

# EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

SPECIAL ISSUE

SAVE STALIN'S VICTIMS  
COUNCIL OF EUROPE TAKING THE LEAD  
LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL VERSUS COMMUNISM  
TIME FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY  
KORAN — SOVIET KEY TO EAST

Contributions by J. H. MacCallum Scott, Mercury, Horia Roman,  
Izeddin Sami

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VOLUME II

APRIL-MAY 1956

NUMBER 4-5

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# EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

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## Save Stalin's Victims

*"Having been run by a ruthless dictator, Stalin, the syndicate which succeeded him needs time to consolidate its power. By making believe that the Communist tiger has now become a milk-fed pussy cat, the Kremlin rulers hope to keep the fountain-head of world communism 'off limits' to possible retaliation."*

From a speech made by Senator William F. Knowland in San Francisco, on August 19, 1955.

There has been altogether too much crystal-gazing going on in the western world about the baffling show offered by Stalin's one-time lieutenants and chief collaborators in denouncing the defunct leader. Conjectures have sprung up by the dozen. All over the lands where the free press's writ runs there is barely a commentator or professional political observer to be found who has not put forward his own theory as regards the probable causes and origins of the posthumous dethronement of the formidable Joseph Vyssarionovitch Stalin.

Roughly speaking, two schools of thought have manifested themselves. There are of course those whom we have more than once termed the "handy fools" of communist subversion—the irrational pacifists, neutralists, pseudo-intellectuals, sentimental marxists and the like. To them "the fact that the Soviet Union is ridding itself of some of its more Mongolian aspects"—to borrow a happy phrase coined by the London *Economist* in its Editorial of April 7th—means that the world has at once become safe again for the popular front. With them we have no argument as there is no common ground for reasoning between us.

Diametrically opposed to them is the other school of thought with which we find ourselves largely in agreement. The ratiocinations of its representatives inevitably all end up in such commonplace, but none the less true, statements of a proverbial nature as "the leopard doesn't change its spots" or "the more it changes the more it remains the same thing". As far as the ultimate goal of world communism is concerned we certainly can have no quarrel with them. It seems to us, however, that they are missing an important point. May we be permitted here to confront all-too-well-known western proverbs with an East European one which goes to the effect that "on the hands of too many midwives the baby tends to be lost". What is the point those learned commentators are missing amidst all their speculations?

To stick to metaphorical parlance for just one more moment, it is briefly this: admittedly, the communist leopard's spots will always remain the same, yet *the conditions of his prowling in the jungle of the world's power politics may still, from time to time, undergo considerable changes.*

But let us be more explicit. It has always been our contention that Stalin's passing away represented such a change, and a fundamental one for that matter, regardless of what its attendant circumstances—invisible to the outside observer's naked eye—may have been. It was clear from the moment Stalin's death was announced that nothing would ever be quite same in Moscow as it had been before. *The working out of the succession to supreme power in a ghastly autocracy of the type that Stalin's was, with no constitutional precedents to provide guidance and nothing to temper the ruthless use of force except the contestants' fear of their own lives, could not fail to produce a colossal upheaval, no matter how little of it hits the eye.*

Therefore, while it is important for all of us—free Westerners and Eastern exiles alike—always to remember that “the improvement in the manners of communism does not remove the Soviet threat to the western world,” we should not fail to note either that the structure of Soviet power is changing with a vengeance, and that its changes offer us more than one chance.

*For these changes have undoubtedly caused a temporary state of weakness which the free world must turn to its advantage. The admission of Stalin's guilt—and of their own as accessories—by his chief collaborators is further evidence of the upheaval that the tyrant's death has set in motion. Moreover, that admission of Stalin's guilt has, in the Alsop brothers' words, made Nikita Khrushchev state well-nigh explicitly that “almost all of Stalin's victims . . . had, after all, been innocent of any crimes.”*

What exactly prompted those admissions we are in no position as yet to know. At any rate, the motives, in this particular instance, are immaterial in comparison with the fact that the Kremlin leaders felt compelled to lift the lid off the devil's cauldron. As Mr. Walter Lippmann wrote recently “we can only guess, or rather assume, that *Khrushchev's main motive is somehow that the destruction of the Stalin legend is necessary to the survival of the Khrushchev oligarchy.*”

Of course, Khrushchev may have counted on his revelations bringing about some beneficial by-products in the West. Despite the Socialist International's prompt refusal to enter into cooperation with the communist parties, as offered by the Kremlin, Khrushchev and his colleagues may still justifiably reckon with the swooning approval of those incorrigible dreamers in the free world to whom the golden gate of “working-class unity” now appears to be opening once more.

Essentially, however, the Soviet leaders are clearly acting under duress; compelled by conditions which they themselves have so greatly helped creating. *What Nikita Khrushchev and some of his principal colleagues are now trying to do is to restrain the reverberations of the explosion with which they blew up the Stalin myth and keep them within the orderly channels of a controlled chain-reaction.*

*It is for the free world to frustrate their efforts!*

*But how can it be done?*

We recommend one method, at any rate for a beginning.

When after Stalin's gruesome trial *in effigie* at the 20th Party Congress the "venerable figure" of seventy-two-year-old A. S. Bubnov, the only living member of Lenin's original Politburo, was suddenly conjured up from some arctic concentration camp, Mr. Edward Crankshaw, one of the most outstanding experts in Britain of contemporary Russia, exclaimed—"How many more of Stalin's victims have been tough enough to survive?"

Well, we can tell him, and others, too, who are sufficiently interested.

Organisations of exiles from all countries of Eastern Europe are keeping close check on the fate of their fellow-compatriots languishing in communist prisons and forced-labor camps. *It is high time that something should at long last be done for these unfortunates.* The communists are busy enough these days, both in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, explaining away the judicial murders, fake trials and clandestine acts of violence perpetrated during the Stalin era, and freeing their communist and socialist victims. That is their domestic concern.

*We call upon the free world's governments to demand of the Eastern bloc powers that they set free immediately also the non-marxists democrats unlawfully held in captivity behind the Iron Curtain!*

Let the Western governments institute fully-fledged diplomatic measures for the liberation of these innocent men and women.

Let *ad hoc* Parliamentary groups of all parties be formed in the legislatures of the free world in order to prod their governments should the latter be inclined to show tardiness or hesitation.

If the communist régimes now see fit to rehabilitate those that had been wronged from among their own ranks, how much greater is the moral, legal and political justification of rehabilitating those East Europeans who, though lawfully representing the non-communist majority of their peoples, were victimized, by their peoples' will and their respective countries' sovereignty being trampled underfoot at that self-same Stalin's orders who is now admitted by the new rulers of the Kremlin to have been a criminal lunatic.

In view of Bulganin's and Khrushchev's state visit to Britain, one of the leading periodicals of that great nation recently demanded that "the visitors must be told that *the British, at any rate, are willing to 'forget Stalin' only if Stalin's deeds are effaced by different new policies.*" Surely the setting free of hundreds of innocent fellow-Europeans from the captive nations should be one such "new policy". *It should be demanded as an elementary test of Soviet good will.*

And if there be voices to counsel caution because only God knows what may result from the Soviet leaders being pressed too hard to make concessions that could threaten the whole fabric of their power in Eastern Europe, let us tell them frankly—*yes, we mean this to be the thin end of the wedge.* Yes, we are hopeful that once the Kremlin is forced to begin making important moral, legal and political concessions in our lands, its entire edifice of domination may also start crumbling.

*But, then, is it not exactly this the free world is striving to achieve?*

# Council of Europe

Responds to "Save Stalin's Victims" Appeal

During the first half of its eighth annual session, April 16—21, 1956, the Council of Europe, nearest thing so far to an all-embracing supra-national Parliament of free European countries, admitted as its fifteenth Member-State the Republic of Austria. That this has become possible was the direct consequence of Austria's regaining her sovereign rights owing to the signing of the State Treaty which—as Foreign Minister Leopold Figl remarked in his opening address—"pushed back the frontiers of the cold war".

The main item on the agenda of the Council's Consultative Assembly was the debate on a *Common European Policy towards the East*. The debate was key-noted by an Introductory Report, presented on behalf of the Council's Political Committee by the renowned Italian Christian Democratic Parliamentarian and former Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, *Lodovico Benvenuti*. This voluminous and closely reasoned document defines the main objective of a common European policy towards the Eastern bloc as one which would make the Soviet Union grasp "that its political ambitions are unattainable; that is to say, that it will never secure either the recognition of the status quo in Germany or Eastern Europe, or an extension of its sphere of influence to free Europe, and could never prevent the unification of Europe."

The Editor of this Review had the good fortune to attend the Council's eighth session, make contact with a great number of delegates from the several European Parliaments and put up to them the suggestion, set out in this issue's Editorial; namely, that the present state of internal crisis and therefore weakness, existing in the Soviet Union should be utilized by the Western Powers pressing, through diplomatic channels, for the release of non-communist political prisoners behind the Iron Curtain.

The issue was first introduced into the Council's general political debate by the well-known Irish politician, great champion of the oppressed nations' rights, *Senator James Crosbie*, on April 18. Calling upon the Government of the United Kingdom to bring to the forefront of their conversations with the representatives of the USSR the liberation of the captive nations as well as the release of non-Communist political prisoners behind the Iron Curtain, *Mr. Crosbie* continued as follows:

"Since the apparent change of policy and the dethronement of the late but unlamented Mr. Stalin, a large number of political prisoners both in Russia and in the satellite countries have been released. But in each case those people who have been released were people who originally were pro-communist and were merely being punished because they had fallen slightly out of step with the party line. *There are, however, still alive, still in existence—their whereabouts are known to the various refugee organisations—a large number of political prisoners who never were communists . . . who have been put in prison on some trumped-up charge or other. I think that*

*this would again be an opportune time for us here and elsewhere to press for their release... It is possible, I suggest, to pay too high a price for co-existence or for the doubtful privilege of East-West trade. I feel convinced that history will undoubtedly condemn any statesman who at this stage abandons the claim to liberty of the Eastern European countries”.*

In the further course of the debate, on April 20, Mr. Crosbie's call was answered on behalf of the British delegation by the Conservative Member of Parliament, *Mr. Julian, Amery*, who assured his colleagues that he shared our belief that *Russia was experiencing strong internal stresses and strains*. But as the present situation might not last and another Stalin might arise, *the leaders of the West had better make full use of the interval*. Mr. Amery also asserted that the invitation by the British Government to Bulganin and Khrushchev had been issued in no spirit of appeasement “but in the belief that a frank and full discussion will serve the aims of the West, such as *the reunification of Germany and full independence for the countries of Eastern Europe.*”

The case of the East European countries was forcefully put also by *Mr. Lujo Tomic*, Austrian Member of Parliament for the Christian democratic People's Party, in his maiden speech before the Assembly. Emphasizing that his had been an enslaved country, too, *Mr. Tomic* said that Europe could not afford to ignore the contribution potentially available from countries forcefully retained behind the Iron Curtain; moreover to *desert these countries would be a betrayal of the fundamental principles of freedom.*

## Special Committee Embraces Victims' Cause

The initiative taken by this Review was endorsed in an especially gratifying manner by the Council of Europe's *Special Committee to Watch over the Interests of European Nations Not Represented in the Council of Europe*. Its Vice-Chairman, *Mr. F. J. Goedhart*, a Labour Member of the Netherlands Parliament, a gallant fighter for freedom for all, in any and every situation, and founder in the Dutch underground of that great national newspaper “*HET PAROOL*”, *tabled a motion on April 19, 1956*, of which we have the privilege to publish the verbatim text as follows:

COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
Strasbourg, 19th April, 1956.

