

# EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

MOSCOW'S ABOUT-TURN

TITO OFF THE FENCE

SOCIALIST REALISM IN COMMUNIST TRIALS

SOVIET LITERATURE AFTER FADEYEV

ROMANIA — LESSON AND WARNING

Contributions by James de Vere Allen, Helmuth Hottner, Mihail Farcasanu, Alexander Kaempfe, Dr Ctibor Pokorny. W. H. Smyth

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## Moscow's About-Turn

### WHY AND WHEREFORE?

(D. V.) Ceaselessly the western world keeps concerning itself with the events of the 20th Soviet Party Congress and the "new look" of Soviet politics — they remain instrumental in shaping problems in international affairs. The western press and radio continue guessing at the motives of the new style introduced by Moscow, beelng tempted, time and again, to draw conclusions from bolshevism's about-turn in respect of practical measures and attitudes that would henceforward seem to recommend themselves to free-world policymakers.

Assessments concerning the newly created situation differ greatly one from the other; opinions are ranging from the assumption of a genuine and fundamental change of bolshevism, requiring a thorough revision of policies thus far pursued by the West, to the assertion that despite the "new look" it recently donned the Soviet world has remained unaltered. While representatives of the latter school of thought are warning the West not to let down its guard as a result of the Soviet conjurers' tricks, the protagonist of the view mentioned in the first place will go as far as maintaining that, following Stalin's condemnation and, what's more, the correction of Lenin's teachings about the "permanence of the revolution" and the necessity of "breaking the capitalist encirclement" Communism has entered upon a phase in which it is winding up itself ideological, not speak of its having renounced the idea of world revolution, that is, its claim to dominating the world. One of the main arguments for the support of this thesis is being found in the spectacle of the Kremlin's leaders "capitulating" to Tito in that they have given up their claim to centrally direct the communist régimes established in the several satellite countries which shall henceforward enjoy the right of handling the communist form of government according to their own lights.

Insofar as these contrasting schools of thought are devoid of a deeper-going analysis and fail to produce factual corroboration, they must both seem equally right or wrong. Let it be stated rightaway — viewed under a doctrinaire angle alone these question cannot be dealt with, let alone correctly answered. While bogged down in a purely theoretical field of speculation, we may equally gain truthful insight and draw the wrong conclusions. In order to get at the truth political realities must be examined under a magnifying glass, as it were, and satisfactory answers have to be found to the following questions: *what are the realistic political considerations and which are the practical political objectives*, that have impelled the bolshevist leadership to carry out its ideological, or rather tactical, volte-face. Only the answers

to these questions will enable us to judge whether the latest adjustment of the communist system and of Soviet policy is the manifestation of a genuine evolution or merely an external adaptation enforced by circumstance in the pursuit of the same old objectives which it is now thought can be achieved more easily with new methods.

As soon, however, as we make an investigation into the "why" and "wherefore" of the sensational events that occurred at the latest Moscow Congress, the most elementary knowledge of the relevant developments compels us to establish the following:

1. There can be no doubt that the posthumous dethronement of Stalin, that idol of the communist world during the last few decades, has been an extremely hazardous step, amounting to a moral *salto mortale* made by the bolshevist system. It is an equally incontestable fact that by so doing communism has laid itself wide open both in its own domestic orbit and before the whole world. Therefore, if Moscow's new rulers were determined to take the plunge, a full three years after Stalin's death, it follows clearly that they must have had very substantial, if not cogent, reasons. Also, they must have felt reassured that not only would world communism survive that surgical operation, but that it would draw new vital energies from it; otherwise the leaders of communism in the Kremlin, whose faculty of cool calculation and political shrewdness can not in the least be denied, would not have taken such a decision.

2. As soon as the Soviet State had been established, the communist rulers of Moscow, instead of continuing to give first priority to matters of doctrine among their objectives, substituted for them the preservation of governmental power and the accumulation of force at any cost. Political, economic and military power geared to putting into practice, nay, wrenching from the teeth of history the so-called proletarian world revolution, that is, world conquest, — this alone has been and remains the supreme commandment of the Soviet system, not the preservation of a thoroughbred stock of doctrinal norms. As demonstrated by Lenin's *novaya ekonomicheskaya politika* (NEP), the fight against "Trotskyism," Stalin's "short course" with its consecutive waves of purges in the 'thirties and, finally, also by the penetrating readjustments instituted by Khrushchev, doctrinaire Marxism has always been subordinated to considerations of political realism for which it was briskly sacrificed every time when such sacrifice seemed warranted in the interests of consolidating Soviet power and securing the pursuit of its objectives in world politics. For the latter has always been regarded as the supreme law in the Kremlin.

3. The foundations of Russian-communist rule over the peoples of the Soviet Union, as well as in the countries conquered only after the second world war and bludgeoned into communist forms of government, were by no means built on Marxist theories, let alone on their popularity among the masses — save for a tiny handful of doctrinaire cranks: it was erected on the foundation-stones of *brute force and mass suggestion*. Autocracy judiciously combined with propaganda to influence the popular masses as conditions would require — these have been and remain the mainstays of communist governmental power; for the subjugated peoples do not care two hoots about the musty 35 volumes of Lenin's assembled works or those of Stalin, for that matter,

whatever their dogmatic value or worthlessness may be. And precisely because these very foundation-stones of communist rule — permanent terror and the influencing of the people through mass suggestion — began to show anxious cracks, the decision was made to turn Stalin into a scapegoat and together with his memory throw overboard any such ideological ballast as may seem an excessive burden for the time being.

The world at large always knew anyway that the late Joseph Dzhughashvili had not been an angel, and that the brutality, the insane mass murders, the persecution mania and similar other endearing features, now attributed to him posthumously by Comrade Khrushchev, corresponded with factual truth. Except, however, his ruthlessness in matters of internal party policy, Stalin is not likely to compare unfavourably with his present-day successors. The fact that he is now made solely responsible for brutal dictatorship, unlawful autocracy, permanent bloody terror and mass murder must without any doubt be regarded as a well calculated, purposeful measure. Invested with all the sins of arbitrary communist rule and aggressive policy, of which his one-time collaborators have not been less guilty than Stalin himself, his body was burnt on the funeral pyre of propaganda so that its glare may be made to seem the dawn of a new, virtuous era of "socialist legality." It was meant to be a heroic decision of which it is above all hoped that it will clear the suffocating atmosphere in the communist-ruled countries, temporarily soothe the ruffled nerves of the captive nations seething with latent revolt, and lend fresh effectiveness to the communist methods of mass suggestion.

This, however, is only half the story. For it is no less acutely important for Soviet policy at the present time to lend credibility and emphasis to its protestations of peacefulness and keenness on coexistence. The brilliance of these must also be served as foils by Stalin's shadow and the hackneyed ghost of the "personality cult." The man, or rather his memory, worshipped until yesterday as the "father of victory" and the "liberator of peoples" is now being made to look as the sole originator of all brutal acts of aggression so that the outside world may be lulled into the illusion that as regards the genially beaming "collective leadership" such arbitrary deeds are out of question, and that unsavoury occurrences such as *the coup d'état* in Prague or the invasion of Korea will not repeat themselves. For the benefit of those who are inclined to draw wrong deductions from communist doctrinal formulae taken at their face value only by themselves, the reservoir of ideology has been tapped for such catch-phrases as "peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition" with the capitalist system, etc.

The causes that impelled that metamorphosis of Soviet policy are obvious. Similarly as the subject peoples' attitude of revulsion forced Khrushchev's hand in making his sensational readjustment in the domestic sphere, the stand so far made by the free world, and above all the commonsense and unfaltering course of American foreign policy steered by the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, coerced the Soviets to alter their behaviour in international affairs. The latter is evidently a mere tactical manoeuvre, not changing in the least the essence of Soviet politics and the ultimate goal of world communism.

The manoeuvre has a dual purpose. Firstly, it is intended to demobilize the single-minded hostility of the free world, together with its intellectual and

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material potential of power; to render communism respectable in world politics and to introduce an area of not only peaceful but possibly friendly co-existence. This, however, is only the means to the end. The second and ulterior goal pursued by the new course is the re-creation of a psychological climate suitable for the successful application of the practices of influencing through mass suggestion, thereby consolidating the Soviet tyranny within its present precincts of power while continuing to build up the latter as a springboard for political, economic and, if need be, also military aggression on a world scale.

Hence the hectic "struggle for peace" against the "positions of strength" and for the discontinuance of the cold war. The West should cease to revile the communist system and the enslaved people lose all hope of liberation, in order that the process of national emasculation and apathetic slave-labour may keep serving the world-embracing schemes of communism unabated.

Communist rule has obviously arrived at a critical limit where brute force as a form of government begins to overreach itself and to need *new impulses* for mass suggestion to achieve success. The pertinent question therefore emerges: what political attitudes should the West adopt to meet this situation? Should it continue building up its potential of power and facing Moscow perhaps even more unyieldingly and firmly as heretofore, in order to foil bolshevism's greatest confidence trick? Or ought the free world be taken in by the manoeuvres launched at the 20th Party Congress; abandon the Atlantic Pact, call off the cold war, advocate the acceptance of an alleged evolution of bolshevism, and, by demonstrating friendly contacts with Moscow, thrust anew at the Kremlin the very weapon which now begins slipping from its hands? *The psychological weapon aimed at disintegrating the internal front of resistance within the bolshevist empire*, not to speak of the disintegration and demobilization of the free world whose turn, as a victim of communist aggression, would soon follow. To put this question means having answered it already.

