extent succeeded in exploiting for its purposes the Islamic fanaticism of those masses. In that game Tito has played an important role even prior to his reconciliation with Moscow. For during the years of sharp dispute between Moscow and Belgrade, the Yugoslav communists were contributing handsomely to the revival of anti-colonial propaganda in the Middle East. Posing as the friends of the free world they knew how to act the part of intrepid champions for the liberation of the oppressed masses, yet at the same time they were using part of the money obtained from the West to conduct anti-western propaganda in the Middle East, propaganda which is now beginning to bear fruit.

Thus, for instance, the Titoists' underhand striving for reducing to a possible minimum any kind of western influence in the Middle East has, among other things, contributed to the savage anti-Christian riots which broke out in Turkey last fall seemingly in connection with events in Cyprus. To the expert observer of the Tito régime's church policies in Yugoslavia this was no mere coincidence. For while they intensified the persecution of the Christian churches they also permitted top-ranking Yugoslav Moslems to embark on pilgrimages to Mekka. This is not to say that Tito gives any real support to Islam in Yugoslavia. Far from it. Considerations pertaining purely to the sphere of foreign affairs persuaded Tito to allow the Reis-ul-Ulema—a personal follower of Tito incidentally also recognised by Yugoslav Moslems—to go to Mekka without let or hindrance, so as to create the impression among his coreligionists in the Middle that Tito was a friend of Islam. As a matter of fact, Tito has simply discovered the great revolutionary potentialities inherent in Islamic fanaticism once it has been aroused to lusty aggressiveness. To coordinate those potentialities and, at the same time, subordinate them to the pursuit of world communism's major objectives was a task which the Yugoslav communists had set themselves even before agreement was reached on communist tactics in the present phase of the spreading of the revolution.

A soon as that agreement was brought into being, Tito was actually commissioned to undermine increasingly the spiritual and intellectual bases of the free world thus turning to good account his reputation gained in the West. Tito carried out his commission by attacking Western 'colonialism' even more violently than before and by opposing with redoubled energy the forming of every conceivable kind of 'bloc' in the Middle East. It was in his capacity of a protagonist of anti-colonialism that he went to Abyssinia, magnificently oblivious of the fact that he, himself, was pursuing a colonial policy albeit in

a form somewhat more primitive than usual. Upwards from 1,000 Yugoslav communists are being kept in residence in Abyssinia alone in an all-out effort to dominate both that country's internal and external trade and to barter Yugoslavia's industrial products, for which no markets can be found elsewhere, against Ethiopian raw materials—primarily coffee, timber and hides. The circumstance makes fairly plain the foundations of the astonishingly close relationship that has sprung up between the God-fearing Emperor and the unscrupulous dictator. At the time of writing, Tito is engaged in training cadres of native communists in Abyssinia of whom it is expected that one fine day they will be able to carry out a communist revolution in the Empire of the Lion of Juda.

As regards Egypt, in that country Tito is more clearly concerned with revolutionary objectives rather than with economic interests, although the latter should by no means be underestimated. In the communists' opinion Colonel Nasser's "national revolution" might also be turned to world communism's advantage. Hence a Marshal's rather peculiar admiration for a Colonel who has distinguished himself by ousting his own superior, General Naguib.

As a thoroughly trained Marxist Tito is only too well aware of the possibility to exploit the 'national' revolutions of colonial or semi-colonial peoples for the benefit of extending revolutionary communism. That is why Tito so loudly keeps welcoming Egypt's national revolution although he full well knows that it falls far behind of what he is publicly praising it for. The unexploited revolutionary potentialities inherent in the profoundly stirred masses of not only Egypt but the whole of North Africa—therein lies in Tito's view the great significance of Egypt's 'national revolution'. In his reply to Colonel Nasser's address welcoming him, Tito expressed this view by saying that the Egyptian revolution by a military junta "represents an event the significance of which is so great as to extend even beyond the confines of the African Continent. It (the revolution) has clearly shown that the peoples of that Continent are no longer content to be the playball of world politics: they want to become themselves the movers of events, a role which they are fully capable of performing, being independent members, endowed with equal rights, of the international community." (BORBA, December 29, 1955.)