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

**CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY**  
**SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO WATCH OVER THE**  
**INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS NOT**  
**REPRESENTED IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE**

Proposal for action to secure the release  
of non-communist political prisoners behind  
the Iron Curtain  
submitted by M. Goedhart

In many quarters of the free world it has been increasingly felt, since the repudiation of Stalin, that now is the time for making a concentrated effort to secure the release of numerous non-communists still held in captivity within the Soviet orbit on all kinds of false charges.

Past methods of fabricated evidence, distorted pseudo-confessions, brain washing and torture, which are now being ruthlessly exposed by the heads of world communism as having distorted and largely brought into disrepute "socialist legality"—those methods of judicial mockery have inflicted death or long-term imprisonment on at least as many staunch non-communist democrats as on faithful communists so unjustly branded traitors by Stalin. Yet while scores, if not hundreds, of the latter are now being posthumously cleared, rehabilitated, and when they are still alive, released in the USSR and the satellites, next to nothing is heard of the non-communist victims of the Stalin era. It is for them that the free world ought now to speak up.

*I therefore suggest that the Special Committee to watch over the interests of European nations not represented in the Council of Europe might consider the possibility of tabling a draft resolution or recommendation in the Assembly urging Member Governments to press the matter through diplomatic channels as a practical test of Soviet goodwill.*

When A. S. Bubnov, the last surviving member of Lenin's original Politburo, was suddenly brought back from long-term exile in Siberia, the question was asked how many more of Stalin's victims had been tough enough to survive their ordeal. It is in fact believed that many have survived; their names are known and in some cases details are available as to where they are being held in captivity.

Some may say: "That is already being done by the communist régimes anyhow, though very gradually, and so as not to undermine their prestige; a public outcry could only jeopardize the chances of what is now evolving as a natural process of history." This is unfortunately not quite true. Wherever they can afford to avoid it, *the communist régimes refuse to set free those who are not communists or who have not collaborated with the communists in popular front coalitions before their complete seizure of power.*

It is my view that our Assembly ought to try to put this question of the non-communist political prisoners behind the Iron Curtain before European public opinion and endeavour to bring pressure on the communist régimes to release these democratic leaders.

*What precisely does this proposal mean?*

It means that an important Standing Committee of the Council of Europe now have the matter of the release of the non-communist victims of the Stalin era before them with a view to discussing it at one of their next meetings usually held in between session terms of the plenary Assembly. Should, as we fervently hope, a draft recommendation in the above sense be tabled and eventually adopted in the Consultative Assembly's autumn session, the Committee of the fifteen Member-States' Foreign Ministers, endowed with real powers to take governmental action, would have to seriously consider making diplomatic representations to the Soviet Union and the satellite governments urging the release of non-communist political prisoners victimised in the course of the now much-maligned Stalin era.

Through its Editor, the Board and staff of this Review have offered to act as a collecting agency for such data as the Special Committee will require for its deliberations during the coming summer so as to be able to step all the more well-equipped before the Council's plenary Assembly at its autumn session. That offer has kindly been accepted.

Promises have also been received from a number of European Parliaments to the effect that sincere efforts will be made to form inter-party groups in order to bring pressure to bear on their respective governments, urging them to take up the case of Stalin's victims through diplomatic channels.

In all this, the Eastern Europe's Monitor has received the most encouraging and expeditious assistance from the Council of Europe's Secretariate and Directorate of Information whose officers have thus proved themselves sincere believers in one of their Council's basic tenets of faith—the unity of the whole of Europe. When our deeply felt gratitude is now being expressed to them without the mention of individual names, this is done out of respect for their status as Members of the European Civil Service.

V. S.

### STOP-PRESS: THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT

As we were going to press, communication was received from its Vice-Chairman that the Special Committee has, by the vote of the majority of its undersigned members caused the following Motion to be inscribed on the Agenda of the Consultative Assembly's autumn session:

COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
21st April, 1956.

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE  
Doc. 513.

### CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

Eighth Ordinary Session  
(First Part)

Action to secure the release of non-communist  
political prisoners behind the Iron Curtain

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION  
presented by M. WISTRAND and  
a number of his colleagues

The Assembly,

Having regard to current reports of an evolution which is said to be taking place in the USSR and the satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe;

Considering that vast numbers of people are still held in captivity in these countries on political grounds;

Calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners in these countries; And expresses the view that a good test of the alleged new intentions of the USSR and the satellites will be the answer given to this demand.

Signed:

*Wistrand, Bögholm, Mandalinci, Crosbie, Kiesinger, Cornignon-Molinier, Hutchison, Daines, Countess Finckenstein, Czernetz, Paul, Goedhart, Fens, Janssen, Jakobsen, MacBride.*

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## On the Track of Events

# The Drama's Latest Scene

(D. V.) Ever since the Soviet State came into being, the world at large had to put up, time and again, with inventive new performances on the Moscow stage. Indeed, the stage managers of the Kremlin have no cause to complain about lack of patience or tolerance on the part of their audience. Although producers, as well as heroes and leading ladies, do change from time to time in the "Bolshoy" theatre on the banks of the Moskva river—theatre having chosen the vast expanses of Russia for its setting and using hundreds of millions of human beings as its silent extras—the interest and the attention of a wide public in the rest of the world have remained focussed on it to this day.

Just think of the number of attractive sensations enacted on that stage. There was the thrilling assassination of the imperial family at Yekaterinburg, there were the millions of corpses starved during the well-engineered famine in the Ukraine; the mass-graves of the Polish officers' corps at Katyn; the torture chambers first destined for 'class enemies' and 'bourgeois nationalists', to be filled later by the victims chosen from the ranks of communism's own actors in the drama of show trials and bloody liquidations; finally, the millions of graves and gallows in the 'liberated' satellite countries. In between, there was the episode of the "gentleman's agreement" with Hitler yielding the profit of one-half of Poland. Soon the switch came to the alliance with the demo-

cratic powers under the sign of 'anti-fascism' and, in the end, the 'struggle for peace' and the 'campaign to abolish colonialism'—enacted on the blood-soaked tombs of brutally raped nations. That everything should have clicked so well, was to no mean extent attributable to 'good, old Uncle Joe' who, for some time, had been a stage-manager particularly well-liked by leading western statesmen.

But now there emerged in Moscow a new drama producer in the person of Mr. Nikita Krushchev; he seems exceedingly well suited to satisfy successfully the new requirements of a public eager for change. After Malenkov's dramatic exit on account of his 'inability', Khrushchev himself vaingloriously grabbed the boss's baton, even though only in the name of a 'collective leadership'. How long his ascendancy is to last is, of course, another question, but it in no way diminishes his present success. At any rate, he achieved the hat-trick of dethroning posthumously little father Stalin—in his lifetime considered Lenin's equal and still sharing the latter's mausoleum—declaring the defunct leader a criminal lunatic and rehabilitating his victims. Drama critics in the West are indulging in profound and involved analyses, the general public is spellbound by the spectacle, some are almost feeling tempted to applaud it. Yet nobody seems particularly disturbed by the fact that, when condemning Stalin's evil deeds and murders, mention is only made of injustices and cruelties committed against members of their own retinue: the rulers of the Kremlin do not speak of mass assassinations and other crimes perpetrated to the detriment of nations outside the Soviet Union and of victims refusing to conform to the communist creed—nobody bothers whether or not restoration is made in their favour. What matters is that a new play is being produced and that it promises to become a cash-box success.

However, if the free world has not yet gone entirely out of its mind, it should at long last make it up as to how much longer it is prepared to tolerate the bloody drama enacted in Moscow. When, in a concert auditorium, the music wanders out of tune or a theatrical audience becomes signally dissatisfied with the play it is watching, whistling and booing will be heard and rotten eggs, sometimes even chairs, thrown at the stage. When, however, as it now happens, the highest representative of a system, which claims to be ushering in a new epoch of history and a future golden age for all mankind, gets up on the open stage to confess that his predecessor, who was the master not only of hundreds of millions of humans but in a certain sense of the entire world's political destinies, had been a bloodthirsty murderer and a demented criminal—the world is contemplating the spectacle with equanimity without even asking the question whether or not the tyrant's successor is endowed with the same 'qualities' and what should come of it all in the end.

Undoubtedly, the latest scene in the Moscow drama gives away the show unequivocally: the Soviet system is rotten to the core, both as concerns its domestic and foreign affairs. Therefore, it is desperately looking for new ground even if it has to perform a *salto mortale* in order to find it. Should it be allowed once more to consolidate so that it may, sooner or later, throw the entire world upon the mercy of those tyrannical madmen and assassins who will not hesitate to deliver to the hangman their own children and disciples?

## Green Light for Tito

by RATKO PAREŽANIN

Following upon the 20th Party Congress in Moscow, a good deal of ferment has naturally enough set in amongst all communist parties, in the satellite countries as well as in the free world. Rehabilitating those that had been liquidated or punished, on the one hand, and demotion or transfer of yesterday's favourites, on the other, are the order of the day. Communist leaders everywhere have both hands full of work and lots of headaches, and the process is not likely to prove a short one. The free world may be certain, however, that the new theses proclaimed by Khrushchev and Bulganin will prevail within the confines of world communism. Already today it is clear that communists all over the globe have, by and large, adopted the Kremlin's new tactics and interpretation. There might be minor resistances and delays, such as we are witnessing in Czechoslovakia, but they are of no importance and will soon be overcome. Whether we like it or not, we must therefore recognize the fact that communism's monolithic nature has once more asserted itself. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has preserved its prestige unimpaired; throughout the communist world its leadership has again successfully stood the test.