Therefore, those who today would prematurely sound the "all clear" in appreciation of Moscow's syren-songs and advise acceptance of Soviet attempts at conciliation, are directly playing into the hands of Khrushchev, the conjuror. Advocacies of that kind can contribute only to the tightening of the captive nations' bonds and render themselves guilty at the same time of the sin of fatally misleading the free world:

# Tito off the Fence

BY RATKO PAREŽANIN

As regards matters of ideology, there has never really been a split between Belgrade and Moscow. Whatever the varying interpretations put on it, from time to time, under the catchwords of Marxism, Stalinism or Leninism, the communist creed has never ceased to be the mainspring of Tito's actions, nor has he ever seriously contemplated to deviate from the trunk-line of dialectical materialism. It should be generally known by now that the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow originated, in 1948, from purely personal causes and that, following the outbreak of the quarrel, Yugoslavia's communist leadership turned far more radically Marxist in many respects than did the other satellite régimes. Thus, for example, as regards religious persecution, the Yugoslav Communist dictatorship has to a certain extent been even more rigid and ruthless than the Soviet and other communist governments — Cardinal Dr. A. Stepinac as well as other high church dignitaries are languishing in internment to this day. Again, in respect of the collectivisation of agriculture, in the years between 1949 and 1951, Yugoslavia had been well ahead of, say, Bulgaria, Hungary or Romania. The relaxations that followed subsequently, along with the partial dissolution of the farming cooperatives (kolkhozes), were by no means instituted as conscious deviations from Moscow's overall policy line; they were emergency measures pure and simple, devised to redress some of the destructive ills caused by earlier radical collectivisation drives. Through the reckless enforcement of "socialism on the land", Yugoslavia, once a large-scale exporter of farm products was rapidly falling prey to recurring famines and its population could only be saved from wholesale starvation by generous food gifts from the USA, Canada, etc.

Nor has Tito ever seriously deviated from the principal tenets of orthodox communism in the sphere of internal politics. Even after he quarreled with Moscow, Tito did not dream for a moment of loosening up his totalitarian system of government. Whatever may have been taken, time and again, for symptoms of "democratisation" or "liberalisation" was a mere show put on for the benefit of such Western circles as would allow themselves to be bluffed. Not even within his own Party, the League of Yugoslav Communist, did Tito permit an opposition, worthy of that name, to crystallize. Milovan Djilas, stripped of all functions and political power, is an enlightening case in point. He and others had to pay dearly for their belief that there might be a chance of gradually introducing a two-party system; needless to say that such chance never existed.

Similar is the position in respect of international affairs. Despite all temporary semblances to the contrary, Tito has never ceased to cherish and pursue in common with Moscow the principal objective of all orthodox communists — the destruction of the fabric of the free world as it

exists today and the setting up of a global communist rule by means of the world revolution. Similarly to other communist régimes Tito's system depends for its continued existence on the final success of that pursuit which, in turn, must remain a hollow utopia — as the Yugoslav dictator full well knows — unless there is kept in being a really strong communist big power, such as the Soviet Union, to serve as a citadel for world communism. Therefore, in a potential conflict between the free world and communism Tito will necessarily always side with Moscow, as Marshal Zhukov was absolutely correct in pointing out when he toasted the Yugoslav dictator on the conclusion of the latter's reconciliation tour in Russia.

Wherein, then, lay the difference between the Kremlin's and Tito's brand of communism — a difference that was once assumed to be so great that politicians in the West saw fit to endow the latter with the generic name of "Titoism"? Why did Sir Anthony Eden go so far as to term Tito's politics "a European variety of communism"? He must have thought at that time there was a possibility to reach a *modus vivendi* with Tito's form of communism as opposed to the Asiatic variant represented by Moscow.

Once the smoke of gunfire wafted away from the field of dispute between Belgrade and Moscow the fact became clearly visible that *the two really differed on one essential point* alone, viz. the tactics of the cold war. The extremely precarious situation in which he found himself after 1948, ground between the warring millstones of East and West, practically drove Tito to seek refuge in a form of "active coexistence". Tito knew that whichever side was going to be the victor in a major showdown would, sure as fate, put an end to his rule: Stalin, while still alive, could not but liquidate him, a decisive Western victory, on the other hand, would strike a spark that could not fail to blow up his régime from within. Therefore, getting the idea of coexistence accepted in both the East and the West became a *conditio sine qua non* of Tito's continued existence. Nobody would deny that the Yugoslav dictator played his cards very skilfully especially with the neutralists of all lands and the non-aligned nations of Asia and Africa. And all the while he built up and kept enlarging a vast network of intelligence and propaganda agents — lavishly financed with U. S.-aid dollars.

In the free world his task could not have been easier, but even on the tricky and dangerous ground of the USSR Tito was operating with considerable success. Both in the Soviet Union and the satellites, then arraigned in deadly enmity against him, Tito's secret agents kept swarming about, some of them masterfully disguised as kominformist "politemigrants"; his lines of communication extended to Stalin's sanctum as well as to clandestine anti-Stalin groups, to Beria, Bulganin and Khrushchëv. Rare indeed must be the statesmen who was capable of keeping himself as accurately briefed as Tito on the inside story of events and intrigues, the decline and ascent of key-personalities in the Soviet orbit. First class reconnaissance is an important clue to Tito's remarkable achievements in that sphere.

At any rate, Tito has become the pioneer of "active coexistence"; its strategy and tactics, as they appear today, very largely bear the imprint of his personality. But as to "Titoism," as a political school of thought, of which so much was heard particularly while the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade was at its height, precious little remains. All the hopes of the West

pinned on the "liberalising" influences allegedly at work inside Yugoslavia have vanished into thin air; likewise did the great expectation that "Titoism" would help to crack the monolithic fabric of Muscovite communism and, perhaps, rend the satellites from the Kremlin. (Remember Mr. Dulles's visit to Tito on Brioni last year.) Even if he wanted to, Tito could achieve no such thing.

The West must face the grim fact that all it has attained with its aid in arms, political prestige and — last but not least — 2½ billion dollars lavished on communist Yugoslavia in eight years was to have *tided over Tito* while he was at loggerheads with the Kremlin. Now — as the Austrian Socialist NEUE ZEIT so aptly put it, — the free world "has no choice but to watch with bitterness as the courted lover glides back into Moscow's arms; the wedding gifts have to be written off."

Internal difficulties both of a political and economic nature and an international situation gravely bungled up by Stalin's blunders, induced the Soviet leaders to adopt the theory and practice of the "active coexistence," thereby paving the way, incidentally, for Tito's return to the common fold. However, since his reconciliation with Moscow, Tito has undoubtedly *lost his position of primacy among the leaders of the coexistence campaign*. Inasmuch as Moscow has, for external consumption, bought some of the Yugoslav dictator's formulae it may be said to have turned "Titoist": far more important, however, is the fact that as a logical outcome of the new situation Tito has become "re-sovietized".

Of course it was an unheard-of sensation to watch Bulganin and Krushchev last year doing penance in Belgrade; of course it seemed incredible seeing Tito, resplended in his powder blue uniform, moving across the scene in Soviet Russia like an Emperor on his triumphal march; of course it is amazing how the leaders of nearly all the communist parties, within and outside the Soviet orbit, are toeing the line to apologise to Tito for having obeyed the defunct Stalin in excommunicating the Yugoslav communists from the Kominform; of course one feels induced to conclude from all this — including the demise of all his enemies, from Stalin's death to Rákosi's head offered to him on a silver salver — that Tito has enormously grown in stature and power; of course he appears as the leading figure of communism, now that he conducts a foreign policy on behalf of little Yugoslavia matching, if not surpassing, that of many a big power.

And yet — Tito is no longer the leading character in the coexistence play; he has ceased to be that since *active coexistence has become a matter of life or death* for the Soviet leadership itself. For as with Stalin's death, and recently again with his dethronement by Khrushchev, the lid was lifted off the bolshevik cauldron, it has plainly become visible for all who have eyes to see that *communism as an ideology has burnt itself out* and lost its powers of attraction it once exercised over innumerable ignorant idealists. Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin and Stalinism was a clear admission of the decline and fall of communism as the world has known it in action for nearly thirty years. What is at stake today is the preservation or disintegration of the Soviet-communist power machine. Naked force alone will not save it from the wrath and bubbling discontent of its own subject masses: only the helping hand of the free world stretched out in "active coexistence" with its deadly enemies,

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in conjunction with continued terrorism, now exerted by an oligarchy instead of the maligned one-man despot, can prevent such incidents as the Poznan revolt from fanning out into a destructive hurricane that would sweep away the whole edifice of the Kremlin's empire.

What a fatal error it is to assume that "destalinisation" is synonymous with the loosening-up of the communist camp. It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that *destalinisation combined with active coexistence represents the supreme effort to keep alive communism as an organized political force and continue keeping enslaved the captive nations.* Tito's attitude is a precise indication of the correctness of this assessment. It will be remembered how many politicians in the West had high hopes that Tito would actively promote both the secession of the satellites from the Muscovite empire and the loosening-up of their fabric from within. Those hopes have been signally frustrated. The Yugoslav communists who, three years ago, hailed the uprising of the German East-Zone workers, now unreservedly follow the Moscow line in condemning the Poznan revolt. More rigidly than any one of the communist leaders, Tito opposes today a "thaw" in the satellite countries.

In his remarkable article, entitled "The Frozen Thaw" (Erstarrte Auflockerung) and published in the latest issue of the Vienna magazine FORUM, Mr. *Richard Loewenthal* correctly states that "in the process of loosening-up and ferment now going on in the Soviet satellite empire, Belgrade is a conservative rather than a forward-prodding factor . . . For years on end, Yugoslavia had been the working model of how the Stalinist régime might loosen up one day. But now, while that model is being copied far and wide in Russia, Yugoslavia remains interesting only as an object lesson of the limitations which must necessarily confront any loosening tendency in the framework of the one-party State."

When the rising of the East Berlin workers occurred, in 1953, Tito was still locked in deadly struggle with the Kremlin. Of course his Press glorified the rebels and vituperated against the "Soviet imperialists". But now that he is at one with Moscow once more, having become "sovietized," his Press and Radio are storming against the "provocateurs" of the "western imperialists" who are said to have engineered the Poznan revolt. The man whom the West has, from 1948 onwards, so unwisely assisted in consolidating his tyranny against the interests of the Yugoslav people is now logically combating every move of the captive nations to regain their freedom and self-determination, for success in one country would inevitably encourage others to emulate that example in a way that must be pernicious ultimately to Tito's rule in Yugoslavia, too. Before Belgrade was reconciled with Moscow, the influence of the West, if judiciously used, could have helped to bring about the liberalisation of the Yugoslav régime and gradually restore the freedom of the Yugoslav people. From now on, liberalisation, democratisation and, ultimately perhaps freedom, can only come from within through demonstrations and risings in the countries of the Eastern bloc. Being fully aware of this, Tito must be expected to join those who would put the brakes on every time a tendency of loosening-up raised its head; at every attempt on the part of one or other captive nation to regain its freedom, the Yugoslav dictator will, in unison with Moscow and the communist satellite régimes, pour abuse over the "re-

actionary provocateurs of western imperialism" to whom such acts will inevitably be attributed.