In these efforts to imbue the awakening and stirring peoples of Africa with revolutionary fervour is to be found the real incentive that actuated Tito in undertaking his journeys to Egypt and Abyssinia. Nor was it due to mere hazard that the timing of Tito's visits coincided with Moscow's intrigues aimed at rearming the Arab world. The anti-western diatribes uttered by Bulganin and Khrushchev all over India and Burma differed little, if any, from the statements Tito made against 'western colonialism' in Africa and the Middle East. Hence the Kremlin's growing admiration for Tito which recently paved the way for a new trade agreement between Moscow and Belgrade, enabling the Soviet Union to send economic advisers to Yugoslavia—clear sign of the rapidly approaching incorporation of Yugoslavia into the Eastern bloc.

The objectives of Tito's policy in the Middle East stand revealed in an editorial article by Marko Nikezić, Yugoslavia's Envoy in Cairo, published by

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the Belgrade newspaper BORBA on December 28, 1955. The relevant passage reads as follows: "... The interdependence of the problems in the Balkans and the Middle East lend immediate and practical significance to Egypt's and Yugoslavia's parallel strivings. Both countries are situated in a part of the globe where the two great world blocs meet and where small and medium states may, therefore, play a very useful part in the prevention of conflicts..." That Nikezić was thinking of conflicts which might bar the progress of world communism emerges from the further course of his reasoning. Referring to the role which had fallen to Abyssinia's and Egypt's lot in fanning revolutionary activities in that part of the world, he went on writing: "... It is not here the question of a country bringing its influence to bear directly on the awakening and vitalization of the freedom movements of other peoples, about which, incidentally, those would complain mostly whose interests are damaged in the process. The fact alone that a country liberates itself influences other countries regardless of their local conflicts. The countries of North Africa are marching ahead of all others along that path, led by the two states that Tito has just visited, Egypt and Abyssinia."

Tito is without a shadow of doubt very anxious to have a finger in each pie of revolutionary upheaval in the Middle East whilst posing ceaselessly as the champion of peace, notwithstanding the fact that in one of his recent speeches made in Belgrade he denounced the Baghdad Pact as an "element of disunity". Again it is no mere coincidence that Tito's adverse criticism of the Baghdad Pact is completely identical with the comment spread by Moscow; they are the emanations of coordinated policies relating to the Middle East.

In the present phase of the international situation the substance of these policies consists in the fanning of the nationalistic and religious fanaticism of the Islamic peoples and the support lent to their strivings to rid themselves of all western influences. Once those nations have fallen under communist influence, the time will have arrived for the second phase in which the lid of the coffin of communist rule will be nailed down over them.

It would be hard to dispute the fact that Moscow has already some success to its credit in its progress along that road. Moreover, from its latest efforts in the Balkans, one is almost forced to conclude that the Soviet Union has set its shoulder to achieving even greater successes, such as wrenching Greece from the NATO connexion and chasing the British from Cyprus.

Tito has been assigned an important role in the game of putting those plans into practice. He is to be shoved forward in every such place where the Kremlin's rulers cannot afford to put themselves in evidence openly lest the broad masses in the free world peep into their cards. Considering all this it becomes quite clear that Tito must be looked upon as communism's extremely able quartermaster in the Middle East.

Facts for Research

BULGARIA

WHERE THE SHOE PINCHES.—The Christmas messages sent by President Eisenhower and some other U. S. Government representatives to the enslaved peoples behind the Iron Curtain have this time invited a conspicuously symptomatic echo from what there exists of public life in the countries of the eastern bloc of powers. While in past years such messages had received merely marginal polemic mention in the communist Press, this last Christmas time they unleashed a veritable storm of protest and rebuttal.

In Bulgaria, the counter-offensive was directed by Premier Chervenkov in person. Already in his broadcast speech on New Year's Eve, he rejected off hand President Eisenhower's good wishes expressed to the captive nations for their speedy return to freedom, labelling them as "open intervention" in the affairs of sovereign states. For a full month thereafter, the Press and the Radio kept harping on the same theme, denouncing the American messages as "brutal interference", even branding them as "illicit incitement of the people to subvert their Government by force". Curiously enough, one of the arguments used in these protests was Bulgaria's recent acceptance by UNO, it being concluded from that fact that the present Bulgarian communist Government had thereby gained international recognition and was in a better position than before to avert attempts at interference by extraneous powers.