Only Tito's régime in Yugoslavia seems to have been spared the 'agonising reappraisal' to which all other communist parties are being subjected. He and his followers in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have won the day. For they alone need not rehabilitate and pardon—at least not overtly—the men whom they had liquidated, punished and defamed after Tito's break with Moscow, in 1948. At any rate, most of the 'kominformist' elements formerly persecuted have been gradually released from prisons and forced-labour camps, particularly since Tito's meeting with Khrushchev and Bulganin last year. In his statement to both houses of the Belgrade Parliament, on March 27 this year, the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior, Mr. S. Stefanovich, reported i. a. "From 1948 to the end of 1955, altogether 15,863 persons were prosecuted for kominformist activities; of these 11,640 were sentenced or otherwise punished. In the course of last year, all remaining groups held interned or in forced-labour camps were released. 1,385 persons who had been sentenced by courts of law are still in prison but their number will greatly decrease during the current year."

Those communist party members who were clinging to Tito faithfully during his long-protracted quarrel with Moscow now see the prestige of their leader considerably enhanced. They feel even closer to Tito as well as stronger in heart, if not in numbers.

In view of this position Tito is being more active in the sphere of foreign affairs than ever before.

His old dream of a Balkan, maybe even a Danube-Balkan Federation has again become topical. The original plan had been frustrated by Stalin, and at that time the removal and untimely death of the old Bulgarian communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, was thought to be connected with the failure of the plan. All of a sudden, Dimitrov had been mysteriously whisked to Moscow

by airplane. While he was still alive, the then Premier, and one of Dimitrov's and Tito's most enthusiastic allies in their striving for a communist Balkan Federation, Traicho Kostov, was first only demoted and appointed national director of public libraries. However, Dimitrov soon fell ill in the USSR, died, and only his body returned to Sofia. No sooner had this happened than, Kostov—the same Yugoslav whose memory was recently cleared—was arraigned, sentenced and executed. His butcher, Vlko Chervenkov—Dimitrov's brother-in-law but otherwise a rabid Stalinist—became Prime Minister. He who had liquidated Kostov as a 'Titoist traitor' was recently forced to eat his words and resign the Premiership in a plenary sitting of the Sofia Parliament, ironically with Tito's visiting Parliamentary delegation looking on from Ministerial chairs.

The speeches and festivities with which that Yugoslav communist 'Parliamentary' delegation was received in Bulgaria clearly spell out the shape of things to come. Already Chervenkov is a 'fall guy' and we may rest assured that sooner or later all his followers and intimate collaborators will disappear from the scene, yielding up their posts of power to Georgi Dimitrov's and Traicho Kostov's one-time friends who are also the friends of Tito.

It is of great significance that Tito's choice for heading the Yugoslav delegation should have been Moshe Pijade. Although President of the Yugoslav National Assembly, Pijade's real importance lies in his being Tito's brains and right hand. Undoubtedly he was sent to Bulgaria on a scouting mission to feel out the atmosphere in relation to the revival of a Balkan Federation plan.

There is evidence to support the assumption that Tito wants to draw into the orbit of that Federation Romania and, perhaps, also Hungary. Moreover, he is casting a greedy eye on Greece, too.

For the time being, Moscow does not seem to object to Tito's grandiose ambitions. The question was clarified in the talks he had last year with Khrushchev and Bulganin in Belgrade and on the Isle of Brioni. It would indeed be the apotheosis of practical "active coexistence", not only in the international field but in a closer confederate framework, if a non-communist State such as Greece were to prove willing to be drawn into it.

Tito has obtained Moscow's blessings for his old dream because, much as the idea had been hateful to Stalin, it fits beautifully into the Kremlin's present strategy and tactics. Of course, Moscow should not be expected to approve of the plan openly: such attitude might arouse grave apprehensions in the West. Therefore the roles are to be divided carefully. While the Soviet leaders prepare the ground internally among the satellites, Tito has been assigned the task of doing likewise in the sphere of international politics.

When the moment has come, Tito will present to the peoples of Yugoslavia the setting-up of a Balkan or Balkan-Danube Federation as the realisation of the old ideals and dreams "of the Balkan and South Slavonic nations' best sons, greatest statesmen, poets and prophets". Communist propaganda will skilfully see to it that the plan is dished up to the masses of ordinary people concerned as that "mighty community of the peace-loving small nations" for which they had been longing ever of old—for, precisely because

## EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

*they are small and peace-loving, they were time and again being torn asunder and trodden underfoot by the big powers of both East and West.*

*Since Tito has once more joined forces with Moscow, the people of Yugoslavia have become exceedingly mistrustful and terrified of the Soviet Union. Misgivings and fear could at least be tempered by the communist régime in Yugoslavia if a federation of the kind Tito has in mind came into being with Moscow's blessings.*

*As regards the western world, Tito is hopeful that he will find understanding with the better part of public opinion; he is relying, in the first place, on most neutralists, pacifists, coexistentialists, advocates of the popular front and, to some extent, even the western social democrats. Tito is, moreover, sure that he can count on a sympathetic attitude from the new independent states and nations of Asia and Africa whom he is wooing incessantly for new friends.*

*In present-day Europe, Tito concentrates on seeking support in France, where he is expected on a state visit in the near future, and in Belgium. He attributes great psychological importance to the winning over to his side of precisely those two countries which in both world wars had been the allies of the South Slavs and particularly the Serbian people. Rumour has it that Tito is already taking it for granted that France and Belgium will officially support him.*

*It should be understood that Tito is not inclined to carry out his plans for a Balkan Federation without the West agreeing to it. Nor does Moscow want him to do so or, generally speaking, risk a split with the West. That would not suit the Kremlin's book at the moment. If, however, the Balkan Federation plan were to be shipwrecked by western resistance against their expectation, Moscow and Belgrade would still count on such a turn of events causing major dissensions within the free world; the communist cause would be once more the winner, for the West would lose its chances on the Balkans to the USSR. Communist propaganda is certainly going to represent the scheme of a Danube-Balkan Federation as a wholly peaceful and defensive community of small countries, practising 'active coexistence' and wishing only to remain neutral between the big-power blocs. Shame on him who ventures to object to such an idyllic creation!*

*It will not be easy to win Greece for Tito's plan, particularly owing to the gravity of her disputes with Bulgaria. Here again, the Yugoslav communist leader relies on his pull with the new 'titoist' crew to overcome these difficulties on the Bulgarians' side. It is also to be expected that both Moscow and Belgrade will support Greece up to hilt on the Cyprus issue and in relation to her claims against Albania. Once again, should these maneuvers be temporarily frustrated by Greece's King Paul, acting in concert with right-wing and moderate circles, the strategists of Moscow and Belgrade will utilise such a situation for the bolstering-up of communist popularity with those left-wing and popular-front elements who made a not unimportant advance in Greece's recent general election.*

*The scheme of which I have been trying to set out the mere outlines is being carefully studied in the centers of communist policy planning and will be carried out by cautious instalments. It is certainly on a much vaster scale*

than the public opinion and press of the free world suspects and is very closely connected with present-day communist subversive action in the Middle East. Tito's activities and the aggressive maneuverings of Arab nationalism are conceived of as the concerted moves of two prongs of a pincer aimed at crushing the West's most vital positions in that region.

Since Tito is playing such an instrumental part in the carrying out of that vast scheme, he is enabled to continue indulging in a veritable orgy of that 'personality cult' which is so forcefully denounced everywhere else in the communist orbit today. Moscow has its designs with Tito; therefore he is allowed not only to preserve but to increase his prestige. And if the Balkan-Middle East scheme proved a success it would represent communism's biggest victory yet in the cold war as well as the greatest defeat suffered by the West since the close of World War II.

## We Wanted to Kill Him

A great song and dance was made about the humane disposition of Tito's World-War-II partisans, in that notable motion picture entitled "*The Last Bridge*". It told the world a great deal of what those partisans had never been and concealed everything they had in reality done and stood for.

"Domestic consumption", on the other hand, is served by Tito's régime in an altogether different manner. In order to provide the young generations with an adequate education, the bloodthirstiness of the wartime partisans is particularly plugged in literature as a great virtue practised by the "great fighters for freedom". In this type of literature destined for home consumption, there is no trace of a humane attitude towards captured enemies. For example, *Mirko Vujatchich*, one of the literary tycoons of the Communist régime, of Yugoslavia and leader-writer of *Borba*, the Party daily newspaper, in his novel "The Crow on the Church Steeple" is bringing evidence which glaringly refutes the claims made in "*The Last Bridge*".

Thus he tells his readers: "Of our Italian prisoners we shot a soldier-boy. We did this although he had barely been 19

years old. He displayed a great deal of defiance and refused to dig his own grave. We 'riddled' him with rounds of ammunition from his own magazine. He never cried and did not even kiss or take off his Madonna, the little female of silver which every Italian soldier wears hung round his neck... At his execution he behaved childishly as though he had thought that people only wanted to play with him. *Yet we wanted to kill him.*"

And so the story goes on. What the narrator omits to reveal is that at that time he, too, had only been a boy. Later on, he had been taken prisoner by the Italians who, however, *refused to shoot him because he was not yet 20 years of age.*

The circumstance that he was spared never seems to have taught Mirko Vujatchich anything about "capitalist morality". He probably thinks them stupid and retrogressive sentimentalists who spared the life of the murderer of an Italian adolescent so that the assassin may live to tell the tale.

What can we do? "Peaceful coexistence" with murderers seems to be regarded as the panacea which will save Christianity from itself—a strange confusion of minds.

## The Liberal International's Attitude to Communism

by J. H. MACCALLUM SCOTT

Since its first Conference—in Oxford in 1947—the Liberal International has always taken a firm stand for freedom and against all that is implicit in the totalitarian way of life, whether of Fascist or Communist complexion. It could hardly do otherwise, for the two concepts of freedom and tyranny are so exactly and diametrically opposed that to lean towards the one is automatically to resist the other. Your totalitarian sees freedom as his worst enemy. Your Liberal knows that, in the long run, there can be no coexistence between his own beliefs and those who hold power by force. One or the other is bound to be beaten down.

The Liberal Manifesto itself makes it perfectly clear where the Liberal must stand. This declaration, adopted unanimously at that meeting in Oxford, sets out the principles on which society must be based and international stability founded. In democratic affairs, it says, the state must assume no power which conflicts with the fundamental rights of the citizens or with the conditions essential for a responsible and creative life. On the international side, it stresses the fundamental importance of respect for national independence and of the free movement of goods, people and ideas between nations. There could not be a more complete opposition to the Communist and Fascist practices of despotic politics at home, and power politics abroad.