Much as he seemed to play the leading part while fêted in Moscow last month, Tito has already passed the zenith of his murky, adventurous political career. At his latest meeting with Mr. Nehru and Colonel Nasser Tito was still frantically trying to impress the world as being the head-man of that incongruous trio. In actual truth he was acting a much less dignified role, aptly described by TIME magazine, in its issue of June 18th, as follows: "Stalin's old cronies and legitimate heirs . . . want Tito as a kind of ambassador extraordinary among the neutral nations, selling the Kremlin line from a new stand, using his influence to reestablish what is now, or soon will be, wholly discredited."

By climbing off the fence Tito has inevitably climbed down from his recently still exalted position. He is more or less back in his old job that Stalin once gave him when, under the assumed name of Mr. Walter, Tito worked as an agent for communism. There is little the West can do to help, let alone save him.

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## Hunyadi and His Time

One of the most dramatic, though hardly remembered, reminders of the western world's greatest ordeal prior to World War I is the tolling of the mid-day bells ordered by Pope Calixtus III in his "Bulla Orationum" for the saving Christendom through the relief of the siege of Belgrade, in July 1456. It followed the fall of Constantinople, the eastern bastion of the civilised world, by only three years, albeit the deadly struggle of the Balkan peoples and the Hungarians had already been on for almost six decades counting from the battle of "The Blackbirds' Field" (Kosovo Polje) in which the mediaeval Kingdom of Serbia had been crushed.

In that hot summer of 1456, Belgrade, at that time the main strategic base of Hungary's southern defences, was saved. It was saved by the common exertions of Christian soulders of South Slavonic and Hungarian extraction, the religious zeal and persuasive force of a great Italian monk, Johannes a Capistrano, and the strategic and statesmanlike genius of the Regent and Captain-General of Hungary, János Hunyadi.

The son of a nobleman from Transylvania, János Hunyadi was brought up at the Court of King Sigismund, the first Sovereign of Hungary to wear also the Crown of the Holy German-Roman Empire. After an initial period of service as page in the household of the Serbian ruler Stefan Lazarevitch — still remembered in Serbian folk songs — Hunyadi joined his king in the latter's travels through Lombardy. He subsequently served for two years under Philip Visconti, Duke of Milan, where he assimilated the essentials of the military art so highly developed in 15th-century Italy. When Sigismund was crowned Roman-German Emperor, Hunyadi was at his side; later he

accompanied the King to the land of the latter's ancestors, Bohemia, as Captain of the King's bodyguard. As member of the King's Privy Council, Hunyadi stood high in the esteem of Sigismund's son-in-law and successor, Albert of Hapsburg. After the sudden demise of Albert, Hunyadi emerges as king-maker in helping to the throne of Hungary Uladislaus I, grandson of Hungary's last Angevin king, Lajos the Great. Again only a few years later, Uladislaus was stricken down in his prime and while the crown went to Albert's infant son László V, Hunyadi, the firm link of continuity, was appointed Regent of the realm by Parliament.

His entire adult manhood is spent in striving for the defence and the salvation of Christendom from the Ottoman Turkish menace. "I shall wear the Cross pinned on my cloak," he wrote to the Pope, "while there remains a drop of blood in my veins". And in a letter addressed to the King of Poland, Hunyadi expressed his simple faith in his own destiny in the following words: "I am going forward unrelentingly, for mine is a righteous cause, for I am fighting for faith, peace and country, for widows and orphans."

It is strange to think that while this attractive hero of Christendom was already winning his spurs in the arts of statesmanship and war, the oak trees from which the galleons of Christopher Columbus were to be built were probably still saplings. The Duchy of Muscovy was still a tributary of the Golden Horde, praising itself happy if its envoys were received at all in the courts of the kings of Hungary and Poland.

Above all, Hunyadi was already attaining to prominence as a soldier and statesman when the Hundred Years' War between France and England was only just drawing towards its close. It makes one think to what extent the history of Europe during those critical years of deadly peril from the Ottoman Turkish aggressor had been influenced by the fratricidal feud of two of Christendom's greatest nations.

Inevitably the parallel springs to our minds of the feud between the French and the Germans which wrecked the western world at the height of its power and glory and which continued right down to the penetration into the heart of Europe of the once infinitesimal Duchy of Muscovy, now swelled up to the formidable monster of the Soviet Union. This monster has fed and is still feeding on the western nations' internecine strife and although it is hardly likely today that they should ever clash in war again, one vital question still remains to be decided. It is the question whether or not ancient distrust and divisions will be resolved soon enough in the awareness that all have to hang together unless they want to be hanged separately.

R. C.

## Chain of Command — Chains of Slavery

(V. S.) Whichever way events may turn, it seems reasonably certain that in the continuing struggle between the free world and the totalitarian communist oligarchies the speech that Khrushchev made at the 20th Congress Secret Session will remain an inexhaustible fund of ideological ammunition for anti-communists.

Looked upon from that viewpoint, the great amount of detailed information contained in the Khrushchev report would admit of an almost infinite variety of analyses and interpretations. However, when viewed under an angle not unnaturally peculiar to the captive nations of Eastern Europe, *one monumental, salient fact* emerges from the Secret Report. It may best be put this way: beginning from the mid-thirties, and certainly throughout World War II and the post-war period *Stalin had been solely responsible for the internal and external policies of world communism* as shaped by its power house, the Soviet Union. On top of the chain of command leading up to the Kremlin from the smallest communist cell, whether inside or outside the USSR, there stood Stalin. All orders originated from him and he was the only man to pass final judgment on the way his orders were carried out.

Two important deductions would seem to offer themselves from this basic fact.

Regardless of the question, which will keep exercising the minds of communist and non-communist analysts alike for a long time to come, i. e. whether or not Stalin's collaborators could have prevented the "whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions" perpetrated by the late dictator, *the Soviet Union cannot disclaim responsibility for what was done by Stalin*. As a big power, rightly or wrongly recognized by the governments of most civilized countries and having its seat in the councils of international affairs, the USSR cannot now, with the voice of Stalin's successors and one-time collaborators, talk itself out of taking the consequences springing from the acts of its former head of government.

One of those consequences consists in the *obligation of remedying situations created by Stalin*, in the name and on behalf of the Soviet Government — situations that can neither be justified in international law nor tolerated indefinitely by the people who have to endure them. Clearly, such situations exist today in the countries of Eastern Europe subjected to communist satellite domination against their will. Clearly, having regard to what the Kremlin continues viewing as potential bases for communist world aggression, Mr. Khrushchev omitted from his enumeration of those wronged by Stalin the captive nations behind the iron curtain.

However, that omission constitutes no reason for the free world to desist from demanding henceforward — demanding on every occasion issues of fundamental importance are being discussed with the Soviet Government — that *the captive nations of Eastern and Central Europe be at long last granted those sovereign rights of national independence and free, representative government of which they have been deprived* through the violation by Stalin of the Yalta "Declaration on Liberated Europe". As the London OBSERVER commented in its issue of July 1, 1956, "the men who struck in the factories and marched

through the streets of Poznan have not liberated Poland; no local action can do that, without further great changes in Russia itself and in the international situation. Their action has, however, destroyed a legend. It has reminded the world that, for all the recent concessions toward 'self-government', *the people of Eastern Europe are still being held down by a new form of colonialism.*"

That new colonialism was of Stalin's doing. According to information from reliable sources, Mr. Khrushchev in the "missing hour" of his Secret Report not included in the version since made known to the world by the U. S. Department of State, explicitly mentioned as one of Stalin's greatest crimes the latter's having "needlessly destroyed international good will existing between the Soviet Union and her World War II allies".

To a very large extent, if not exclusively, that good will was destroyed by the rape of what are today known as the captive nations of Europe. The breach by Stalin of Soviet Russia's pledges included in the various war-time and postwar agreements concluded with her allies was beyond any doubt the root-cause of the cold war. If Khrushchev now demands, as he did in his Secret Report, that "the evil caused by acts... which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual, has to be completely corrected", that *correction cannot be confined solely to "the violations of revolutionary socialist legality"*.

As a big power, claiming membership of the most important international institutions, the Soviet Union is bound by international law and the rules of behaviour in international affairs. Therefore, the USSR must be regarded as being under a sacred obligation to remedy the ills caused by that Stalin for whose breaches of international law and rules of behaviour she must shoulder full responsibility.

The chains handed down to the unfortunate captive nations along the chain of command controlled by Stalin as head of the Soviet Government and, in fact, unlimited ruler of the USSR, must be removed by Stalin's successors. It is for the free western powers to press that demand relentlessly, on every conceivable occasion.

*"Now that the Kremlin is accepting Titoism and Tito is accepting the Kremlin, he symbolizes the change without leaving the Soviet orbit. He is the argument for not breaking with Moscow, and for collaborating with Moscow... Besides being an example to the satellites, he will be a formidable missionary to the neutralists... Tito is the living example of how to be aligned with both coalitions, how to be neutralist and yet aligned... We may well ask ourselves whether, given the change from Stalinism inside the Soviet Union, Tito is not on his way to becoming the most important of all the missionaries of Communism."*

(Walter Lippman in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE,  
June 7th, 1956.)

## “Socialist Realism” in Communist Trials

BY J. DE V. ALLEN

In recent weeks we have heard of the rehabilitation of László Rajk, Hungarian Foreign Minister who, nearly seven years ago, was tried and executed on charges including sedition, plotting against the state, and the perpetration of war crimes and ‘crimes against the people’. A few months before that occasion the Western nations had been watching, with equal pessimism if infinitely more concern, the trial on similar charges of another leading figure of Hungary, Cardinal Mindszenty of Esztergom, the Prince Primate. It would be presumptuous here to compare the cases of these two men, and perhaps superfluous to discuss the truth of the charges, about which better qualified pens have written so much. But it will be of interest to examine the court-room story of the two trials: that is the behaviour of the Cardinal on the one hand, and on the other of the Communist leader who is now admitted to have been wronged; the tactics of the prosecution — in fact, of the President of the Court; and finally all the psychological pressures brought to bear, both within the court-room and beyond, during these two historic trials.

For these purposes let us at first assume that the Prosecution’s facts were adequately supported by the evidence they cited and amounted to prove crimes within the meaning of the law; let us say, too, that the Court was so constituted as to provide conditions for fair verdicts when the hearings were complete. I do not believe this, and indeed most of it is palpably untrue and can be disproved by material evidence available in the Free World; but we are not here concerned with these things and it is possible to expose the trials for what they are worth independently of them. Further, I will make only the minimum of reference to the co-defendants on both occasion, since their cases and characters are less widely known, so that they do not serve as such good illustrations of my point. Finally let me add that where I quote the trials *verbatim* I use, for the sake of argument, the Hungarian government official versions, although I am aware that they are not always accurate.