A spate of cartoons and commentaries were produced to ridicule U. S., concern about the fate of the nations behind the Iron Curtain while suggesting to the peoples themselves that their interests were best served within "the invincible socialist camp". Marshal Bulganin's and Mr. Khrushchey's Asiatic tour, represented as already having won over India and most of the other nations of Asia as partners of the "peace camp", and the sixth Soviet five-year-plan said to have far out-

paced western capitalism, are thus being used to confirm that impression and paralyze all ripples of hope for liberation.

The reason why the communist régimes were this time mounting such big guns against American Christmas wishes to the nations behind the Iron Curtain is pretty obvious. For no sooner had the bolshevik rulers succeeded in popularising in their respective countries the "spirit of Geneva", and in creating among their peoples the impression that after President Eisenhower's unsuccessful attempt to bring up their case at the Geneva conference they had been completely written off by the West, than the American Christmas and New Year's messages evidently demolished that fabric of lies. All this clearly shows where the communist shoe pinches and how susceptible the captive nations still remain to the trends of western politics. There is more than a hint in these reactions at the effect which a resolute liberation policy could have in the psychological war waged by the free world against tyranny behind the Iron Curtain.

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SOCIALIST NEIGHBOURLY LOVE.—Newspapers in the so-called people's democracies are paying tribute day by day to social and health care spent on the working people, services which are said to be incomparably better organized today than they were in the "bourgeois" or "fascist" past. A reader's letter to the Editor of the Bulgarian Government daily "Otechestven Front", published on January 19, 1956, in issue No. 3543, may be taken as a fair sample of "welfare organization" and communist "neighbourly love".

The letter relates that on August 1, of last year, citizen Ivan Yotov, a resident in Plovdiv, had made written application to the Bulgarian Red Cross in order to obtain a certain medicament that, according to the prescription enclosed, his mother needed in her severe illness. Only four and a half months later had Yotov received a reply from the Ministry of

Public Health, informing him that the medicine he had applied for had been granted to him and that he could purchase it for 150 Leva in Sofia. However, unfortunately old Mama Yotov had already died three months previously.

An investigation into the causes of delay had revealed the following information: All applications for the purchase of medicines imported from abroad had been shelved for a number of weeks as the question of principle had first had to be decided whether or not the Bulgarian Red Cross was authorized at all to import medical supplies. But even after the question had been favourably decided by the Ministry of Public Health, on October 14, 1955, ruling that the State Commercial Enterprise "Chimimport" was entitled to do so, the "International Relations" section of the Bulgarian Red Cross had slept over the application for another few weeks. When it was returned in due course to the Ministry of Health, there occurred a further delay of an entire month until, on December 2, a special board reviewed and finally granted the applicant's request. 17 more days elapsed before the applicant was informed of the favourable decision.

The official inquiry instituted after the wretched patient's death finally established the fact that the medicament applied for—"Embehin"—had been on stock all the time and could have been made available instantly from the stores of the "Chimimport" enterprise in Sofia so that the whole import licensing procedure had indeed been wholly superfluous.

"Such attitude toward patients is criminal and least excusable in functionaries of the Red Cross and the Ministry of Public Health and Social Hygiene", says the reader's letter in conclusion. Obviously he must have been a man well placed in the Party hierarchy to be able to air his sad experiences. One wonders, however, how many "citizens of the people's democracy" are condemned to bearing their cross of the communist régime's "blessings" in silence?