In the nine years which have followed that first Conference, the Liberal International has taken an ever stronger and more positive line to illustrate the dangers into which the free way of life is heading. Perhaps its most forthright statement was *The Uppsala Appeal* which was issued at its Congress in Sweden in 1951. This was the time when great play was being made by the Communists with the Stockholm Peace Appeal, and when all the batteries of Communist propaganda were being channelled through that single word, Peace, using it as a kind of holy symbol which no one might question or deny. To work for peace was good; Communism was the greatest exponent of peace; therefore, Communism was good. Throughout the whole free world, people of good will and sloppy mind flocked to the Peace Campaign. Many democrats opposed it, but it was left to the Liberals not only to oppose it, but to debunk it by the fallacy that lay behind the Communist reasoning.

The first draft of the Uppsala Appeal was written by Don Salvador de Madariaga, at that time President of the Liberal International, and the final document varied little from it. It was very short, but its small compass included all that needed to be said. A Government which held down its own people by force could not be said to have secured internal peace; and it could not, therefore, be trusted to remain at peace with the rest of the world. Peace

could not be based on internal or foreign oppression. The only way to Peace lay through freedom, for freedom was an essential guarantee against preparations for aggression and therefore indispensable to the world-wide confidence on which peace must be based. Finally, it pointed out that the main purpose of the Communist World Peace Movement was to weaken the free nations by playing on man's natural and not unworthy hatred of war. "No peace worth the name," it concluded, "can be purchased at the cost of freedom."

At the same time, the Liberal International has been deeply concerned with the more positive methods of combatting Communism. In particular, it has thrown its whole weight into the fight for a closer integration of Europe, and has played a leading role not only in the general political field but also in such more specialised areas as the Council of Europe and the Coal and Steel Community. Integration, which is based on the elimination of restrictions, is a natural Liberal development, and the fact that a free union of the European peoples is the best possible antidote to Communism makes Liberalism, and especially international Liberalism, the advance-guard of the anti-Communist forces.

A word should also be said about the Liberal International's Congress in Lucerne, Switzerland, in 1955. It took place shortly after the meeting of Heads of State in Geneva that summer when the political air was still thick with heady talk about "the Geneva spirit". The problems of "co-existence" and "subversion" filled the Congress Agenda, and were discussed exhaustively. The result was a clear and unequivocal rejection of the idea that the Russian leadership had suffered a change of heart, coupled with a call for a more realistic approach to the need to counter Communist methods of subversion. This view, which was only too amply confirmed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference a month or two later, constituted the first warning against complacency issued by any organised group.

Finally, not long after it was established, the Liberal International held a Conference for Liberals living in exile. Many of the satellite countries had been represented at the original Conference at Oxford, but on this occasion the delegates were concerned primarily with the exile viewpoint, and with the particular contribution which those liberals living in exile could make to the fight to re-establish liberal thought. As a result of the Conference, the Committee of Liberal Exiles was established, and it has played an important and very helpful part in the work of the Liberal International ever since. Its representatives have attended its Executive Committee regularly, and at its longer annual meetings the voice of exiled Liberalism has been accorded a welcome and deeply interested hearing. The Liberal International has never wavered in its expression of the belief that there can be no stable peace in the world while small nations are subjugated as they are to-day.

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# Time for European Economic Solidarity

by MERCURY

In wide circles of the West German economy the hope is still being entertained that it will be possible to intensify in a lucrative way commercial exchanges with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Eastern bloc. Viewing the situation from a purely commercial angle, the fact is naively, sometimes even deliberately, overlooked that *trade with the East is of an essentially, political nature.*

There are undoubtedly possibilities to increase the volume of trade; for in recent postwar years the economic structure of Soviet Russia and its European satellites has been changing at an ever higher rate of speed, and industrialisation in China has also made considerable headway. Reminiscences from the 'thirties have therefore largely become irrelevant. If, back in 1932, the German Reich absorbed 46.5% of the total of Soviet exports while selling 10.9% of its exported goods on the Russian market, that situation was due to the world's economic crisis then in progress. Nor can the average, calculated over the period from 1925 to 1941, of a 23.5% German share in Moscow's exports and a 4.7% slice of Germany's total exports directed to the Soviet Union, be applied as a yardstick to present-day conditions. In Soviet Russia the numbers of the population have risen steeply from 139 million, in 1914, to 214 million, in 1954—an increase by 54%. There has been a considerable structural change, too. Owing to forced industrialisation, the urban population in the Soviet Union has, over the last four decades, risen from 25 to 85 million, representing an increase of 340% while the production of agricultural and consumer goods has been raised by only 10% during the same period. Tsarist Russia's classical exports, such as grain, timber, dried peas, beans and lentils, oleaginous seeds, flax and hemp, have ceased to be surplus goods and are now being imported by the Soviet Union.

West German economic circles are frequently considering themselves handicapped by the circumstance that some NATO countries—above all Great Britain, but also France—have conformed to the rules, which ban the exportation of certain goods to the Eastern bloc, with a less meticulous European sense of duty than the Federal Republic. President Eisenhower's recent announcement which foreshadowed some loosening-up of the embargo was, therefore, greatly welcomed in those German economic circles. A closer look at the overall position, however, will soon reveal that such export bans as have been observed by the NATO partners more or less conscientiously are not at all decisive in relation to a potential increase in East-West trade. Neutral European countries, not members of NATO and thus not subject to supervision by the Paris Coordinating Committee (COCOM) in respect of compliance with embargo regulations, may serve as clear-cut test cases to prove that East-West trade is not likely to be noticeably stimulated by a relaxation of selective export restrictions. For, despite the embargo, industrialisation has so much got into its stride in the Eastern bloc countries that by now they no longer need to import from the West those goods—such as arms, ammunition, nuclear raw materials, machine-tools to make atom bombs, etc.—on which an absolute ban has been imposed. Above all, the Eastern bloc is in need of

capital goods with which to supplement, i. e. enlarge, its industrial potential. Since, as is well-known, the East has not at its disposal adequate means of payment to purchase in large quantities the goods it needs, it will confine itself to buying what it deems most vital for its own purposes—in other words, it will certainly not buy finished products, let alone consumer goods.

Commercial policy has always been a very important tool of general political policy for dictatorships. For two years already the so-called offensive of the rouble has been concentrated on the Arab countries and those of South-East Asia. Needless to say that Russia's European glacis of satellites is participating in it. Jordan, for example, has entrusted Poland with the planning of the reconstruction of the Hejaz railway. A Soviet delegation of experts is at the present time advising the Yemen Government on matters relating to that country's industrialisation. Premier Bulganin has offered Pakistan assistance for the peaceful use of atomic energy. The Syrian Government has been approached once more with a Soviet offer to build the projected oil refinery. Czechoslovakia is anxious to build the new Damascus airport. The Hungarian nationalized engineering industry has been commissioned to construct and erect a number of important road and railway bridges in Egypt. This very month, Red China is visiting Cairo with a large-scale industrial fair. A delegation of shipbuilding experts from the Eastern Zone of Germany is negotiating the building of shipyards in Alexandria. Similarly, Poland is pouring propaganda into the Arab countries to obtain orders for its shipbuilding works.

This policy of trade expansion, now pursued with particular vehemence along the southern confines of the Soviet bloc, is—as the Review of the Czechoslovak Institute of Statistics candidly admitted not long ago—"the upshot of a precise plan, elaborated in accordance with political considerations".

Since Bulganin and Khrushchev completed their extensive propaganda tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan, the western world has come to recognize with awe what Moscow's trade offensive is driving at—the political penetration of these vast and populous areas. Donning the mask of the benign uncle, the itinerant Russians offered economic assistance to all and sundry. At the same time, they skilfully kindled the national susceptibilities and resentments still nurtured toward the former colonial masters. The Soviet emissaries knew how to render their offers particularly attractive by, firstly, charging low prices, secondly, granting long-term credits at an average rate not exceeding 2 per cent., and finally, by accepting repayment in goods.

These methods are well adapted to the psychological and economic requirements of the Orient. For once, the eastern mentality bent on bargaining is exceptionally responsive to the lure of low prices. Also, the industrial products of the Soviet bloc—let the West beware of misleading illusions—are cheaper not only because of their lower standards of quality; their machine-tools and instruments are, apart from their other features, simpler in design and finish. Now, these uncomplicated, one might almost say, fool-proof machines are just the thing the former colonial countries and underdeveloped areas need. And the possibility of repayment by barter trade represents a great advantage to those states so notoriously short of foreign currencies.

## EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

The Soviet Union, for example, recently accepted from Cairo payment in great quantities of raw cotton at a price which it would have been impossible for Egypt to attain on the western market. Meanwhile, the same cotton has turned up once more in the world's free markets, but this time offered by the Soviet bloc countries at a much lower price. One of the by-products of this operation was an incidental disturbance of barter relations—already difficult enough in themselves—between Egypt and the West German Federal Republic.

It is true, of course, that the volume of exports from the communist countries is not nearly what eastern propaganda would have us believe. Thus, according to expert British estimates, the total value of exports from the Soviet bloc to the Middle East and South-East Asia amounted only to about \$ 150 million in 1955. This is not much in comparison to the flow of western goods directed to Arab and Asiatic regions. West Germany alone exported goods to that area to the tune of \$ 450 million, last year. The same applies to credits granted. Western private commercial firms—not to speak of State loans—have extended to the countries under review medium-term credits for the purchase of goods many times as much again as offered by the Eastern bloc. To this must be added the economic aid granted directly by governments—in the case of the Colombo Plan Great Britain and the USA gave assistance to the tune of nearly 1,2 billion dollars from 1951 to 1955.

The essential thing, therefore, is that the Western powers must not, as has hitherto been done, appear in the Arab-Asian markets singly, let alone competing with one another. Precisely because the former colonial powers are faced with heavy odds of a psychological nature, everything should be done to soothe the susceptibilities of the newly established independent states in the region under review, they being particularly apprehensive of government assistance; moreover, it is important that the West should render its offers more attractive by lending them massive weight through concerted action, so as to capitalize on them in the field of political propaganda, too.

In the above sense there is much to be said for such plans as were recently discussed by German firms—Krupp's for example—in their talks with US Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy. For it would seem desirable that, when seeking orders from underdeveloped areas, the western industrial countries should form *ad hoc* international business groups and submit concerted tenders. This method carries with it two advantages; on the one hand, the West could oppose the Eastern bloc with a united front of economic policy; on the other hand, it is easier for an international business group to assuage the misgivings of one of those sensitive, newly-independent countries than for a former colonial power to offer itself as prospective partner.