The first outstanding feature common to both trials is the extent to which the conduct of, the accused conflicted with all that is known of their characters and all that was expected of them, at any rate by those unaccustomed to trials before the People’s Court. Proof of Mindszenty’s fierce and resolute frame of mind in the days immediately before his arrest can be seen in his last Pastoral Letter. “Of all my predecessors,” he wrote, “not one stood so bare of all means as I do now: Such a systematic and purposeful propaganda of lies, time and again disproved but time and again repeated, has never been organized against any of the seventy-eight predecessors in my office. I stand for God, for the Church, and for Hungary. This duty was imposed upon me by the fate of my nation, which stands alone, an orphan in the whole world. As compared with the sufferings of my people own fate is of no importance. I do not accuse my accusers. If I am compelled to speak out from time to time and to

state the facts as they are, it is only the misery of my people which forces me to do so and the urge for truth. I am praying for a world of truth and love. I am praying for those who, in the words of my Master, "know not what they do". Again, in the note which he wrote on an old envelope during the last hours before the police came: '1) I have not partaken in any conspiracy. 2) I shall never resign. 3) I refuse to give evidence. 4) Should anyone hear or read that I have made a confession or resigned, even if there were evidence proved by my own signature, this must be regarded as a sign of human frailty and weakness and I declare it herewith null and void.' It is evident from these statements, among other things, that the Cardinal submitted to his arrest with a defiant determination to fight for his opinions and defend his actions with all the eloquence and moral zeal for which he was renowned. The part he played in the court-room a month and a few days later was to disappoint any such expectations. I cannot give many details here. Suffice it to say that he had, in an admittedly dubious confession, already agreed that he was involved in a conspiracy; he offered to retire temporarily from his functions, he retracted the note disavowing any confession that he might make; and he apologised for writing it and for many other actions, limiting his self-defence almost entirely to an occasional qualification of one of the President's more outrageous deductions. The Pope's verdict on this trial contrasts ironically with the Cardinal's own statement in his last Pastoral Letter: '... a man, he said, 'endowed with the full vigour of a forceful nature suddenly appears so weak and mentally unbalanced that he conducts himself in such a manner as to accuse not himself but those who were accusing and condemning him.'

The career of Rajk, more easily than those of his colleagues who have survived him, admits of interpretation as the life of a man who was a genuine believer in the infallibility of Marx as formulated by Lenin and Stalin, and not without a certain distorted concern for his country's interests. Far be it from me to represent him as a martyr to the cause which he had after all served unflinchingly for so long with such disastrous consequences. But he was what historians might have been able to call, before the recent spate of fashions, a 'nationalist communist' (to be distinguished from Titoist no less than from Trotskyite), and at any rate he was tenacious of his beliefs and not easily persuaded, as others were, to retreat to Moscow when in trouble with the pre-1945 regimes — he was one of those who fought in Spain. The picture we have of him is of a ferocious fighter and obdurate believer, and Count M. Karolyi, his admirer, has stated that 'he could be hard and uncompromising'. His attitude before his arrest is difficult to determine because he was under a cloud for many months and imprisoned for at least two. Before the People's Judges, however, his conduct was even more abject than that of Mindszenty. In effect, he recited his confession instead of merely acquiescing in quotations from it, and his last plea was a pitiful performance — even as compared to the effort of his defence counsel — whereas the Cardinal's showed unmistakable traces of a return to his former self-respect. Indeed, there is general agreement among those who heard recordings of the two trials that both the accused spoke in the same expressionless, dull, unnatural voice; but however that may be, such signs, and the circumstances which might have brought about these changes of character, need not detain me here. The impression is outstanding that two strong-willed men, not without confidence in

— and the capacity to argue for — their own beliefs, were presented in the court-room as indeterminate, entirely lacking in principles and constructive ideals and unenthusiastic in their own defence.

I now propose to turn more briefly still to the other aspects of the trials. It is always difficult to discuss another country's judicial system; the historian must see each trial against a background of previous trials in the same land; the lawyer can only with difficulty dissociate his mind from the subtleties of his own nation's legal system and regard in an objective light the new scale of values and code of conduct. But there is without doubt some sort of universal standard, partly codified in various agreements and conventions, which no country can ignore without incurring the charge of perverting justice, if not in its own time, at the hands of historians. And by such a standard it is no exaggeration to say that the conduct, during these two trials, of the prosecution, the government, the press and the radio was quite inexcusable. I will give only one example, with reference to the leading questions, insinuations and outrageous deductions of the Presidents of Court, from each trial. First, the following exchange during Mindszenty's trial:

*President of Court: The Prosecution charges you with having proposed at a meeting of the Borough Council, on November 18th, 1938, that Imrédy — Béla Imrédy, who has since been executed — be elected Freeman of Zalaegerszeg.*

*Mindszenty: This is correct. But, if you please that does not mean that I agreed with Mindszenty's policies. I did not.*

*President: If you please, if a person formally proposes somebody as a Freeman, one cannot logically conclude from this that he disagrees with the policies of the man concerned. . . . (The conversation switches to another topic.)*

The extract from the Rajk trial requires a little explanation. It might at first sight seem reasonable for the Judge or Prosecution to establish publicly whether the accused had changed his name, even in the Rajk trial where five out of the eight defendants were born with German or at least non-Magyar names. But against the background of a public opinion highly inflamed against the Germans and everything connected with them, it seems prejudicial — to say the least — to make the disclosure about Rajk's origin right at the end of his examination (whereas all the others had been formally established when the trial opened) in the following exchange:

*President: I have one final question to ask you. What was the name of your father?*

*Rajk: József, but he is dead.*

*President: What was his surname?*

*Rajk: József Rajk.*

*President: That is, József Rajk, as you say. What was your grandfather's name?*

*Rajk: (irritated) My grandfather being of Saxon descent, wrote his name Reich.*

*President: So you say your grandfather was called Reich. How did it become Rajk. Legally?*

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*Rajk: Legally.*

*President: How?*

*Rajk: I could not give the exact date when it was legalized. In my certificate of baptism it is still spelt with an á, that is, Reich became Rájk; anyhow my university papers were made out in the present spelling.*

*President: You simply used an a, dropping the accent. And you call this legal?*

*Rajk: (remains silent).*

*President: So you know that Rajk came from Reich.*

*Rajk: In this respect I wish to add that I am of Aryan descent and genetically too, because on one side I am Saxon. The Hungarian Aryan Law...*

*President: The question is not whether you are of Aryan or Saxon descent. But look here, this is your birth certificate (showing the accused): born on March 8, 1909, your father was József Rájk, his son was László, that is you. If the Minister of Home Affairs had not approved it you were using this name illegally.*

*Rajk: (goes up to platform to look at the paper, hands it back to the President and returns to the microphone).*

*President: That will be all.*

(In order to see this incident in its proper context, it should be remembered that it was not normally considered a crime after 1945 to have acted illegally before that year; also that by 1946 Rajk was himself Minister of the Interior.)

I have chosen at random these two examples — perhaps not the most flagrant — of the brow-beating and tendentious methods of the Court Presidents. It may seem strange at first that in these two trials, both presumably calculated to prove to the Western nations that the accused were given justice (since a restricted number of Western observers were admitted, contrary to normal practice; and within a few hours of the verdict government versions of the trial were on sale in English translations), the Presidents should so far exceed their rights only to establish such irrelevant points. And I emphasise that time and time again, not only during the cross-examination but in the broadcasts, in the press and in the overtly official publications, before, during, and after the trial, this sort of indirect accusation or innuendo was introduced — often so patently fabricated as to make the whole contention or confession spurious — which could not possibly serve to show that Mindszenty was plotting a Habsburg restoration or Rajk the installation of some sort of Tito regime.

The solution to this paradox is to be found deep in Marxist ideology. I refer my readers to the strict aesthetic code, which has driven so many artists of all branches to flee from Communist dominated countries, known as Social Realism. A fundamental tenet of this code is that artists should portray their subjects, not as individuals, but as expression of a class. Thus the villain must always conform to the pre-conceived, semi-political pattern; he must be culpable of all the classic 'crimes against the people'; his ingredients may be found in long lists in almost any Soviet publication — a fascist past, connections with the imperialist sabotage movement, nationalist deviation, and the like, — with the generous incompatibility range allowed to all these terms by

modern usage; and it is interesting to note that recently foreign, not seldom German or Jewish extraction has by implication come to be included in the black-list. And as in art, so in life. By the same psychological quirk in the Russian-Communist mentality a parallel fetish has arisen about trials: the accused must make a confession; he must admit to having committed as many of these black-list crimes as is compatible with his career, and often more; and in general he must conduct himself in the prescribed way. Herein, I think, lies the answer to the question of Slavomir Rawicz, author of 'The Long Walk,' and doubtless many others. When the Russians devoted much time and trouble to persuading him to sign a confession and to organizing his trial, though the verdict was a foregone conclusion and there was not the slightest propaganda interest since he was tried *in camera* and the Western press could hardly have even known of his case, he could only ask himself why they did not send him direct to Siberia and save themselves the trouble. I have no doubt that a thorough examination of all the major trials that have taken place in the history of Soviet justice would reveal the gradual growth of a complex system calculated to convert all sorts and conditions of men to the identical, shallow symbol of criminality. The story would include setbacks, brave men who denied or rejected their confessions and who fought for their reputations at the end; it would also show crimes appearing on the black-list later to be struck off it, such as Titoism (still distinguished from nationalism and Trotskyism); but by and large it would show the development along social-realist lines of the grim art of levelling down to the same degraded condition any given mind, any given character.