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RUMANIA

"YOU CAN'T CONCEAL TRUTH" is the headline of one of the articles printed in the new periodical, entitled "Glasul Patriei" (The Voice of the Homeland), mouthpiece of the so-called "Rumanian Repatriation Committee", founded in East Berlin last December. Yet precisely that is what the publication under review sets out to do. On every page we find nothing but praise for the new Rumanian People's Republic and the people who are made to sing it are represented as visiting foreigners. Foreigners they are, indeed but of what kind? Some are downright Soviet agents whose job it is, naturally to enthuse; others are naive and ignorant strangers who have never seen or heard any of Rumania before they went visiting. As they have been well received by amiable Commissars, put up free of charge in the most luxurious Bucharest hotels and fed royally at the Government's expense, they are understandably inclined to believe everything they are told by their wily 'Politruk' guides. "Look at the city of Bucharest", the latter tell them, "with its palaces and beautifully laid-out streets and avenues! Admire Rumanian industry and art! All this has been created by us, communists; nothing of it had existed before we came." Everywhere the visiting foreigner is being escorted by these guide-commissars. "Have you been told that there is no religious freedom in Rumania? Please, step into a church and see for yourselves!" And the stranger is being led to a crowded church where a priest officiates Holy Mass and preaches the sermon. How should the naive foreigner know that the sermon had previously to be passed by a Government censor, and that he is by no means allowed to speak his own mind.—"Do you want to speak to a factory worker? Please yourselves." What could the intimidated wretch tell a stranger if he wanted to go on living as a free man, at least in the primordial, physical sense of the word? "O, we are fine, we are very well off; we have everything we need—money, good apartments, paid holidays, not like before when we had nothing and were starving."—"Do you want to inspect a big department store? Come along!" Again, how should the poor

dupe of a foreigner know that the average worker cannot afford to pay half a month's earnings for a suit of clothes; that he must not buy a few pounds of meat or butter at the exorbitant prices charged, lest he be accused of being a saboteur. This is how farmers Roswell Garst from Iowa and Dr. Geza Schutz from Minnesota, USA, were trapped into enthusing about everything they had seen in Rumania. An Indian journalist, Mr. Om Prakash, was confronted with a worker who told him that workers were free in Rumania. What the man could not tell Mr. Prakash, however, was that Rumanian workers had to raise their individual output month by month without a corresponding rise in wages, and that they were not allowed to choose or change their place of work and occupation at will.

Juggling with percentages is one of the communists' favourite propaganda methods. One of the most popular parlour games of this type is telling the foreigner that, as compared with conditions in 1944, the number of crèches (public baby nurseries) had risen by 2,000 per cent. Nobody would care to add, of course, that up to 1944 babies could be nursed at home by their own mothers and were not reared as livestock by the State, for mothers were, then, not compelled as yet to work in factories and mines so that the Soviet Union might be properly supplied.

Among other items, the "Voice of the Homeland" also features a letter from one Dr. Ionel Pop. It is a letter clearly intended to entice refugees to return home. "... What the governments of the ancien régime were never able to put into practice has been achieved by the young People's Democracy of the peasants and workers in a few years." Quite true. Much has been achieved, but at what cost? At the price of the suffering of hundreds of thousands of slave labourers and the unpaid toil of countless others. All the time, the People's Republic is making a considerable section of the country's population work as convicts under inhuman conditions for the one and only reason that they did not agree with the bolshevik régime. "The pharmaceutical industry is flourishing" according to Dr. Pop. Why, then, is there such a shortage of medicines

that they are peddled against U.S. dollars, at exorbitant prices, in the black market?—"Books that no longer poison but enlighten the people's minds are being published—in every conceivable sphere of knowledge—by the tens of thousands..." What kind of enlightenment? All sorts of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist trash, translated from the Russian language—grass of the field which today is and tomorrow is cast into the oven—that the unfortunate so-called toilers are compelled to buy and read.—"I condemn war and those who want war", continues Dr. Pop, "as I condemn those who, egged on by hatred, revile their fatherland and fellow-countrymen." This is certainly not true of any refugee living in the free world. They love their country and their people all the more for being forced to live far away from them in exile. They only hate the terrorist régime and the perpetrators of its will, set up and kept in power exclusively by Moscow's armed might. And in that feeling of hatred the exiles are at one with the people in the homeland; for they, too, have no love for the Muscovite henchmen.

"The Voice of the Homeland" also tells us about the great successes achieved by Rumanian artists abroad. It fails, however, to inform its readers of the fact that when these artists travel in foreign lands they are escorted and surveilled everywhere by bolshevik commissars; and that in spite of this some of them do, from time to time, succeed in eluding escorts and asking for asylum in the free country where they happen to find themselves.