There can hardly be any doubt that every single economic move made by the Eastern bloc is also aimed at an ulterior political objective. Therefore *the West should learn the lesson that rather than striving for the less important goal of intensifying trade with the Soviet bloc and Red China, it must close its ranks and devote all its energies to the building up of the underdeveloped areas, in deliberate competition of an economic and thereby also political nature with Moscow and Peiping.*

# Koran — Soviet Key to East

by IZEDDIN SAMI

*Cairo, April 1, 1956*

When, some years ago I first had the opportunity of talking with Halid Bardash, head of the Communist Party of Syria, at Zahleh, that ravishing beauty spot in the Lebanon mountains, I was amazed by his theological knowledge. Without trying to conceal my astonishment, I spontaneously asked Bardash how and where he had so profoundly acquainted himself with Islamic doctrine, seeing that theologians trying to interpret tenets of faith from "the book of books" were in many instances far from arriving at clear, let alone unanimous, conclusions. Obviously flattered by my appreciation of his knowledge, Bardash replied with a wry smile of pride lingering on his lips: "The Koran is the key to the gates of the Orient, and we Marxists have learned from experience the need to be able to handle that key."

At that time my interlocutor was living as a proscribed exile in a small village near Beirut. The Lebanese Government was headed by Riadh-es-Solh, to be killed later by an assassin at Amman. My meeting with Bardash, one of the most outstanding personalities of the communist underground movement in the Middle East, was arranged by an Arab journalist who had lived in Europe for many years; ours was a strange acquaintanceship, which enabled me, however, to have a good look round behind the scenes of communist subversion, and the methods it employs, in the Middle East.

The overthrow of Shishakly in Syria made it possible for Halid Bardash to return to Damascus. He is now sitting in the Syrian Parliament as the sole representative of the Communist Party. My conversations with him gave me the first clue to the use of Islamic theology by the communists for their own political purposes. I decided to follow that clue.

At the time when the late Mr. Mussadek's antics put in jeopardy not only Persia's oil revenues from Abadan but, owing to his underhand dealings with the pro-communist Tudeh Party, threatened to overthrow the Shah-in-Shah's constitutional monarchy, refugees from Persia's political and economic life were flocking to the Lebanon. Among the numerous Iranian refugee bankers, politicians and journalists I made the acquaintance of a particularly remarkable man whom, for the sake of mutual convenience, we will call Zafrullah.

Originally, Zafrullah had been a militant communist. As a youngster he had to escape to the Soviet Union where he became a komsomolets—a member of the communist youth organisation. In Moscow he was made to take a course for eastern agitators and was subsequently sent to Tadzhikistan there to complete his education by learning to harmonize Marx's dialectical materialism with Islamic theology. Why Tadzhikistan, I wondered. Zufrullah looked carefully round St. Simeon's beech in Beirut, where we were strolling leasurably before answering my question at length, in a low voice.

## THE SYMBIOSIS OF MARXISM AND ISLAM

Near Tashkent, in a rather nondescript house, standing in a hidden grove, a School of Islamic Theology—a medreseh—was established in 1944, with the purpose of providing students from Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia, Pakistan, Indonesia and all the Arab countries, who had previously been given communist training in Moscow, with a high-grade final polish in religious-ideological schooling based on a judicious combination of Marxism and the Koran. For many passages of the Muslims' holy writ, especially those dealing with social questions, can seemingly be made to harmonize with Marxist doctrine without having recourse to excessively tortuous sophisms. There is, for example, a verse in the Koran which teaches that the hungry masses have the right to rise against the rich and deprive them even by force of the gold they had amassed through exploiting the people. Now, that is a tenet which it certainly should not be difficult to reconcile with Marxist teaching. It provides the bolsheviks with a peach of a slogan with which to foment revolution among the Muslim masses in order to get them, eventually, under communist domination. Another quotation from a chapter of the Koran, entitled *Zekat*, orders the faithful to distribute annually a certain portion of their earnings among the poor.

These two examples alone suffice to illustrate the direction in which it is tried to coordinate the ethics of Islam with Marxist doctrine.

Koranic students at Tashkent, while devoting most of their time to the comparative study of Islamic theology and dialectical materialism, are under an obligation to memorize the Koran or at least learn so many verses of it by heart as to earn for themselves the title of *Hafiz*. At the end of the course, the students are subjected to a final examination which includes reciting, without reference to the holy book, the most important chapters—*Yasin*—of the Koran. Having thus graduated, the communist Koranic scholars are then dispatched by illegal routes to their respective native countries.

Persian Azerbeidzhan serves as the assembly ground and port of embarkation whence Moscow's emissaries are made to disperse in convoys all over the Middle East. The geographical position of the corner at the intersection of the Turkish, Persian and Iraqi borders, with its population of Kurds most of whom are contaminated with communism, provides an ideally suited area from which to flood the Middle East with agents and propaganda material. (Halid Bardash, the Syrian communist leader, of whom mention was made above, is also a Kurd by origin.)

Communist cells organized by Moscow in that area, are favourably poised to penetrate all the Arab countries as well as the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, the Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. If there is anything to be wondered at it is only that subversive work of this type should have been allowed to go on unhindered for a number of years.

Bolshevik agents equipped with Islamic theological schooling find fitting bases for their activities in a great number of Muslim monasteries, the so-called *tekiyehs*, medresehs and the local organisations of the Moslem Brotherhood. One of the most active groups is a branch organisation of the Brotherhood, named "*Islamic Sacrifice*", whose leader, Sa'awa happens to be behind bars at the present time. Many of these and similar religious organisations

have been practically converted into communist party cells. Typical of their strivings was the attitude adopted by Ayatullah Kashani, the head of Persia's fanatical Muslim fraternity.

At the communist-run medreseh in Tashkent, the students are indoctrinated with the idea that, in the first phase of collaboration between Islam and Marxism, their common enemy, the western world, must be defeated. In the directives sent from Moscow that phase is termed "the symbiosis of Marxism and Islam"; it is a thesis which must not only be zealously propagated but confirmed by adept theologians on Koranic grounds.

In the course of this first phase of evolution, neither the Soviet agents nor the communist-trained theologians are allowed to engage in arguments relating to the existence or non-existence of Allah or the truth of Islamic revelation as announced through the Prophet Mohammed. These questions are strictly reserved for the second phase in which the new propagandists shall be selected and trained in those very countries where they will eventually be called upon to work. These Marxist theological cadres will, according to the Kremlin's strategy, be called upon to demolish step by step the very concept of *Allah* until the time is ripe for the final dethronement of Islam's deity. The powers that pull the strings in the Muslim-Marxist theological training centers have named this second period "the ideological conquest of Islam".

#### KORAN AND DIESEL ENGINE

The political planners in the Soviet Union are well aware that in the orbit of the Islamic world they can only hope to carry out their subversive work successfully if they harness the Koran to their evil purpose. Bolshevik experts are, therefore, busy analyzing with diabolical precision every verse, every sentence in Islam's holy writ that might lend itself to furthering world communism's ends.

In the course of past centuries, the Koranic precept "every Muslim is the other Muslim's brother" has become an unshakable dogma in the world of Islam. Between the Atlantic Ocean and the Persian Gulf these words represent a live force, not a mere formula. Therefore, also, Moscow's emissaries who are burrowing their ways through the countries of Islam, with turbans wound round their heads and the Koran in their hands, are looked upon as "missionaries" and allowed to travel about without let or hindrance. When leaving Azerbaïdzhan for the South, they need no passports; their movements are not supervised by any one; the Koran is their document of identification that gains them willing admission to monasteries, schools and mosques. And, as even their adversaries would concede, these Soviet-trained Muslim clerics—*imams*—are fascinating preachers. The religious services they conduct are permeated by the spirit of their high-level knowledge and profound erudition. Their lectures are essentially different from the sermons of the *ulema* trained at the Cairo University of *El Azhar*, for the latter still reflects the reactionary interpretation of the Koran, its exegesis being based on scholastic methods. As opposed to the old-fashioned alumni of *El Azhar*, the Soviet-trained Islamic theologians display a many-sided education; they can make the Koran come alive and bring it into connection with contemporary events. Moreover, these

men are fully qualified to talk about any topical subject from the solar system to the Diesel engine. No wonder that Moscow's Islamic theologian-propagandists are proving very attractive to the Muslim masses.

This campaign of communist infiltration, conducted with scientifically calculated methods, has already succeeded in gaining considerable influence with Islamic organisations of varying hues. It is thanks to them that Halid Bardash is holding his seat in the Syrian Parliament—thanks to their persistent activities among the students and the members of the Moslem Brotherhood—for the Communist Party as such has hardly been able to strike any sympathetic chords in the hearts of the Syrian population. Communist influence has so far gained substantial footholds only with the refugees from Palestine who have not as yet been granted the franchise.

Communism has thus, with the help of its theologically trained agents, cleared the first hurdle on the road to the conquest of the Middle East. Soviet activity directed at the penetration of that region is in full progress. There remains only one question to be answered—how far will the western world be capable to call a halt to the political and ideological subversion conducted by the Kremlin. For if it does not so soon, the Sovietisation of the Middle East will become inevitable. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that pessimism is misplaced in judging these circumstances and events since once again the West seems to be missing the bus. There is no getting away from the fact that the Arab world has become the Achilles heel of the free world's defences against Soviet aggression.

## Clouds Over Romania

by HORIA ROMAN

The murders of Iuliu Maniu and Constantin Bratianu have, alas, not evoked nearly enough of an echo or given rise to sufficient protests in the free world. These two men had been the leaders of Romania's two great political parties based on popular mass support—the *National Peasant Party* and the *Liberal Party*. Their dramatic death should, therefore, have aroused at least as much of a vehement indignation as the hanging of Nikola Petkov, Masaryk's 'suicide', or the sentence inflicted on Cardinal Mindszenty. Yet nothing of the kind happened.

Unlike the exiles of other nations, the Romanians do not entertain close relations with the great British press, as do, fortunately for them, the Hungarians; which is a great pity.

Alone among the periodicals devoted to European unity, the *Bulletin Européen*, published in the French language in Rome, has commented on these tragic events, carrying a drawing on its title-page and, above all, a headline which aptly summarized the hard reality: "*Maniu and Bratianu Forsaken by the West; Assassinated by the Russians in Romanian Prisons*". Forsaken by the West—this is indeed an appropriate expression, for Maniu as well as

Bratianu signed the Romanian Armistice Agreement, on August 23, 1944, trusting, as did the great masses of their respective parties, not the Russians whom they did not believe, but the West.