But we cannot leave the story there. It will be remembered that in recent months, just as one crime has been added to the blacklist with the title of Personality-cult, so a number of names have been taken off the lists of the damned and reinstated among the ranks of the heroes by a process known as Rehabilitation. In the course of this particular revision of history, to revert to my original theme, László Rajk has been rehabilitated and his whole trial briefly reported to have been 'based on provocation'. Even if this were the only such example it would be a serious indictment of the entire social-realist trial concept; but new cracks appear in the façade daily. I stress that the cracks are in the façade and not in the fundamental structure of Russian Communism: *nobody has yet been released who might not be considered safe from the régimes' point of view or at any rate worth the risk for the sake of political expediency*. But the prison-gates are open: the latest news at the time of writing is of Archbishop Grösz of Kalocsa, sentenced for crimes almost identical with those alleged against Mindszenty, who has now been released for the paradoxical reason that he is to resume leadership of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops; and some pressure in the right quarters might be sufficient to secure the release of some other victims of a justice which has been finally discredited. We have yet no right to expect that the whole authoritarian system will not recover from this *volte-face*; but it will something, if its material consequences correspond to its ideological significance.

J. de V. Allen

EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES

84th Congress

WOULDN'T IT BE MORE HONEST TO TEAR DOWN THE STATUE  
OF LIBERTY?

A few days ago, looking across new York Harbor towards the Statue of Liberty, the thought struck me: —

"What's that Statue of Liberty doing there now? Now, when through its financial, material and military aid, our government enables a Communist bandit and mass-murderer, Tito, and his America-hating gangsters, to hold our 17,000,000 Yugoslav allies and friends in slavery, wouldn't it be more honest to tear it down?"

That thought struck me again reading the newspaper reports of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's deliberations over the President's request for \$ 4,900,000,000 for Foreign Aid, which included \$ 30,000,000 as "defense aid" for Communist Yugoslavia. Why call that "defense aid" or "military aid"? Why not truthfully call it, what it would be, "Aid for maintenance of the institution of slavery in Communist Yugoslavia"?

Some may say that an unknown businessman has no place meddling with this. But having known the Yugoslavs for 36 years, including 20 years operation of my own company in the former prosperous, food-exporting, pre-World War II Yugoslavia, and now constantly meeting refugees freshly arrived from Tito's present food-begging, practically bankrupt, Communist slave-state, I feel it my duty to submit this for your consideration.

Wouldn't the President's request for \$ 30,000,000 for "defense aid" for Tito in 1957, and his requested right to spend \$ 40,000,000 in any one country from his "special discretionary fund" of \$ 100,000,000 permit him to give Tito \$ 70,000,000 in 1957, and this on top the sum to accrue in Yugoslavia from our January 1956, sale to Tito of \$ 49,000,000 of wheat, lard and cotton for Yugoslav dinars? Why permit this? What have we received from the \$ 2,000,000 already given to Tito and his gangsters?

Ladies and Gentlemen, whatever our Foreign Policy makers may say, the fact is, we cannot hold the trust of the 800,000,000 people now in Communist slavery if we aid the atheist Communist Dictator, Tito, to hold the Yugoslavs in slavery. Those enslaved peoples and others, knowing the Yugoslav Columnists to be real Communists, easily, from our support of Tito and his Communist gangsters, can doubt the sincerity of our government's expensive worldwide anti-Communist propaganda.

Therefore why not *stop all aid to Communist Yugoslavia*, and show the world that our Statue of Liberty still stands for liberty for all men? But if, for reasons of policy too devious for open explanation, you will feel forced to vote funds for the continued support of slavery in Communist Yugoslavia, then ought you not also vote funds for tearing down that great Statue, and for replacing it with a memorial to the ideals for which we once were respected?

Sincerely yours  
WILLIAM H. SMYTH

# Socialists and Communists in Austria

BY HELMUTH HOTTNER

Ever since communism has entered the stage of world politics, its tactics in relation to outsiders has been oscillating between brutal attack and hypocritical ostentations of friendship. In all this the democratic Socialists of the West have been one of communism's favourite targets.

In Austria which enjoys the doubtful privilege of being contiguous to a number of communist satellite states and which, owing to having suffered Soviet occupation over a long period of years, had the benefit of an object lesson on the essence of communist rule, the communists found the going rather harder than elsewhere. Yet they will try, time and again, to establish political links with the Austrian Socialists.

Years ago the communists succeeded in hitching to their band-waggon a splinter group from the left wing of the Austrian Socialist Party led by Erwin Scharf. Admittedly, they are a fairly unimportant little gang, those so-called "left socialists". Nevertheless, the treatment meted out to them by their communist associates after the recent general election, which, incidentally, cost the Communist Party of Austria much of its voting strength and one out of four seats in Parliament, was a practical demonstration of communist "good faith". The Socialist Workers' Party — the name by which those left-wing Socialists are calling themselves — made great and loyal play in the election campaign with the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, its newspaper stressing in particular that the resolutions passed in Moscow had opened up "new and extremely welcome vistas of cooperation between socialists and communists". However, when after the election the time came for the Communist Party of Austria to cede one of its seats in Parliament to Erwin Scharf's group, the official communist daily, "*Volksstimme*" bluntly declared: "Despite all its loyal collaboration with the Socialist Workers' Party, the Communist Party of Austria did not, after this election that failed to justify our hopes, find itself in a position to agree to the previously fixed order for the candidates to occupy their Parliamentary seats." Which meant, of course, that the communist pledge to sacrifice one of its members in the Nationalrat, the Lower House, in favour of Scharf's group was not redeemed.

The Moor had done his duty and was dismissed, even though the same "*Volksstimme*," in an article equally published after the general election, acknowledged his services in the following manner: "It is due to the communists and *left socialists* that thousands of workers, disillusioned by the Socialist Party, have been comforted and strengthened in their socialist faith and saved from being thrown into perplexity as regards the socialist idea."

To the main body of socialists, however, the communists chose to show the clenched fist. The wage demands of the Vienna public transport workers, suddenly stepped up before the general election, and the streetcar workers' strike, threatened but never carried into practice, were to serve that purpose. Together with other pin-pricks administered to the Socialist Party and the

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trade unions, they were meant to mollify the socialists by frightening them that they might lose a considerable number of votes.

Meanwhile, the communists did not cease to make more or less camouflaged overtures to the socialists to enter into league with them. Their approaches have, however, remained unsuccessful so far, and it is rather interesting to find out why. Why, indeed, should the Austrian socialists turn a deaf ear to those communist blandishments to which their colleagues living farther west by no means prove always to be immune? Admittedly, the Soviet occupation of Austria and the immediate vicinity of some of the communist satellite régimes has something to do with that reluctance. They do not, however, provide the whole explanation; for the real causes we must look somewhat deeper. In fact, we have to dig a little into the past.

After World War I, the Austrian Social Democratic Party — as it was then styled — took a course of evolution increasingly converging on communism. Those days when the socialist workers were commandeered in closed formations to view the Soviet propaganda film "The Cruiser Potemkin", when the praise of communism's achievements in the Soviet Union was being sung in almost every issue of the Socialist Party organ "*Arbeiter-Zeitung*", and when the Social Democratic Party kept organizing conducted tours of its adherents to Russia, are by no means forgotten as yet. Now, by the side of that great Social Democratic Party, which at that time was 95 per cent pro-communist, the Austrian Communist Party naturally played an entirely subordinate role. Their principal aims they held in common — firmly based on the indisputable teachings of Marx and Engels — and there was obviously not much point for an Austrian socialist in becoming a communist, the two being practically identical. It was the almost complete identity of their ideas that reduced the Austrian communists of that period to insignificance.

What with the end of the second world war, however, and the way the Soviet communist "liberators" endeared themselves to the Austrian people, the picture has changed altogether. Those who called a spade a spade, and themselves communists, had found a strong protector. And if the Socialist Party of Austria — as successor to the former Austrian Social Democratic Party — wanted to stand up to the Christian democrat Austrian People's Party, it had to renounce its predecessor's idols. Other factors also contributed to diverting the gaze of the new Socialist Party of Austria from the East; notably, most of the exiled socialist leaders had, since 1938, weathered the storm in western countries and drawn inspiration chiefly from the British Labour Movement.

That change of course proved to be not without consequences as regards the Soviet Union. When the war had ended, the latter had thought to be able to take the situation in Austria firmly in hand. Now it suddenly saw its hopes waning because the domestic evolution of political thought in Austria. Many an Austrian prisoner of war who firmly reckoned on endearing himself to the Soviet victors by pleading membership of long standing in the Social Democratic Party, found himself sorely disappointed. The Russians showed more trust and understanding to the average petty national socialist who would openly admit having been an adherent of the late Nazi Movement.

In this context it may be interesting to record the story, which we have on the authority of Austria's leading communist parliamentarian, Dr. Ernst

Fischer, of how the first President of the postwar Austrian Republic came to be nominated with the approval of the Soviet Government.

Prior to the President's office being filled, a joint delegation, consisting chiefly of communists, visited Moscow under Dr. Fischer's leadership. They submitted to Stalin a list of candidates, asking him to name the person he would prefer to see installed in that office. On scanning the list, Stalin unhesitatingly pointed to Dr. Karl Renner, the leader of the Austrian Social Democrats after World War II. Apparently in the early days of the bolshevik revolution, when Stalin had held under Lenin the post of People's Commissar for National Minorities, he had come across a paper written by Dr. Renner, when still a member of the old Austrian Imperial Parliament, on the national minorities problem of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The ideas expressed in that treatise had so much impressed Stalin at the time that he subsequently used it as a guide for dealing with his own kindred problems in the Soviet Union. That is why of all the names submitted on that list, Stalin found Dr. Renner's the one that was most familiar to him.

However, the new Socialist Party of Austria began turning increasingly to the West, which made the differences of policy between it and the communists more marked. This, in turn, somewhat enhanced the influence of the Austrian Communist Party. Yet, despite a somewhat more sharply outlined profile and the lavish support given to it by the Soviet occupation, the Communist Party never succeeded in winning over substantial masses of the Austrian working class, even though it tried hard and repeatedly to take power by fomenting armed disturbances and general strikes. These attempts were frustrated by the indifference of the Austrian workers.

After their last effort of that kind had failed in 1950, the Austrian communists changed their tactics on the well-tried oriental pattern. Instead of agitating in the streets, they turned to the plants and workshops, there to increase their influence patiently, step by step. At the same time, they began to strive clearly for contacts, if not close association, with the socialists. Having achieved to chip off the main body of the Socialist Party the group of Dr. Erwin Scharf already mentioned, they are now concentrating their astute propaganda on the Party's left wing consisting mainly of the younger element.

The result of the latest general election last spring, has further confirmed the Austrian communists in the correctness of their endeavour. As is well known, in that election the non-socialistic People's Party increased the number of its Parliamentary seats by 8, the democratic Socialist Party by 1, while the new Liberal Party lost 8 seats as compared with those held by the so-called League of Independents in 1953. The one seat the communists lost obviously must have gone to the Socialist Party.