Castling about in Western Europe, the Rumanian communist régime is certain to find some naive souls who will swallow the bait of repatriation. So far one could count their numbers on the fingers of one's hands. But quite independent of the measure of its eventual success, the repatriation propaganda does not disturb the exiles. On the contrary, it renders a useful service to them in that it performs a cleansing operation which the refugees could not very well put into effect themselves. Once the time-limit set for the "magnanimous amnesty" is over, we shall close our ranks even more firmly. Surely not many, and by no means the best of

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us, will be missing from those ranks. And we shall go on struggling in the free world with all means at our disposal until we, too, are able to go home—not by the grace of some Politruks serving a terrorist and tyrannical power but in freedom to a truly free, democratic Rumania.

I. P.

YUGOSLAVIA

NO SACRIFICES SHIRKED.—The communist revolution in Serbia is vividly described in one of the most popular and highly praised novels of contemporary Titoist literature, Dobrica Ciosich's "The Sun's Far Aaway". In one of the chapters of that book the author tells of the horrible reprisals carried out by the occupying power in the villages where communist acts of sabotage had been perpetrated. The tortured villagers took to the woods to implore the partisans on their knees to cease fighting and leave the neighbourhood lest the local civilians be wiped out altogether by the enemy. "hey will destroy us kith and kin", said one old peasant with tears in his eyes. "All that breathe will be shot by the occupant", he continued, "and Serbia will be left an unpopulated waste land. What use is freedom for which you pretend to be fighting if neither of us remains alive." The others murmured agreement. A woman raised her voice and shouted at the partisans "get out of our sight, you are bringing disaster upon us!"

The partisan troop, among whom there were only a very few seasoned communists, began vacillating at the people's moaning and were prepared to yield to their clamor and clear out of the region which had already suffered so much. Even the deputy commander of the partisan

group, who had up to that moment been a fearless and heroic fighter, became hesitant. His name was "Gvozden" (the iron man). But when the political commissar noticed his indecision, he ordered three partisans to form a court marshal and immediately sentence Gvozden to death. After the death sentence had been carried out on the spot, the commissar turned to the partisans with the following words:

"You thought, of course, that our task is only to fight the enemy. You are wrong. Our warfare is directed to achieving the revolution, not only to win a war. And the revolution has its own moral code. It demands that we should fight to the bitter end without mercy. What could frustrate a revolution if not the indecision of its perpetrators? Sacrifice? That is precisely which delays the success of revolutions in many countries. We must not shirk sacrifice! If we, communists, do not see that clearly, revolution does not stand a chance."

In Oktober 1941, the Germans shot 2,300 innocent burghers of the township of Kragujevac in Serbia as hostages in retaliation for the murder by the partisans of 23 German soldiers. Raja Nedeljkovic, then District Commander of the pro-communist partisans, whose murder of the German soldiers had brought upon the citizens of Kragujevac the terrible retribution, had this to say at the time (he is now a high-ranking functionary in Tito's régime): "The more burghers of Kragujevac, who refused to join us, are being shot by the Germans, the better. At least we shall have to shoot that much less when we grasp power."

There are living in the free world today men who witnessed Raja Nedeljkovic's statement but so far they found it hard to make outsiders believe their story. Ciosich's novel has now provided not only confirmation but glorification in an "artistic form" of that mentality.

NEW CONTRIBUTOR TO THE CURRENT ISSUE

PROFESSOR DR. FEDOR MIKHAILOVITCH STEPUN was born in Moscow, in 1884, and reared in the Russian countryside. He studied at the Universities of Moscow and Heidelberg and took his first degree with a thesis on Solovyev. During World War I he fought as a reserve officer in the Russian Imperial Army and thereafter served for a while as Counsellor in the Political Department of the Ministry of War under Kerensky. After the Bolsheviks had kept him in prison for some time, Stepun finally succeeded in escaping to the West, in 1922. Under the Weimar Republic he was appointed to the Chair of Sociology in the University of Dresden, but was deprived of his professorship by Hitler, in 1937. Since 1945, Professor Stepun has held the Chair of the History of Russian Civilisation in the University of Munich.

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