It must be stated that, apart from the Review quoted above, only émigré periodicals, disseminated in limited circulation among fellow-compatriots all over the world, have commented on the disappearance of the two great Romanian statesmen who had, in South-Eastern Europe, occupied positions similar to those held by Sir Winston Churchill and Lord Attlee. (*An extensive obituary by Mr. D. C. Amzar was published in our November-December issue. Ed.*)

And there is, indeed, an old French diplomatist who, having had the opportunity to get to know, in his youth long since passed, that magnificent oriental Paris which merry Bucharest had once been, has recalled the fact that Bratianu belonged to that family whose members had been the architects of modern Romania and that Maniu, with his formidable Party of Transylvania liberated, had contributed to the democratisation of that country, a Latin island in the Slavonic ocean of South-Eastern Europe.

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Clouds are gathering on Romania's already darkened sky. A French review has published the news, inoffensive in appearance but in reality of incalculable gravity, that in the liturgy of the Orthodox Church the Romanian is to be replaced by the Russian language. Under the headline "ROMANIA—THE CROSS UNDER THE SICKLE" the periodical *Jours de France*, in its issue No. 57, published in Paris, December 17—24, 1955, carried the news of which we extract the following:

Lengthy talks have taken place in Moscow between M. Constantinescu, Romanian Minister of Religious Cults, and M. Karpov, President of the Committee of Religious Cults in the USSR. The objective pursued by the talks was to strengthen the "cooperation" between the Romanian Church and the Patriarchate of Moscow. It was decided: first, that in future Moscow will have to be informed in advance of the names of persons nominated to become dignitaries of the Romanian Church; second, to send annually 60 young Romanian clergymen to Moscow so that they may finish their studies there; third, the Old Slavonic language, relinquished 200 years ago but still in use in the Russian Church, will soon be substituted for Romanian as the liturgical language.

Thus, insidiously and indirectly, it is Stalin's old policy that is being carried on; the policies of that Stalin whom the whole world today declares to have been a "demented criminal"; his typically Caucasian cunning has left behind it prolific seeds, and it is Stalin still who guides Soviet expansionist policy directed toward the heart of Europe.

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In conclusion, an Italian repatriated recently from Bucharest, has brought the information that the historical libraries are now in the process of being destroyed systematically in Romania. The first to be hit was Ion C. Bratianu's collection of books which consisted of 45,000 volumes of Romanian works of history—200 of them were unique in the world.

This, then, represents more than an isolated act of vandalism: this is an episode from the process of annihilating methodically a cultural heritage by which it is hoped to wipe off the face of the world forever the history and the intellectual life of an entire nation.

The outlines of the Soviet plan are thus clearly revealing themselves:

- a) the elimination of politicians enjoying a certain reputation in the world and enjoying an embarrassing prestige with the Romanian masses;
- b) the abolition of cultural and religious traditions;
- c) the destruction of documents which are the legacy of Romanian history—the history of a country whose entire past is evidence of an insurmountable aversion to Russia.

Indeed, Stalin's work, bloody and destructive, is continuing unabated behind the Iron Curtain. That recent event, the demolition of the great idol, is but a crude farce. It is well known, anyway, that Russia is the classical country of the ballet and of choreography . . .

## Assembly of Captive European Nations

### CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ON STALIN'S REPUDIATION

*Dr. Vilis Masens, Chairman of ACEN, issued the following statement on the repudiation of Stalin by the current Kremlin masters:*

*"Now that Stalin has been repudiated by the current Moscow leaders who have themselves blindly carried out the late tyrant's orders during his lifetime (it is easy to condemn crimes which can no longer be remedied), and now that Stalin is blamed for all the misdeeds and murders of the past, the new régime, as an earnest of its sincerity, should exonerate and free without delay the victims of judicial murders who are still alive.*

*"Here we are thinking not only of such dignitaries as Cardinal Mindszenty, Cardinal Wyszynski, Archbishop Beran and the many others who formerly held high positions, but of the hundreds of thousands of people held in prison or forced labor camps on trumped-up charges, both in their native countries and in the Soviet Union.*

*"The greatest crime committed by the Stalin régime was the suppression of the national independence of nine countries and the consequent falsification of elections. Therefore, the second step, following in the immediate wake of the first one, should be to call, under proper international safeguards, unfettered national elections throughout the subjugated lands of Central and Eastern Europe since the power of the present rulers there is based on false elections."*

*"If the new Soviet régime has difficulty in finding all the evidence of Stalin's crimes, we could supply a substantial list drawn up by each of the nine countries' representatives in exile.*

*"Until these two steps are taken by the Kremlin, and the Iron Curtain lifted, we will continue to believe that the repudiation of Stalin is nothing more than an effort to appease the peoples living in the Soviet orbit and to deceive the West into believing that the new régime is treading a new path. In the meanwhile untold thousands of prisoners of war still languish in Soviet Russia, and images of Stalin and monuments to him still offend the dignity of our peoples. Meanwhile a history which has been deliberately falsified is still being taught to innocent schoolchildren in order to poison their minds.*

*"The world, and particularly the captive peoples, demand deeds—and not propaganda piffle."*

## Anti-Stalinism in the Captive Countries

The repercussions in the captive countries of Stalin's dethronement should be viewed as *the beginning* of a lengthy process, the end of which cannot be yet foreseen, rather than the conclusion of an era whose nightmarish memories, filled with blood, terror and purges, have disappeared overnight together with Stalin's "cult of personality", so dramatically attacked at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow:

That awe-inspiring move has so far evoked the loudest echo in Hungary and Poland, the latter country being flooded by a wave of rather surprising criticism of Stalin's crimes as well as the "undemocratic" development of the Polish Parliament and trade unions.

A Warsaw radio commentator, for example, said, on April 1, 1959, that the "revelations about Stalin" at the recent 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. in Moscow had heralded in "a new epoch of truth". They had been "painful to many people, and a great shock—but necessary". The new epoch was "ruthless in its speaking the truth about the past, in the repairing of its mistakes, cruelties and foolishness", the *Polish* commentator added. "Today we can talk and shout loudly if things go wrong, and this is the first but very important step for correcting evil."

The new "anti-Stalinist era" was called by the Polish commentator "our new spring". This "new spring" brought about the release from prison of former Deputy Premier and, until 1948, Communist Party boss, Wladyslaw Gomulka, together with a score of prisoners sentenced with him in 1951. Gomulka, as will be remembered, was arrested as the "would-be Tito" of Poland.

Gomulka's rehabilitation has not proved a smooth affair. In an article by Jozef Kleszcz, published in the Polish Communist newspaper *Trybuna Robotnicza*, on March 13, 1956, under the rather involved headline "On Different Roads of Transition to Socialism and the Deviation of Gomul-

ka", the latter is accused of having opposed "the building of socialism" and advocated the "introduction of capitalist methods in economy". Moreover, Mr. Kleszcz charged Gomulka with having "denied the leading role of the Soviet Communist Party in the socialist camp and the entire international workers' movement." Such "nationalist-opportunist deviation" represented the greatest sin to be ever committed in a communist country. Nevertheless, twenty days later, Gomulka was released by the new First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, Edward Ochab, succeeding Boleslaw Bierut who recently died in Moscow. It is interesting to note that Ochab had been one of the most fanatical accusers of Gomulka and is regarded as strictly a "Moscow-man".

In Poland as well as in all other Communist-dominated countries, the Communist party leaders are now anxious to prove that ordinary rank-and-file members were as guilty as they themselves of aiding and abetting Stalin's "cult of personality". On the other hand, however, attacks against Stalin limit themselves to the role Stalin played *after 1934*. Admittedly, Stalin had been grand until 1934, i. e. in the period of forced collectivisation, industrialisation, extermination of "kulaks", introduction of forced labor camps, etc. Stalin had turned evil only after 1934, i. e. in the period of the great purges, particularly after having "criminally dissolved" the Polish Communist Party in 1938. In this connection an article by Jerzy Morawski, a secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party, in *Trybuna Ludu* of March 27, 1956, is of special interest.

Morawski recalls the decision of the Comintern, in 1938, to dissolve the Polish Communist Party, and says it was taken "with the aid of false and fabricated accusations". "Almost all the leaders and activists of the Communist Party of Poland", he adds, "then residing in the

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Soviet Union, were arrested and sent to camps". According to Morawski, "Stalin's morbid suspiciousness and his growing despotism, not willing to admit even the slightest objection", were the greatest obstacles of socialist progress. He forgives, however, other leading Soviet Communists for not taking a firm stand sooner by asserting: "The point was not to save one's life. The point was to save the revolution."

According to the latest information the Hungarian Communist Party leadership had to undergo severe criticisms at recent party meetings. The Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party convened on March 12—13 to listen to an address by Hungary's "strong man" Mátyás Rákosi. His speech was published in *Szabad Nép* on March 15th, 1956. "We must study every detail of the 20th Congress decisions and put into practice its lessons as quickly and as thoroughly as possible", Rákosi said. Although many western observers believe that Rákosi's position of strength in the Hungarian Communist Party has been seriously undermined by the Moscow 20th Congress and by the wave of denunciations of the Stalinist "cult of personality", it still seems, as if Rákosi was Moscow's choice for any conceivable situation.

Thus, in a telegram sent to the Hungarian Central Committee by the "Russian Communists, made prisoners in World War I, who fought in the International Brigade of the Hungarian Red Army" under the leadership of "the excellent Béla Kún", a flattering reference is also made to Rákosi as one of the leaders of the revolution "with whom we fought side by side, in 1919, for the happiness of the Hungarian people". The rehabilitation of Béla Kún was made complete after an article published in *Szabad Nép* of March 21, 1956, by the Director of the Institute of (the Hungarian) Party History, László Réti. The "excellent" Béla Kún disappeared in Russia and died before a firing squad during the Stalinist purges of 1937—38 as a "Trotskyite and Bukharinite traitor". Said Réti: "Recent investigations have shown that this charge was unfounded."