The Austrian Socialists are well aware that the People's Party is only one seat short of a straight majority over all other parties in Parliament. Their left wing is under constant fire from the incessantly thundering guns of communist propaganda demanding united action by all "workers' representatives" For the communists know full well that their three Members of Parliament may kick up what row they will, they cannot increase their influence unless they succeed in broadening their platform.

Hence the line the communists are now taking in their Press and in the occasional statements made by their leaders is to claim that, in spite of some shift in the distribution of seats, the "strength of the working class has not diminished" in the new *Nationalrat*. The communist clamour for restoring the "unity of the working class" is still the same old snare set to trap the socialists. It is fervently to be hoped that the way in which socialist or socialist-dominated governments in the neighbouring satellite countries were made to prepare the ground for communist dictatorships, only to be gobbled up, in turn, by the latter, will serve as a clear and effective warning even to the left wing of the Austrian Socialist Party.

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## Soviet Literature after Fadeyev's Death

BY ALEXANDER KAEMPFE

On May 14th, 1956, the Central Committee of the All-Union Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) communicated to the country and the world at large the news of the "premature tragic" death on the previous day of its Candidate Member, Alexander Fadeyev, Chairman of the Soviet Writers' Union. The medical findings attached to the communiqué mentioned as cause of death far-progressed alcoholism and depressive suicide as the way in which Fadeyev's death occurred.

Sufficiently well informed observers will first of all think of the conspicuously great number of suicides among Soviet poets; he will remember Yesenyin and Mayakovsky, recall the short-story writer Andrei Sobol, perhaps Nikolai Kuznetsov, the "proletarian," and, finally, the great Tsvetayeva. Our observer should nevertheless beware of jumping to conclusions when likening these suicides one to the other and, particularly, to Fadeyev's voluntary self-annihilation.

To begin with, let us group these cases in their chronological order. Kuznetsov, Sobol and Yesenyin put an end to their lives between 1923 and 1925; Mayakovsky in April 1930. There followed a long gap of some 26 years. In the middle of that period occurred the death of Marina Tsvetayeva. This, however, must be left out of consideration; for the poetess had returned from exile only a short while prior to her death and does not, in the strict sense of the term, belong to Soviet literature. It may thus be established that for 26 years no suicide has become known in the Soviet literary world proper. It is, therefore, chronology itself that limits the value of our initial observations.

Of all poets' suicides during the early Soviet period it was Yesenyin's death which drew the greatest attention and was frequently emulated even by

non-poets. However, that revulsion from Soviet reality — stigmatized with the name of “Yesenshchina” at the time — when compared to Mayakovsky's deep despair impresses us as being almost flippant. For in Mayakovsky's person we are confronted not with the vaguely sympathizing, sentimental boozier that Yesenyin had been, but a man passionately, if erroneously, devoted to communism; no immature dilettante of Kuznetsov's type, but a poet of global stature.

Vicariously for its other great masters, too, Mayakovsky terminated the last, short-lived heyday of Russian literature, which despite all denials and slanders is being drawn upon, unadmittedly, to this day. The shot with which Mayakovsky ended his life marks the transition to that epoch which was later to be named, semi-officially, after Stalin, and which endowed literature with the strait-jacket of “socialist realism”. And in the front rank of the literary doctrinaires, bullies and jailers there emerged a certain Alexander Fadeyev.

## II

*“Bitter is the realisation that this career should have found an abrupt ending so tragically, wastefully, senselessly. It is difficult to imagine that precisely he, Alexander Fadeyev, a writer so truly communist, whose work are replete with an indestructible zest for life and the solemnity of the struggle for a new morality for man, should have committed the act that contradicts his entire life-asserting, creative work.”*

The above paragraph appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of May 15th, 1956. The same, almost word by word, was written about Mayakovsky 26 years earlier. Similar also is the way in which the reason for their respective suicides have been minimized: in Fadeyev's case it is supposed to have been alcoholism, in Mayakovsky's unrequited love for an actress.

The similarity of these obituaries speaks against their authors. It merely indicates that, when confronted with “a comrade's suicide” nothing more intelligent comes to the communists' minds. Moreover, after the “building of socialism” has allegedly been completed already, such excuses must appear even more threadbare than at the time of the first five-year-plan.

Nor had either of the two been “assertive of life”: Mayakovsky had gone to pieces, and as regards Fadeyev, in his capacity as a policeman of the Party, his job was to destroy life, not to affirm it. Even in his ideals Mayakovsky had only been half a communist; Fadeyev, on the other hand, had practised communism indeed. Of course, a true communist ought to be as little thwarted by alcoholism as by the charms of an actress. Of the two alcohol offers the more acceptable excuse; Fadeyev must have had recourse to it to numb his politics, though politics most likely delivered the *coup de grace* when they took a new turn. This applies to Fadeyev more exclusively because in Mayakovsky's case there must have been also mystical causes playing a not unimportant part.

There is very little Mayakovsky and Fadeyev had in common. When the latter first made his mark with the novel entitled *Razgrom*, Mayakovsky had

already left a lifetime's work behind him. The hypersensitive lyrical poet and the prose writer, as conventional in his mental make-up as in his writings, were direct opposites. In the jingoist writer's group RAPP, of which Fadeyev was one of the leaders, Mayakovsky had been suffered as a "leftist fellow-traveller" but not particularly beloved. That group had been the breeding ground for the new type of literary bureaucrat so intensely hated by Mayakovsky.

Eventually RAPP was disbanded and Mayakovsky canonized posthumously. Ironically, however, the trustees appointed to be the administrators of his legacy of glory were former RAPP people, among them particularly also Fadeyev himself.

### III

*"Already after the Central Committee of the Party had issued its decree (on literature, 1946) Selvinsky decided to publish an anthology containing most of his earlier works. In all Soviet poetry there is nothing which could be more alien to us in spirit, more inimical to the true essence of our relationship to life and art."*

In this vein Fadeyev, the literary potentate, used to rebuke his underlings, in this particular instance the poet Ilya Selvinsky. Admittedly, his hysteria was never greater than at the zenith of the Zhdanov era; later he may have treaded more softly. Nevertheless, Fadeyev, who at the age of 20 had taken part in suppressing the revolt of the Kronstadt sailors, was the very man to become, in his forties, the oppressor of a literature so greatly indebted to the insurgent spirit of Kronstadt. While some poets may have fared better than Selvinsky, it has been proved that a worse fate fell to the lot of many others.

The Stalin epoch — which in literature coincides with Fadeyev's era — saw the disappearance of many a writer. The end of some of them is shrouded in darkness, but to many of them the term "murder" can and, indeed, must be applied. Among the victims of extreme violence there are, apart from a galaxy of secondary figures, such masters as Kluyev, Mandelstamm, Babel and Pilnyak. Fadeyev's era was in fact the period of the murder and prohibition of poets.

Nobody can as yet tell if the suicide of the protagonist of that era also marks its termination. In itself it would indicate a return to more normal conditions in literary life, to a more humane solution of conflicts. What is more important and hopeful: the re-introduction of suicide was the act not of a poet, but a literary bureaucrat under whose knout literature had had to suffer for decades. Herein lies the essential difference between Mayakovsky's and Fadeyev's suicides.

## IV

But what would an end to the "Fadeyev era" actually mean? As regards the Party, it would certainly mean no more no less than the collapse of its literary policy, the renunciation of the doctrine of "socialist realism". Hitherto it has been maintained that Soviet literature had never accomplished its true achievements before Stalin's times. Of course, there was no way of proving so. To anyone having some idea, no matter how rudimentary, of artistic quality the superiority of the 'twenties must appear incontestable. The authors, however, that claim by reference to examples, much as cunning reviewers tried to do ever, who had been young in those years, later mostly deteriorated considerably although one would have expected the maturity of experience to work in the opposite direction.

A genuine liberalisation of literary life is, of course, incompatible with the continuance of "socialist realism". But were the clumsy conventions, so hostile to art, of the compulsory ideology to fall by the roadside, literature would escape the clutches of the Party and lose its propagandistic function. As a result, there would probably materialize a link-up with the tradition of the 'twenties. The chief representatives of that era — of whom Leonov, Vsevolod, Ivanov, Kaverin, Katayev, Sholokhov, Paustovsky, Fedin, Selvin'sky, Lugovskoy, Tikhonov, Aseyev, Kirsanov and Shklovsky survived without having been banned — are not even particularly old as yet. Their indisputable decadence is due not so much to old age as to dissimulation, practised for decades, which may have blocked up creative springs. Again, there may be authors who, even while they wrote things worthy of the Stalin Prize, entrusted their more substantial works to a locked drawer. Perhaps some of those will soon emerge; Leonov's "Chariot," Paustovsky's "Golden Rose" may be taken as auguries.

Rehabilitations started a few months ago are pointing in the same direction. Ever since, tiny notices have been cropping up, time and again, in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, announcing that a commission had been entrusted with the publication of so-and-so's literary legacy. Those hitherto mentioned were mostly communists, such as Koltsov, the publicist, and Kirshon, the playwright. The only non-communist of note among them was Isaac Babel.

There is no telling whether or not that trend is to continue and bring to the surface all early Soviet writers long liquidated. But if it happened that way, it would necessarily have to result in the re-publication of the works of authors who managed to survive even though most or all of their writings had been banned — such as Pasternak, Olesha, Zabolotsky, Anna Akhmatova, Zoshchenko. That, in turn, would further alienate literature from the régime. No wonder, therefore, that the Party should be anxious to put on the brakes and mute the the voices of opposition ever more frequently manifesting themselves. Insofar as the régime is making concessions, those are by no means so voluntarily granted as would appear to western observers.

An important aspect of the change is the appearance of socially critical works, linked up not so much with the early Soviet than rather with the classical tradition. Although the new critics will not allow themselves to incur risks nearly as great as those taken by their predecessors, and are mostly focussing their criticism on secondary matters, nevertheless it is criticism of present-day conditions.

Inasmuch as the criticism is directed against conditions and occurrences which the classics had already been castigating in their time, the reviewers of the Party may resort to representing it as aimed at the "remnants of the old society" and fit it into the framework of "socialist realism". Yet the question was raised if all this did not spell the inadmissible rebirth of "critical realism". According to the official cliché, "critical realism" must precede "socialist realism" and coexist with the latter only for a transitional period which it is claimed the Soviet Union has already passed.