At the end of March, 1956, there came another sensational move on Rákosi's part: the rehabilitation of László Rajk who was executed in September, 1949, as an "imperialist" and "Titoist agent". About six years ago, former Hungarian Minister for the Interior and, later, Foreign Affairs, László Rajk, faced a Communist Court in Budapest on charges of treason. In the course of his being questioned by the Court, Rajk made the following admissions:

"Yes, I am a traitor of many years' standing. I have spied for the United States, Great Britain, Hitler's Germany, and France. I gave them military information. I also worked hand-in-hand with Tito with the aim of breaking up relations between the Soviet Union and European Communist countries." The Budapest newspapers of March 31, 1956, the same which carried news of Rajk's trial and execution in 1949, gave the following information: "At the outcome of an investigation it has been revealed that László Rajk and his associates were innocent and were executed wrongfully. They are now posthumously rehabilitated."

One thing the Hungarian Communist papers seem to have forgotten; namely, that in Sept., 1949, they printed column after column of *Rajk's own confessions*. The former Minister *personally confessed* all his sins and admitted that he had been a traitor. The Communist press of Hungary and other countries had at that time stated that Rajk was telling the truth. Now the same press announced that an investigation revealed, more than five years later, that Rajk did not know what he was talking about! In his speech rehabilitating Rajk, Rákosi tried to blame whatever excesses were committed by the security police on Beria and on the ex-chief of the Hungarian Secret Police, Gábor Péter. However, if Stalin was responsible for Beria, Rákosi is equally responsible for Gábor Péter. When in his speech Rákosi said Beria and Péter had fabricated the charges against László Rajk, he was also indirectly indicting himself since at the time of Rajk's show-trial Rákosi was the real chief of the secret police.

Will Rákosi be demoted or relegated to lesser party duties? It is hard to say. At

any rate, it should be noted that on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the "liberation" of Hungary by the Red Army (April 3, 1956) it was Sándor N6grádi who made the "liberation speech" at the Budapest Opera House, and not Mátyas Rákosi. Up to now N6grádi has been a comparatively unimportant party official and "political general". Known as pro-Titoist, he was relieved of his post as First Deputy Defence Minister several months ago. He now leaped into some prominence with his "liberation speech" and might next be picked to assume important party duties if the Hungarian Communists find it necessary to shove Rákosi more into the shade. In his speech N6grádi stressed the importance of the "People's Patriotic Front", a non-Communist organization used by the ex-Premier Imre Nagy from July, 1953, until the autumn of 1954, when Rákosi overthrew Nagy and his "patriotic front" policy. N6grádi called for an "increased part of the People's Patriotic Front" in Hungarian social life, now, although he also indicated that, generally speaking, there would be no return to Nagy's "new course" policy.

While Hungary's Rajk has been posthumously rehabilitated the Czechoslovak Communist leadership is not willing to rehabilitate Rudolf Slansky and Vladimir Clementis who, together with a group of alleged "Titoists" and "imperialist agents" were executed in 1952 after a show-trial.

At a press conference in Moscow on April 6, 1956, Zdenek Fierlinger, President of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, said that the name of executed party leader Rudolf Slansky would not be cleared in the current drive to rehabilitate the purged victims of the Stalin era. Fierlinger added that the Slansky case had been thoroughly investigated and "we found that the verdict of 'guilty' was justified, and no change is to be expected".

For how long will the present Czechoslovak Communist régime's leadership be able to resist pressure from Moscow to adopt the anti-Stalinist line, cannot be foreseen. At any rate, the official Czechoslovak Communist Party organ *Rude Pravo* announced on April 12, 1956, the release and rehabilitation of all wrongly imprisoned "honorable and faithful" party members who had been implicated in the

Slansky trial. Accusations against Rudolf Slansky had been that he had plotted with Tito to set up a national-communist government in Czechoslovakia, that he was a member of the international Zionist conspiracy. In the course of a show-trial Slansky confessed that all these charges were true.

*Rude Pravo* said that "it has been shown that it was wrong to sentence people only on the basis of their own confessions by using illegal methods without having real material evidence". According to the Communist newspaper Slansky caused breaches of "socialist legality" in security and judicial organs. This led to unjust sentences of "honorable and faithful" Communists. *Rude Pravo* said Slansky ordered security organs to adopt as their own the methods of the "capitalist police apparatus", particularly of the Nazi Gestapo.

This type of Communist mental acrobatics is very difficult to follow for the western mind. It would seem to amount to an official admission that most of those convicted in the Slansky trial had been innocent while the principal accused—Slansky and also Vlado Clementis—had so to speak dug their own grave by violating "socialist legality".

Otherwise, in its resolution of March 30, 1956, (published only on April 3) the Prague Central Committee declared itself faithful to the principle of "collective leadership" but in that lengthy document *Stalin's name was not even mentioned!* It limited itself to a statement calling for the implementation of Marxist-Leninist principles of "collective leadership" and at the same time claimed that the first steps in this direction had been taken as early as 1953. It is apparent that the Czechoslovak Communist leaders are collectivity sheltering in anonymity when it comes to attacking Stalin's memory. Moreover, while other Communist régimes put all the blame on their "state security organs", the Czechoslovak resolution reaffirms that these organs must, on the one hand, "maintain socialist laws" and, on the other, "be uncompromising and firm against the machinations of the class enemy".

Whether or not East Germany's Walter Ulbricht was afraid of losing his own life

while attacking Stalin, remains to be seen. Said Ulbricht: "We did not deny that Stalin was a Marxist, even an educated Marxist, but if we analyze the developments exactly we must say that after the 17th Party Congress J. V. Stalin showed increasing tendencies of personal despotism... The result of this personality cult were a number of mistakes... Some comrades may say 'Stalin is known to the masses as the man who defeated Hitlerite Fascism'. I must tell them that our Party documents said that Hitlerite Fascism was defeated by the heroism of the Soviet Army and the Soviet people. This is still our opinion... It is also said in the Stalin biography that Stalin was an 'ingenious generalissimo' without whom no important decision has been made, and who alone led the country to victory over Fascism. This is historically not correct!..."

There are many such assertions to be found in the speech Ulbricht made before the SED (Communist) Party conference in East Berlin last month. He was in a great hurry to follow the new Moscow anti-Stalinist line. Whether this fact will save his head, nobody can tell. In any case Ulbricht certainly will not forget the words shouted by a young East German Communist: "If Stalin was so bad, then our Party leadership must be bad too!"

On March 29, 1956, Romanian newspapers published a report delivered by Romanian Communist boss Gheorghiu-Dej, at the enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee, held on March 23-25, 1956. Gheorghiu-Dej praised Moscow's 20th Congress and attacked the "cult of personality" by quoting Marx, Engels and Lenin. According to the Romanian party organ *Scinteia*, the meeting of the Party Central Committee in Bucharest passed a long resolution on Stalinist policy. It noted that "Stalin's thesis that the class war must sharpen with the progress towards Socialism caused no little confusion in our Party". This, however, did not prevent Gheorghiu-Dej to say at the end of his report that the situation in the communist countries was "a brilliant testimony of superiority of socialism over capitalism... Our era is the era of ultimate victory of socialism and communism". Gheorghiu-

Dej did not reveal whether the Romanian "Titoist" *Patrascanu* would also be posthumously rehabilitated as was Hungary's Rajk.

In *Bulgaria* the situation is also somewhat confused although the sharp about-turn in the Moscow Party line has already reaped concrete results. Some of the leading collaborators and fellow-accused of Traicho Kostov, hanged by the present régime in 1949, have been released from prison. Among them are the former secretary of the Politburo, Nikola Pavlov, former Finance Minister. Ivan Stefanov; then Petko Kunin, a former member of the Politburo and Minister of Industry; the former high-ranking functionaries of the State Security Service, Stefan Bogdanov and Nikola Zagorski; the former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Kosta Mitov and the former Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, Kanyo Kanchev.

While the fate of the figurehead of the régime, Viko Chervenkov, still hangs in the balance, it is interesting to watch what kind of twists the present Bulgarian Communist leaders are trying to dodge the horns of the dilemma presented to them by Moscow. A resolution adopted by the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee at the beginning of April, after surveying Bulgarian achievements in mobilizing the people and successfully building socialism "deems it necessary to state that these successes would have been even greater if the cult of personality, from which harm resulted, and non-Marxist methods, would not have found a large place in the work of the Bulgarian Communist Party and in public life during the past years."

From *Albania* there is not much news. On April 3, 1956, Albanian Prime Minister, Mehmet Shehu, in a major foreign policy statement told the Albanian Assembly that the Government intended to press for improved diplomatic and economic relations with Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy. This is the only sign of the Albanian Communists having accepted the Kremlin's "let's be friends" line. No anti-Stalinist statements have been forthcoming as yet.

P. K.

*(In these developments it is quite impossible for a monthly periodical to keep abreast with events, so fast is the march of the communist parties' trying to follow Moscow's lead. Even while the above were being set up in print, Bulgarian Premier Viko Tchernkov, for example, was forced to resign. We shall, nevertheless, do our best to complete the picture in subsequent issues. Ed.)*

## BULGARIA

### KOLKHOZ ENTHUSIASTS?

Recently, Bulgarian newspapers have been reporting almost daily and from all parts of the country on a new mass movement to join the agricultural collectives. It is claimed that during the last two months of 1955 alone no less than 28,000 formerly independent farmers had applied for admission to farming cooperatives. In the first quarter of the present year their numbers are said to have increased two- and threefold.

Naturally enough, the communist propaganda is duly licking its chops at this news. Newspaper headlines are featuring the triumph of the kolkhoz system over private farming. Editorials and commentaries are representing this 'marked shift' as evidence that even those peasants who had previously adopted a sceptical attitude towards collective farming and stubbornly stuck to their private holdings, had come to satisfy themselves of the advantages of the kolkhoz system for it alone could guarantee their prosperity and offer a happy life. There were even reports to the effect that in some places the whole village population had flocked in procession, amidst merry singing, to the collective farms, among them peasants who had once already been in collective farming but left it meanwhile owing to "a variety of reasons".

Already some years ago, collectivisation of agriculture had seized as much as 65 per cent of Bulgaria's arable land. Since then, there was a complete standstill until, in the last few months, the influx to the kolkhozes started increasing

by leaps and bounds; so impressively indeed that it almost seems to justify the régime's propaganda claims.

However, those who know the previous history of that phenomenon, do find it quite easy to understand the true facts and the background of the sudden flare-up of 'enthusiasm' for the kolkhozes in Bulgaria. For at the end of October last, the Government of Bulgaria granted the peasants a generous remission of debts that had been owing for a long time to the State banking concerns. No less than 150,000 debtors were affected, involving a total indebtedness of roughly 140 million Leva. But the salient point of that remission of debts was the stipulation that only such private farmers could benefit from it who were prepared to join an agricultural cooperative not later than March 31, 1956. Success did not fail to attend that well-calculated government measure. Immediately in the wake of the promulgation of the prospective remission of debts, the rush to the kolkhozes set in to reach its climax towards the end of the time limit set on March 31st.

The question may legitimately be asked why the private farmers of Bulgaria were so keen to rid themselves of their debts even at the cost of joining the kolkhozes. In order to answer that question we must know that the entire agricultural and financial policy of the communist régime was pin-pointed at throttling the privately-owned sector of agriculture by all possible means. As regards loans for the procurement of tools and appliances, as well as in respect of production targets and delivery quotas, individual farmers were put at enormous disadvantages in comparison to the kolkhozes, with the result that the former gradually sank into debt up to their necks. Most of them were hardly able any longer to make a living from their land while paying annuities on their old and current debts. Is it to be wondered at, then, if the individual farmers of Bulgaria felt compelled to make use of the possibility offered to them to get rid of their debts by joining a kolkhoz and continue eking out a meagre living that way? After many a year of standing fast, there was obviously no other way out left for them.

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PROMOTION OF CULTURE.—In all matters pertaining to the "fulfilment of planned targets" in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, emphasis is being put time and again not only on "shock-industrialization" but also on promoting the material and cultural welfare of the people as the final aim of socialist economy. A small event, symptomatic however of the realities underlying communist organisation and promotion of culture, was described in issue No. 3535 of *Otechestven Front*, published on January 10, 1956, in the column of "Self-Criticism". In reply to a public accusation levelled by the Director of Public Libraries against authors who allegedly had not kept their promises to deliver certain lectures, one of the accused, Pavel Vashinov put forward the following.

He had been invited by the Directorate of Public Libraries to be present in person at the discussion of one of his novels in the parish of Pavlikani. Arriving in the village at 1 o'clock in the morning—the time fixed for his visit—Vashinov found that there had been no room reserved for him in the only hotel at Pavlikani. The innkeeper had thereupon shown him into a room where a number of people were already sleeping. On of them the hotel manager had thrown out of his bed without further ado in order to make room for Vashinov. The latter, however, refused to avail himself of such awkward an opportunity and proceeded, instead, to the local Police Station hoping to be able to spend the night there at least in a heated room. The people's militia refused to put him up, therefore he sought shelter in the local hospital—again without success. It was only then that the author decided to go back to the railway station whence he returned to Sofia with the next train, dog-tired and nearly frozen to death.

### WRITERS UNDER TUTELAGE

Shortly before his fall from the Premiership, Mr. Tchernovok addressed the Communist Party group of Bulgarian writers. His speech had been preceded by a long-drawn-out and rather acrimonious polemic in the official periodical of the Authors' Association "*Literaturen Front*" which clearly demonstrated the Bulgarian writ-

ers' straining against the tethers imposed upon them by the totalitarian State. Matters had obviously come to a pitch where the Prime Minister felt compelled to intervene personally. In so doing, Mr. Tchernovok willy-nilly revealed the true situation and gave away secrets of the communist engineering of literary and cultural life in a manner that speaks for itself.

In the first place, Tchernovok was apparently forced by circumstances to take the defence of a number of 'bourgeois' writers who had adapted themselves to the new régime to the extent of occupying to this day key posts in the Authors' Association and who are constantly being attacked by the old guard of communist literary men. Tchernovok took the line that it was wrong to scrutinize what a person had written decades ago rather than judging him by his present-day writings. This alone shows what dearth there must be of gifted writers for the Bulgarian communist Government not being able to dispense of 'bourgeois' renegades.

Tchernovok also revealed that recently a group of leading literary men had approached him, complaining that an all too stringent and narrow-minded censorship was shackling creative work with the effect that literary work was getting 'shallow', 'rigid' and 'uniform' while the writers felt insecure and deprived of individuality. He, Tchernovok, had thereupon told them that writers must "grab the initiative" and exercise "candid criticism". However, literary workers had misunderstood and misapplied his suggestions. Many of them had exceeded the permissible limits of "constructive criticism" and had, in the choice of their themes, offended against the principles of marxism as well as against the rules laid down by the socialist State.

Therefore, Tchernovok repeatedly and expressly warned the writers that the Communist Party did not accept all kinds of criticism and could not tolerate limitless freedom in literary creation. Only criticism conducive to the strengthening of communism was allowed, while that which undermined it was to be rejected. Writers offending against these principles would have to be prepared to take discipl-

linary punishment from the Communist Party's Central Committee.

Yet under the same breath, Tchervenkov held out a placating hand to the sorely tried authors and promised them assistance in their need. He cited by name the case of writer Vedzhinov who had complained to him about the loss in recent years of his individuality and creative faculties. Well, instead of whimpering publicly, Vedzhinov should approach the Central Committee of the Communist Party which would protect him any time against "unjustifiable restrictions".

Tchervenkov deplored in general the low level of the writers' "marxist education", including those of the Communist Party group, and their deficient knowledge of socialist life. It was not so much the restrictions imposed by the censorship than rather the lack of confidence in the correctness of the socialist cause which primarily stifled the writers' creative energy.

The only way out of that bogged-down situation, according to Mr. Tchervenkov, consisted in "ever closer contacts" between the writers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Communist society just was not a "Club of Freethinkers": it was "a fighting organisation of like-minded people", and that did apply, in particular, to the writers.

D. V.

## ROMANIA

### MESSAGE IN A BOTTLE

*"Iadul pe pământ"* by R. S. Rubsel. Editura Autorului (published by the author), Paris 7, POB. No. 8607. 1955. Pp. 332. Price 600 French francs or \$ 2.50.

"Hell on Earth" is the title of the book whose author, a Romanian Jew had no need to deny his being a Jew in order to prove a faithful Romanian. Originally a journalist, Rubsel soon switched to business. Yet in this account of things he had lived through, Rubsel seems to have rediscovered his writer's vein.

Rubsel describes with intense insight, if not methodically, the second phase of the communist revolution in Rumania, as it evolved from about 1947 to 1950, when the author succeeded in emigrating to Israel. The whole book is indeed nothing but the narrative of an Odyssee of flight and the preparations leading up to it. But while so doing, the author finds plenty of opportunity to explore the methods applied by the Romanian communists, with the stage-managers at Moscow pulling the wires from behind, and to experience on his own skin as well as on that of others the results of their 'handiwork'. In the first place, he makes his reader live through the carrying out of the second land reform (1949), the nationalisation of industry, the assumption of State control over the Orthodox Church and the persecution of the Greek Uniates, etc.

The suggestion to describe his experiences, should he ever be able to escape abroad, was made to the author by an orthodox priest, a uniate clergyman and a former State prosecutor. Independently of one another, these three asked Rubsel to convey this outcry to the free world: "Write it down for all who have ears to listen; write it down for our sake as well as for that of the free world so that the latter might know what lies in store for it. For the death of the peoples killed by free man's indifference will spell its own ruin."

Thus spoke the orthodox parish priest to R. S. Rubsel. In due course the book was written and has found a good reception among Romanian exiles. The author is now preparing the French and English translations of his book. (DCA)

## YUGOSLAVIA

### THE OLD COMMUNISTS' DOOM

Perhaps no corporate group of communists was so hard hit by the ill-famed Stalin purges as the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Not one of them survived. Stalin's butchers executed Professor Dr. Sima Markovitch,

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leader of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Chairman of its Parliamentary group after the first world war, a gifted scholar, brilliant publicist and an honorable man, who as such enjoyed a high reputation even in bourgeois circles. Such leading men and ideologists as the former Members of Parliament *Kosta Novakovitch*, *Filip Filipovitch*, *Dr. Vukashin Markovitch*, *Sima Milyus*, and others were also shot. The last one to be killed was *Milan Gorkitch* (Yosif Tszizinski was his real name), Secretary-General of the Party before Tito.

As to who butchered them, apart from Stalin and Yezhov, has been recorded by Professor *Franz Borkenau* as follows:

"In the course of the great purge of 1937, Milan Gorkitch, the leader of the Yugoslav Party was shot. His Politburo was extinguished. Its only surviving member was commissioned to reconstitute the Party. He was given a free hand to recruit new members. What sinister impulses actuated the semi-mad Yezhov in perpetrating that particular blood-bath, nobody will ever be able to tell... The only shaft of light that penetrates the darkness highlights the part played in that tragedy by Gorkitch's successor, *Yosip Broz*, subsequently called *Tito*. Already a year before, he had played a major role in the mass execution of Party members in Russia and had contributed to the doom of all his superiors, for the bulk of the Yugoslav Party leadership happened to be in Moscow at that time. One of the victims was his own wife. The man who worked his way to a not unimportant part in that fashion, was the embodiment, the ideal prototype of the new generation of communist leaders that had sprung from the Spanish civil war and the great purges. No habit of independent thinking ever burdened him; he hardly knew more

of marxism or of the history of the communist movement than was found good for him to be taught as a dead letter of doctrine. In fact, the beginning of his career was characterized by a remarkable lack of interest in politics and an emphatic predilection for zestful physical exercise. Altogether a 'dynamic' type of man, well suited for every kind of action that involved a maximum of deeds and a minimum of questioning." (*Der europäische Kommunismus* by Franz Borkenau, Leo Lehnen Verlag, GmbH, München, 1952.)

In a number of consecutive issues of the Swiss weekly "*Weltwoche*", in April and May, 1953, another expert, *Serge Caplan* published details of Gorkitch's execution, mentioning the cold-blooded and contemptful manner in which Tito—then working under the pseudonym 'Walter'—assisted in the liquidation of his old leader, unmoved by the tears of the latter's unfortunate wife. Immediately after Gorkitch had been shot, Tito-Walter was called to Malenkov's office where the latter beamingly announced the news that Tito had been chosen by the Komintern to succeed the traitor Gorkitch as Secretary-General of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

All these circumstances are well enough known to experts for us to recall them merely in order to portray Tito as a butcher. The point we are trying to make is that while Stalin and those of his accomplices, who are already dead and therefore of no use to communism any longer, are being denounced by Stalin's former collaborators now in power, Tito can live on unharmed because he is still supremely useful. He has nothing to do penance for, nobody to 'rehabilitate'. The new overlords of the Kremlin, having turned 'titoist' themselves, have good reason to spare him. Such is communist 'morality'.

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J. H. MACCALLUM SCOTT, a British political writer of note; Secretary-General of the Liberal International (Liberal World Union).

MERCURY, the pen-name of a leading economist and publicist in the West German Federal Republic.

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IZEDDIN SAMI, the pen-name of a Muslim journalist whose identity cannot be revealed for professional reasons.

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