Of course, reality will shatter that cliché. For social criticism is actually not at all the essential characteristic of "pre-socialist" literature. Moreover the Russian classics have, as a rule, been more critical than the early Soviet writers. By the time the latter had at last become thoroughly regimented, the "socialist realism" forced upon them found its expression in that while they went on idealizing the present and the future they began to criticise the ever-receding past. It may be instructive to examine from this viewpoint the works of Leonid Leonov and compare, for example, "The Russian Forest" (1950—53) with "The Thief" (1925—26). The masters of Soviet literature in their capacity of "socialist realists" have frequently been more critical than their "critical realist" opposite numbers, but their criticisms bore relation to a ghost only and were therefore — discounting their propagandistic function — socially irrelevant.

The new critics, on the other hand, are, despite their comparative innocuity, fundamentally more critical than either, the classics — who, willy-nilly, had offered much more than mere criticism — or the early Soviet writers who had mostly other things to think about. Moreover, the new critics are no longer wrapped up in dialectics, their analyses are to the point and genuine. They do not, however, excel in artistic quality; at any rate not sufficiently to ascend to the spheres of truly great art. Yet, even while only lashing out at the régime without specifically enriching literature, they are indirectly rendering a great service to their fellow-humans.

# The Relief of Belgrade

July 21—22, 1456

When the Ottoman Turkish Emperor, Mohamed II, conquered Constantinople, the capital city of the Byzantine Empire, in 1453, the highway to the Balkans was opened to him; by crossing the Golden Horn he wished to invade the smaller Balkan principalities in order to incorporate them into his realm. There was only one mighty obstacle capable of thwarting the Sultan's progress — the Crown of Hungary which lay astride his road of conquest to the heart of Europe and which for centuries past had been the suzerain power over the Balkan countries. Already in 1454, when Mohamed launched out to conquer Serbia, his attempt was frustrated by a lightning offensive — carried out with an essentially defensive purpose over a distance of very nearly 1,000 miles — by *János Hunyadi*, Regent and Captain-General of the Kingdom of Hungary. With the remnants of his defeated army, Mohamed II withdrew to Constantinople there to brood and plan his new campaign which was to lead to the siege of Belgrade two years later.

The Sultan assembled his hosts in Rumelia, a part of contemporary Bulgaria. Among others, he built up a corps of artillery — unheard-of in those days — consisting of 300 pieces, including 22 five-inch siege guns and a number of mortars in the muzzles of which a man could be placed comfortably in a sitting position. Mohammed also organised a Danube flotilla of 200 galleons and armoured boats. His land army was about 150,000 strong.

Having received word of the Turks' preparations, Hungary's National Assembly, the Diet, quickly passed a military budget, sent messages for help to the Germans, Italians, and Albanians and appointed *János Hunyadi* Commander-in-Chief.

In the beginning, the Hungarian army barely amounted to one-tenth of the Ottoman armed forces; Belgrade — the called *Nándorfehérvár* in Hungarian — had a garrison of about 3—4,000 men while Hunyadi's mobile force comprised not more than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. This force was increased by another 20,000 men as the result of the recruiting activities conducted by that great crusader of the period, the Franciscan friar, *Johannes a Capistrano*; his volunteers, however, represented a host of religious zealots rather than an orderly military force.

Hunyadi therefore made it his first task to hasten to Belgrade and reinforce its garrison with a number of hand-picked men from his own mercenaries while strengthening its artillery with material drawn from other fortresses. Hunyadi then appointed his brother-in-law, *Mihály Szilágyi*, Commanding Officer of the fortress of Belgrade and sped to the fortified town of *Pétervárad*, farther north, in order to begin organising the army which was to lift eventually the siege of Belgrade.

For Hunyadi knew that the Turks were planning to conquer Belgrade, the strategic base of the Hungarian defences in the Balkans. It was Mohammed's plan to besiege Belgrad from the south with his mighty land army while sealing

off the approaches from the north, making his Danube flotilla take possession of that stretch of the river which confronts the city. Mohammed would then bring his formidable artillery to bear on the fortifications and batter them until such time as Belgrade was softened up to be taken by assault.

From the way the Turks deployed their forces, Hunyadi correctly guessed their plan. He did not hesitate to take appropriate counter-measures; for his part, he also began organising a fleet of river craft with which to breach the Turks' blockade on the waters of the Danube and the Sava so that he could bring relief to the Belgrade garrison from the north. The rest of his army of relief he planned to keep on the left bank of the Sava river as a strategic reserve.

The Ottoman land army set out on its long march from its assembly bases in Bulgaria and Serbia as early as April, 1456. It reached Belgrade at the beginning of June, facing the city's fortifications which consisted of a double wall thrown around the town itself, the Citadel known as the Kalimegdan and a number of outworks in the north erected along the banks of the Danube and the Sava.

Mohammed disposed his land forces in a large semi-circle, resting the right flank of his European Corps on the Danube while the left flank of his Asiatic troops abutted on the Sava. Simultaneously, the Sultan sent his fleet up north of Zemun (Zimony in Hungarian) ordering its units to cast anchor and be chained one to the other so as to form an impenetrable barrier across the Danube. Having thus screened off Belgrade from the outside world, Mohammed proceeded to lay siege to the fortress city in the classical manner of those days. He approached the city walls with trenches and battered their outworks with the concentrated fire of his numerous siege-guns of formidable caliber. And indeed, he soon succeeded in breaching the outer perimeter. Nor could the inner walls have resisted for long had Hunyadi not succeeded in carrying out his masterly plan just at that critical period.

In Pétervárad the Hungarian Captain-General had meanwhile divided his army of relief into two groups. One, consisting of his own well-trained mercenaries and the cream of the crusaders, was to proceed downstream on board his 200 river boats; the other, comprising Hunyadi's cavalry, artillery and the rest of the crusaders, had orders to march on Belgrad along the right bank of the Danube. On July 14th, 1456, the two river flotillas clashed. The battle raged for five hours and in the end the Turkish fleet left its position decisively defeated. Three great Ottoman galleons with a complement of 500 were sunk, four were captured, the rest, severely damaged, began drifting downstream in disorderly flight. When they reached the outworks of the beleaguered city, Mohammed II, enraged to the extreme, had all his remaining boats set on fire.

This decisive feat of arms on the river was effectively supported by Hunyadi's army group, particularly his artillery, marching along the right bank of the Danube, as well as by the besieged garrison's 40 armoured boats.

Through the breach thus opened in the Turkish encirclement there poured into the fortress some ten thousand of Hunyadi's best soldiers — a considerable reinforcement. The other units not transported into the city — chiefly Capi-

strano's crusaders — had strict orders from Hunyadi to take up action stations on the Sava river facing Belgrade and not to budge thence until expressly told.

Meanwhile the Ottoman land forces were directing a number of consecutive yet unsuccessful attacks against the city's fortifications until, after a formidable artillery barrage lasting 24 hours, the Sultan gave orders for the main assault to begin on July 21st. Heading in person one of his assault-columns, Mohammed was able to penetrate to the moat of the citadel by nightfall. However, at dawn the garrison's counter-attack threw him back beyond the city's inner perimeter. Thereupon a force of foolhardy crusaders, encouraged by their comrades-in-arms' success, sallied forth through the breaches of the city wall and routed a Turkish cavalry unit preparing for a charge. More and more crusaders ventured out of the city, and, seeing this, their fellows across the Sava could no longer contain themselves. Despite their orders to stay put, they crossed the river and, joining the other crusaders at the opposite side, they fought their way through to the Turkish Asia Corps' camp and began looting.

It was a critical moment which Hunyadi's military genius turned to victory. Himself encamped in the citadel, Hunyadi saw what was happening and decided to attack the Turkish right flank. With the initial impetus of his sally, the Hungarian General captured a goodly number of Turkish guns and, turning them against their former owners, fought his way through to the Sultan's encampment despite the desperate resistance put up by the Emperor's bodyguard of Janissaries. The only circumstance that bade Hunyadi halt and cautiously withdraw to the Turks' assault trenches was the appearance of a massive force of Ottoman cavalry at the far side of the imperial encampment.

However, the Sultan no longer believed in the possibility of wrenching victory from defeat. That same night — July 22nd he ordered a general retreat, had fire set to his camp and withdrew in a panic, leaving all his siege-guns behind. With his men still heavily outnumbered, strongly decimated and exhausted in the furious fighting, Hunyadi could not think of giving pursuit, even though Mohammed's army was running away in disorderly flight so that it was not before reaching Sofia that the Sultan was able to reassemble his forces.

Instead of pursuing his defeated adversary, Hunyadi wisely concentrated on repairing the damaged fortifications of Belgrade and burying the immense number of corpses lying in and around the city which in the scorching heat of July represented a serious danger to the health of his troops. However, in spite of these precautionary measures, Hunyadi himself succumbed to an outbreak of the plague. Taken ill, he had himself transported to Zemun where he died on August 11th, barely three weeks after one of the most resounding victories in Europe's military history.

V. S.

# Voices in the Wilderness

*Topical Extracts from the Free Western Press*

## THE DANGER OF EMPTY WORDS

"Of neither of the three (Nehru, Tito, Nasser) could it be said that they are the symbols or leaders of an impartial trend in world opinion trying to keep at equal distance from both camps. Tito is a communist; Nehru represents the paradox attitude of a liberal socialist, and Nasser is an Arab. Although they are vaunting a neutral posture, each of them has his own particular conception of the ultimate objectives of policy. To some extent they owe their stature to the failure of western statesmen to make clear to the world what it's all about. For all the western powers have devoted too little attention to the two essential features of the world conflict: they have not made it sufficiently clear that what is happening is a dispute between the free world and the Communist Party, not a power conflict involving Russia with the West. By omitting to point that out they have blurred the issue which is not one of mere power politics but a question of ideological controversy.

"These two basic mistakes of political strategy have led the western powers to commit two corresponding errors in political tactics: on the one hand, there is the incessant clamour for 'talks with Russia,' and, on the other hand, a similarly stubborn indifference in respect of unhappy Eastern Europe. This second mistake has led to the result of the problem of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Germany sailing under the flag of reunification, whereby it has been divorced from the complex of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe as a whole of which it is only a part...

"In spite of a violent opposition in domestic politics and a deplorable lack of solidarity on the part of his western partners, Adenauer remains unshakably faithful to his western orientation — he, of all statesmen in the West the clearest in vision and strongest in conviction. If the Soviet Union wants to achieve its ends, it will unavoidably have to put Adenauer out of the way... Adenauer's is the correct policy, but it is not a popular one. It is the comfortable, vague timid and shortsighted policy which follows the slogan: "Let's talk to the Russians and forget about the satellites" — a policy that, in fact, London and Washington are equally advocating and practising, too...

"Precisely at a time when the awareness is dawning on the British Labour Party that personal freedom ought to be shielded from interference by the State, the German Social Democrats declare themselves prepared to barter the freedom of Eastern Europe in return for 'reunification' — a reunification of which all reasonable people must know that it would be available only at the price of the enduring enslavement of 17 million Germans in the Eastern Zone.

"It follows from the preceding that the policy which Ollenhauer as well as Dehler are advocating is a policy of empty words. It could best be defined

as reunification without liberation, that is, a policy conducive to a situation which would be neither liberation nor reunification; for it is obviously a matter of impossibility to unite in the same fold a free liberal Germany with an enslaved communist one . . . The leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) are extremely unrealistic from the statesman's viewpoint; they are however, calculating very realistically as political agitators. While their motto of direct negotiations with Moscow will not bring about the reunification of Germany and the liberation of the East Zone, it will provide them with all the desirable chances of victory in the approaching elections.

"Such victory would result in a serious defeat for Germany and a mighty success for the Soviet Union. Germany's true future lies in becoming the leading central power of a federated Europe. In order to attain to that end, Germany must win and preserve for herself the confidence of both the western and eastern halves of Europe."

*From Don Salvador de Madariaga's leading article, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, July 8, 1956.*

#### POZNAN WRITING ON THE WALL

(After East Berlin and Poznan) "what labour leader of a free country could still afford to shake hands, no matter how, with those who have not refrained for the second time from shooting at strikers? The call to establish diplomatic relations with the satellite régimes, raised in the German Bundestag almost simultaneously with the order issued by the satellite leader, Ochab, which set the tanks rolling in Poznan, is likely soon to disappear from the German Socialists' program."

"Almost a year ago, on July 18th, 1955, the fate of the men and women of Poznan was dealt with for the last time. On that day, President Eisenhower politely reminded his interlocutors over the Geneva conference table that there were a number of East European states still deprived of their sovereign rights and self-government. With bated breath the free world watched that performance of manful outspokenness — until, an hour later, Mr. Bulganin summarily informed the President that the form of government in the people's democracies was 'exclusively the concern of these states'. That point was touched upon no more. It was not desired to jeopardize the results of the peace conference by a dissonant mood. However, it soon turned out that there was nothing to jeopardize, for the conference bore no fruit."

"'Give us bread' and 'Out with the Russians' clamoured the toilers of the Stalin Works within the earshot of western people who had come to visit their exploiters' Industrial Fair. Is there need to ask what their motives were? You don't sing the Polish national anthem facing guns fired from tanks; you don't drench a flag in the blood of your workmates shot dead; you don't cry 'death to the communists on board the truck which carts you away under the escort of armed communist security troops — unless you've reached the end of your

## EASTERN EUROPE'S MONITOR

tether in terms of despair and endurance. Will those voices be understood in the confusion of speech prevailing in contemporary politics?"

*Peter Mottram writing in the Swiss weekly WELTWOCHTE, July 6, 1956.*

### THE EXPELLED AND THE ENSLAVED

"We are greatly concerned with two questions to which a final answer has yet to be found... Firstly, there are peoples in Europe who have perhaps suffered even more than those expelled from their homelands. In the East and South-East (of Europe) there are millions of human beings living deprived of their freedom. Millions of humans are, maybe, envying the fate of the expelled, for the latter are today living in freedom even though they have lost their homes. We ought to establish relations with these peoples and their émigré groups in exile... For we are profoundly convinced that every nation has a right to exist and that, should the chance arise one day of settling anew conditions in the East, each will have to make concessions...

"The second problem seems to me to be of equal significance. Very soon after Germany's collapse at the end of World War II, a great many far-seeing and peace-loving people began spreading their views about European integration, the European community of destiny and duty of all European nations to safeguard western values — Christianity, humanitarianism, social justice and all else connected with these. Alas, including our own people, we often found the deplorable tendency to view Europe only in the West. But surely, Europe is present also in Warsaw, in Prague, in Riga and Reval, in Budapest and Bucharest, etc; those too, are European countries. We, the expelled, when looking eastward, have no right but to wish that Europe may extend to the East in peace and freedom. For a Europe that stopped at the Elbe would only be residual Europe. As regards population figures, the bigger part of Europe is situated beyond the Elbe river. In my view, all West Europeans, no matter what nation or State they belong to, have a stake in reviving that Eastern Europe. To nurture the idea of Eastern Europe, which is, after all, but a part of universal Europe, is one of the essential tasks incumbent upon the refugees"

*From an address delivered to the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly by Dr. Baron Manteuffel-Szoege, Member of the West German Federal Parliament, Berlin, June 15, 1956.*

*"The critics of the Bonn Government, as well as that Government itself, should at last get it in their minds that the freedom of all Europe must be given priority over subsequent arbitrary delimitations of state frontiers unless we want to become guilty once again of betraying Poland's freedom and, incidentally, our own, as it had been a bad tradition to do for centuries past."*

(From an editorial by Paul Wilhelm Wenger, Bonn Editor of the RHEINISCHER MERKUR, June 15, 1956.)

# Romania — Lesson and Warning

BY MIHAIL FARCASANU\*

The totalitarian State is a maximum not only of lack of liberty but also of injustice.

Emil Bruner

Twelve years ago Romania became the victim of Soviet imperialism. It was Roosevelt's pro-Soviet policy which resulted in the occupation of Romania by the Red Army as well as its economic and political enslavement. A fortnight after Andrei Vyshinski had, at Yalta, put his name as cosignatory to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which was to ensure that the so-called "liberated" nations should have independent and freely elected governments, the same Andrei Vyshinsky, then Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, set up in Bucharest, with the application of massive military pressure, a dictatorship subservient to the Kremlin.

I witnessed that typical communist act of subversion, carried out with the help of Soviet tanks, that introduced Romania's enslavement at a time when the Romanian Army was fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Allied troops. Stalin declared cynically at Potsdam in July 1945 — only half a year following the communist *coup d'état* in Bucharest — that there could be no question of free elections in Romania. Nor did that fact prevent the governments in London and Washington from tolerating Romania's gradual colonisation and from expressly recognising it by concluding with the agents of Moscow in Bucharest a "Peace Treaty" in February 1947. A long road lay still ahead from that point to Romania's admission to UNO — a road littered with brutal terror and innumerable treaty violations committed by the communists. Economic and "cultural" cooperation with the free world that Moscow's satraps in Bucharest are nowadays boasting completes that picture of "co-existence" with a tyrannical régime imposed upon the country.

This, then, is Romania's situation put in a nutshell; that of a country grievously suffering under most cruel terrorism, ruthless mass deportations and a system of forced labor unworthy of human beings.

How can the Western world look on and continue tolerating such a state of affairs? Is it really believed that by making concessions all the time the communist urge to dominate the world can be restrained and a stable rule of law in the international sphere be guaranteed?

While bleeding white Romania and the other captive nations, the Soviet Union is deliberately building up those countries as its military bases against the West. It is the forces of NATO against which those strategic measures are directed, and it is the Christian civilisation of the Western world which youth in Eastern Europe is taught to hate.

The policy of appeasement, with all its illusions about the allegedly peaceful intentions and the humanisation of the Muscovite tyranny, has been refuted

\* Published as preface to the booklet "Rumänien Land ohne Freiheit", Comité International Pax et Liberté. Paris 7, 167, rue de l'Université. 1956.

by facts a thousandfold. The only result yielded by that policy of *rap-prochement* consists, in fact, in the moral strengthening of an inhuman terrorist régime.

Or should it be believed really that bolshevik totalitarianism can be countered with the threat of the modern weapons of mass destruction? At any rate, at a time when the production of murderous nuclear arms is progressing apace, a feeble policy of "good will" toward despotic governments, leaving on the side all consideration of ethics, represents the surest way to war.

When will it be recognised at long last that the most effective weapon with which to combat the red tyrants is to be found in the enslaved nations' longing for liberation and that what is needed is the strengthening of that will to freedom rather than weakening it by a feeble preparedness to make concessions? Or is not the call for freedom and justice a far better weapon against the Kremlin's puppets in the subjugated countries than nuclear arms? National independence and individual freedom — these are the things demanded by the peoples living between the Baltic and the Black Sea, and they are more feared by the Kremlin's rulers than military threats brandished by compliant governments. Here lies the Achilles-heel of the bolshevik dictatorship; this is the point to be tackled if western policy is to stop swinging between feeble compliance and unjustified confidence in nuclear weapons. This is the third way which alone promises success. He who speaks up bravely for the rights of the subjugated peoples thereby also protects his own freedom. The revolutionary hankering after freedom and justice of the captive nations represents a mighty pool of moral force; it is, in fact, an explosive force which could burst from within the shackles of red police rule if the western governments reinforced that will to freedom by confronting the Muscovite despots with a policy of firmness.

Unfortunately, the West is still far removed from seeing the light. On the contrary, with its display of inconsistency and compliance it supplies the bolshevik despots with those weapons of propaganda which they need for consolidating their rule. Nothing could more effectively weaken the enslaved nations' will to resist than political wavering that makes them despair of western aid in their potential struggle against their oppressors. Such wavering discourages the fighters for freedom among the subjugated nations and provides arguments for those who would represent slavery as an enduring condition. The result of that unfortunate policy is inevitably the strengthening of Soviet tyranny. Do not let us forget that the Kremlin is utilizing a block of 900 million humans subjected to the most brutal kind of forced labor and assisted by the abundant natural resources of a number of countries and, indeed, half-continent in order to pitch the uncivilised barbarity of materialism against the western world. If those responsible for the destinies of our free world continue favoring such a policy for lack of creative activity, there can hardly remain a hope for Europe's freedom to survive and total war to be permanently warded off.

The hapless fate of Rumania, for which western policy is part responsible, and its craving for the rule of law in freedom ought to be a lesson and a warning to all; for our tragedy may one day expand into a bloody tragedy to engulf Western Europe and, indeed the entire free world. Once the cup of injustice is full to the brim, freedom will be of no avail to those who refuse to





























